This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
Theodore Roosevelt’ssecond corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
ensure the promotion of humanitarian
causes across the world. John Quincy Adams’s warning that the USA
should not go abroad ‘in search of monsters to destroy’, a
dictum that had shaped US foreign policy for much of the nineteenth
century, no longer appeared to deter American activism. 2 A new spirit had infused
The embodiment of this new spirit was TheodoreRoosevelt
Stirring language and appeals to collective action were integral to the battles fought to defend empires and to destroy them. These wars of words used rhetoric to make their case. This book explores the arguments fought over empire in a wide variety of geographic, political, social and cultural contexts. Essays range from imperialism in the early 1900s, to the rhetorical battles surrounding European decolonization in the late twentieth century. Rhetoric is one of the weapons of war. Conquest was humiliating for Afrikaners but they regained a degree of sovereignty, with the granting of responsible government to the new colonies in 1907 and independence with the Act of Union of 1910. Liberal rhetoric on the Transvaal Crisis was thus neither an isolated debate nor simply the projection of existing political concerns onto an episode of imperial emergency. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's principles of intervention in response to crimes against civilization, constituted a second corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The rhetorical use of anti-imperial demonology was useful in building support for New Deal legislation. The book argues that rhetoric set out to portray the events at Mers el-Kebir within a culturally motivated framework, drawing on socially accepted 'truths' such as historic greatness and broad themes of hope. Now, over 175 years of monarchical presence in New Zealand the loyalty may be in question, devotion scoffed, the sycophantic language more demure and colloquialized, the medium of expression revolutionized and deformalized, but still the rhetoric of the realm remains in New Zealand.
Often presented as a proto-totalitarian, Rousseau has traditionally been seen as an opponent of constitutionalism, checks and balances, and the separation of powers. Following a brief overview of the history of constitutionalism (from Moses to the French Revolution), this chapter compares Rousseau's political writings with the writings of constitutionalists like James Madison and Baron de Montesquieu. It shows that Rousseau shared the view that checks and balances are necessary for preventing the corruption of power and that he advocated a system of the separation of powers (and spoke highly of the British constitution. Yet, contrary to the other constitutionalists, Rousseau was a democrat. Whereas Montesquieu and Madison wanted the elites to check the elites (through the introduction of second chambers and constitutional courts), Rousseau emphasised that the executive ought to be checked by the people. He thus anticipated the political system that was instated by the American populists (including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson). However, unlike other constitutionalists, Rousseau did not believe that institutions themselves would be sufficient for creating a good polity. He ceaselessly emphasised that political education was necessary for creating a good society.
Susanne Lachenicht, Charlotte A. Lerg, and Michael Kimmage
Kaiserreich: Wilhelm II, das Auswärtige Amt und ihr Interesse an den Deutschamerikanern’, Zeitschrift fü r Geschichtswissenschaft , 63:5 (2015), pp. 413–34; L. Butler, Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); E. Fuchs, ‘Transnational Perspectives in Higher Education’, Comparativ 22:1 (2012), pp. 7–14; David G. Haglund, ‘That Other Transatlantic “Great Rapprochement”: France, the United States, and TheodoreRoosevelt’, in H. Krabbendam and J. M. Thompson (eds), America
science. The code, though transgressed by many white hunters, from
TheodoreRoosevelt downwards, served to exclude Africans and Indians. It
underpinned game legislation which attempted to eliminate
‘cruel’ African or Indian practices. By these means the
club’s rules became national laws. Since the ‘clean
kill’ was the prime provision of the code, African and Indian
hunting techniques involving the use of
The iconography of Anglo-American inter-imperialism
, proponents of American empire in the 1890s instead focused on the invigorating effect of colonial warfare on what TheodoreRoosevelt famously chastised as ‘the over-civilized man’ who ‘fear[s] the strenuous life’.
For Roosevelt and a cabal of Republican Party leaders including Henry Cabot Lodge and Senator Albert Beveridge, martial virtues were viewed ‘as an essential ingredient of national self-renewal’ which would be the adhesive bond of American nationalism.
voluntarism.’ Philanthropy ‘was recast as an American invention’. 4
The history of philanthropy from the turn of the twentieth century is in part a history of foundations – and the biggest foundations were in the United States. They might seem to be uncontroversial. The opposition to the setting up of the Rockefeller Foundation in the early twentieth century shows how mistaken that view is. Legally, it needed the support of Congress. One line of opposition was voiced by former US president TheodoreRoosevelt: ‘no amount of charities in spending such fortunes can
turned to specimen
collecting for museums in the 1880s, built up a large personal
collection at his house in Worplesden, and acted as adviser to many
other hunters and collectors, ranging from TheodoreRoosevelt to Lionel
Rothschild. The cavalier approach to endangered species is perfectly
represented by the hunter and administrator Robert Coryndon, who shot
what were then thought to be the last two