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This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
ensure the promotion of humanitarian causes across the world. John Quincy Adams’s warning that the USA should not go abroad ‘in search of monsters to destroy’, a dictum that had shaped US foreign policy for much of the nineteenth century, no longer appeared to deter American activism. 2 A new spirit had infused US diplomacy. The embodiment of this new spirit was Theodore Roosevelt
Often presented as a proto-totalitarian, Rousseau has traditionally been seen as an opponent of constitutionalism, checks and balances, and the separation of powers. Following a brief overview of the history of constitutionalism (from Moses to the French Revolution), this chapter compares Rousseau's political writings with the writings of constitutionalists like James Madison and Baron de Montesquieu. It shows that Rousseau shared the view that checks and balances are necessary for preventing the corruption of power and that he advocated a system of the separation of powers (and spoke highly of the British constitution. Yet, contrary to the other constitutionalists, Rousseau was a democrat. Whereas Montesquieu and Madison wanted the elites to check the elites (through the introduction of second chambers and constitutional courts), Rousseau emphasised that the executive ought to be checked by the people. He thus anticipated the political system that was instated by the American populists (including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson). However, unlike other constitutionalists, Rousseau did not believe that institutions themselves would be sufficient for creating a good polity. He ceaselessly emphasised that political education was necessary for creating a good society.
of Manhattan’ to his close friend Theodore Roosevelt, writing: ‘It is because of this common regard for our strange and many-sided city that I am giving myself the pleasure of proffering to you this little volume of vignettes.’ Years later, as President of the United States, Roosevelt’s immigration restrictions were informed by popular stereotypes, many of which he had
Kaiserreich: Wilhelm II, das Auswärtige Amt und ihr Interesse an den Deutschamerikanern’, Zeitschrift fü r Geschichtswissenschaft , 63:5 (2015), pp. 413–34; L. Butler, Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); E. Fuchs, ‘Transnational Perspectives in Higher Education’, Comparativ 22:1 (2012), pp. 7–14; David G. Haglund, ‘That Other Transatlantic “Great Rapprochement”: France, the United States, and Theodore Roosevelt’, in H. Krabbendam and J. M. Thompson (eds), America
science. The code, though transgressed by many white hunters, from Theodore Roosevelt downwards, served to exclude Africans and Indians. It underpinned game legislation which attempted to eliminate ‘cruel’ African or Indian practices. By these means the club’s rules became national laws. Since the ‘clean kill’ was the prime provision of the code, African and Indian hunting techniques involving the use of
, proponents of American empire in the 1890s instead focused on the invigorating effect of colonial warfare on what Theodore Roosevelt famously chastised as ‘the over-civilized man’ who ‘fear[s] the strenuous life’. 78 For Roosevelt and a cabal of Republican Party leaders including Henry Cabot Lodge and Senator Albert Beveridge, martial virtues were viewed ‘as an essential ingredient of national self-renewal’ which would be the adhesive bond of American nationalism. 79 Gillam
of establishing their standing in what was then called the concert of nations, had signed an arbitration treaty in 1908 (which was renewed in 1914). 2 However, as the United States promoted peaceful exchanges among ‘developed’ nations, it repeatedly intervened in the Caribbean according to Theodore Roosevelt’s new reading of the Monroe Doctrine. Italy, on its part, declared
voluntarism.’ Philanthropy ‘was recast as an American invention’. 4 The history of philanthropy from the turn of the twentieth century is in part a history of foundations – and the biggest foundations were in the United States. They might seem to be uncontroversial. The opposition to the setting up of the Rockefeller Foundation in the early twentieth century shows how mistaken that view is. Legally, it needed the support of Congress. One line of opposition was voiced by former US president Theodore Roosevelt: ‘no amount of charities in spending such fortunes can
turned to specimen collecting for museums in the 1880s, built up a large personal collection at his house in Worplesden, and acted as adviser to many other hunters and collectors, ranging from Theodore Roosevelt to Lionel Rothschild. The cavalier approach to endangered species is perfectly represented by the hunter and administrator Robert Coryndon, who shot what were then thought to be the last two