August, reports in the
media indicated that, to the contrary, the participation of the private sector
had only just reached 70% of the total amount of bonds. Even the Greek
banks were reluctant to participate, owing to the losses they would incur in a
period of increased instability and reduced revenues.
The third factor which had a profoundly negative effect on the implementation of the agreement of 21 July was the confrontation between the
government and the representatives of the Troika during negotiations over the
quarterly review and subsequent funding in
The aim of this book is to assess the quarter century of political competition in the Republic of Ireland from the time of the ending of recession of the 1980s up to the 2011 general election where Ireland was ruled by the Troika and austerity was a by-word for both policy making and how many people lived their lives. This book assesses in a thematic way the forces which shaped the decisions that political elites in Ireland took over the course of this crucial quarter century in modern Irish life. It examines the nature of electoral competition in modern Ireland by focusing on a number of key themes that shaped the decisions of Irish politicians. These include the nature of coalition politics in Ireland; the payments to politicians by developers and businessmen that led to a number of tribunals of inquiry; the culture wars over divorce and abortion; the process of the economic collapse to boom and back to collapse cycle that effected the lives of so many Irish people; and the collapse of Ireland’s natural party of government, Fianna Fáil. It analyses why Irish citizens have been comfortable in continuing to vote for traditional political elites despite the failures of the Irish state and explains why it has been so difficult for new parties to emerge.
Anxiety and uncertainty mounted. The Troika report on the sustainability of
Greek sovereign debt published in October 2011, conducted as part of the fifth
quarterly review on the progress of reforms, did not bode well.1 The report
indicated that substantive change in the Greek economy was driven more by
the recession than by the structural reforms of the Memorandum. The reforms
were not stimulating the internal devaluation they were designed to achieve:
‘The situation in Greece has taken a turn for the worse’. The report indicated
Since 2010, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty have received assistance from international lenders on condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding were implemented. How did negotiations take place in this context? What room for manoeuvre did the governments of these countries have? After conditionality, to what extent were governments willing and able to roll back changes imposed on them by the international lenders? Do we find variation across governments, and, if so, why? This book addresses these questions. It explores the constraints on national executives in the five bailed out countries of the Eurozone during and beyond the crisis (2008–2019). The book’s principal idea is that, despite international market pressure and creditors’ conditionality, governments had some room for manoeuvre during a bailout and were able to advocate, resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by external actors. Under certain circumstances, domestic actors were also able to exploit the constraint of conditionality to their own advantage. The book additionally shows that after a bailout programme governments could use their discretion to reverse measures in order to attain the greatest benefits at a lower cost. It finally explores the determinants of bargaining leverage – and stresses the importance of credibility.
15th session of the
General Assembly was further complicated by two other issues; the Soviet troika proposal and the campaign to declare a formal end to colonialism.
The troika proposal
As early as the first week of August, Hammarskjöld had cabled his deputy, Cordier,
that: ‘The United Nations cannot stand for an isolated regionalism which goes against
the whole of the organisation; regionalism can be accepted as a tool of, and bridge to,
universalism but must be resisted by the organisation if it puts itself up against universalism.’108 He was referring to the
the beginning of the crisis, many countries have sought to contain
the impact of minimum wages on average wage developments and labour
costs, especially those where austerity policies were scrutinised by the Troika.
However, a significant number of countries have continued to rely on minimum wage increases to conduct their wage policy (ILO, 2015a). The contrasting approaches reflect new momentum in old debates about the role of
minimum wages in labour markets, fuelled by evidence of a slowdown in realwage growth, persistent high shares of working poor and long
Omen of a post-republic: the demon child of neoliberalism
Kieran Keohane and Carmen Kuhling
Ireland we now have
guardianship by a technocratic elite in the form of the IMF–ECB–EU Troika.
Rule by the Platonic guardian technocrats of the Troika turns out to be less an
alternative to anarcho-neoliberalism than a variation of authoritarian neoliberalism. The rule of the guardians is characterized not by interpellation of their
subjects to a new moral order of elevated and elevating ideals, but of conform-
ity to a stern and austere economic materialism and by a cultivated apathy and
indifference to feeling, which, according to Adorno and
The Republic of Ireland was one of the countries worst hit by the global financial crisis and the ensuing Eurozone crisis. It was the first EU country to go into recession and the first to require a bailout, it was effectively under the control of the troika and endured austerity measures for several years. Even though the country officially emerged from bailout conditions at the end of 2013, and recorded the highest rate of growth among EU member states in subsequent years, the social costs still weighed
is able to democratize the EU. It will not hide, as leaders of political parties dominating the European construction hope, the growing and unbearable authoritarianism of their decisions and of the non-elected institutions like the European Commission and the Troika. Our candidacy will strongly criticize the non-democratic nature of these institutions, their mode of nominating, and demand for a democratic rebuilding of the Union, respecting the sovereignty of the peoples and of the European nations.
question. Third, there was the issue of UN
prestige. As Sture Linner, Head of Civilian Operations in Congo 1960–1961, pointed
out, the UN needed a success to ‘blunt the Soviet vendetta against Hammarskjöld’
which had started with the Troika initiative.6 The Soviets continued to loudly criticise
Hammarskjöld and the UN action in the Congo, with Pravda even going as far as to
denounce the Secretary-General as a ‘butcher’ and a ‘Judas’ in February 1961 following the death of Lumumba.7 Hammarskjöld’s plan for the Congo included reconvening
the Parliament, aiding the