Within the broad context of generalised anti-government ideas and entrenched populist sentiments outlined in Chapter 2 , other ideas and frames were brought to the forefront by the Trump campaign during the course of 2015 and 2016.
At first sight, these ideas do not appear to take a structured or coherent form. Indeed, National Review , the flagship US conservative magazine, was brutally dismissive at the beginning of election year:
Trump is a philosophically unmoored political opportunist who would trash the broad conservative ideological consensus
” (Quiggin, 2012 ).
The election of Donald Trump ushered in a second round of obituaries for neoliberalism, based on his campaign rhetoric vilifying some of the elements of globalization, such as immigration and free trade, which were longstanding elements of neoliberal policy. Writing in The Guardian , Cornell West declared that the “neoliberal era in the United States ended with a neofascist bang” (West, 2016 ). In Jacobin , Nicole Aschoff predicted that the election was the end of neoliberalism's heyday (Aschoff, 2017 ) (see also Peters
This book explores how a candidate who broke with almost every single norm
governing candidate behaviour, appeared to eschew the professionalised forms of
campaigning, and who had been more or less disowned by Republican elites, prove
victorious? The focus is on Trump and his campaign; the account does not go
beyond the November election and its immediate aftermath. The book argues that
the Trump campaign, like earlier populist insurgencies, can be explained in part
by considering some defining features of US political culture and, in
particular, attitudes towards government. It explains the right-wing populism
that has been a recurrent and ingrained feature of the political process over a
long period. The book discusses structural characteristics of the American state
that appear to be of particular significance in shaping attitudes, as well as
some other ideas and frames brought to the forefront by the Trump campaign
during the course of 2015 and 2016. It also considers the shifts and swings
amongst voters and suggests that these, alongside ideas about the state and the
'entrepreneurial' efforts of the campaign, form part of the
explanation for Trump's eventual victory. The book assesses Trump's
ascendancy as a function of, and reaction to, the strategies and discourses
pursued in the years preceding 2016 by Republican Party elites.
'Trumpism' and European forms of populism are still in some ways
weakly embedded but they may intensify the battles and processes of group
competition between different constituencies.
“I alone can fix it.”
Donald J. Trump, accepting Republican nomination for President of the United States 1
The second major 2016 shock for transatlantic relations came in the United States with the Republican nomination and then electoral victory of Donald Trump – someone who had selfidentified as both a Democrat and Republican over the years and donated money to candidates of both parties. Trump raised concerns throughout the campaign as someone who played on the fears of Americans concerning both terrorism and their own financial well
the region (of which China disapproved), and helped tighten the security relationship between the Republic of South Korea (ROK) and Japan. Frustrations in Washington over North Korea intensified towards the end of Obama’s second administration as bipartisan support for a more assertive or aggressive policy grew. Obama therefore set the stage for a more aggressive American stance for his successor to the White House, yet no one anticipated the intensity of the rhetoric which President Donald Trump would employ as he threatened ‘fire and fury’ and total annihilation
Hello, everybody. This is not Frank Underwood, it’s Barack Obama.
Barack Obama 1
This book analyses the period since the turn of the millennium – television’s second golden age. This period covers the world politics of the US during the presidencies of Bush, Obama, and Trump. When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001, it was far from obvious that he would pursue two large regional wars and an extensive counter-terrorism campaign. He was elected on the basis of a promise to do less in the world, if at all possible. His
Washington’s painful search for a credible China policy
of Donald Trump as president of the United States in late 2016 brought something of a sea change to US foreign policy. Yet it remains true that Washington needs to develop a viable policy based on today’s – and tomorrow’s – realities. No such policy is in sight.
From a Western perspective, it can, naturally, be tempting to dream of travelling back in time to an era when China was catching up rather than constituting an economic, military, political and even systems challenge. There have been critical moments. Notably, China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 provided
As both candidate and throughout his first two years as president to early 2019, Donald Trump employed unilateral actions and flamboyant posturing in upending the strong commitment to positive diplomacy and political engagement of regional governments and organisations of the previous administrations of Barack Obama. Two years into his presidential term, Trump remained avowedly unpredictable as he junked related policy transparency, carefully measured responses, and avoidance of dramatic action, linkage or spill-over among competing interests
Donald Trump’s 2016 election threatened a revolution in US Asia policy. Since the early years of the Cold War, the United States has been a constant presence in the region’s security setting. 1 American military power has been the pre-eminent force in the region, organised through a series of bilateral alliances and quasi-alliance guarantees. This presence was part of the larger US Cold War grand strategy in which Washington sought to ensure a favourable strategic balance in Western Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. 2 Although the Obama
The return of the United States to the Indo-Pacific is one of the most significant elements of former President Barack Obama’s foreign policy legacy. He ordered a bold alteration of course, in the midst of an economic storm, to save the crumbling maritime empire against continental China’s advancing influence. As will be shown, this occurred as part of Obama’s efforts to rejuvenate the United States’ Asia Pacific presence, a strategy his successor Donald Trump built on throughout the relabelled Indo-Pacific. Even so, the United States has long