Joseph Heller

Americans would consider an attack on Israel as Communist aggression and defend it in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine. 37 US policy fluctuated between assuming the United States would have been able to maintain control of the Middle East if Israel did not exist and assuming the Arabs were unstable and could not be trusted, but Israel could and should receive support. Israel had achieved some of its

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Tentative bridge-building to China during the Johnson years
Author: Michael Lumbers

This is a comprehensive study of US policy towards China during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, a critical phase of the Cold War immediately preceding the dramatic Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s. Based on a wide array of recently declassified government documents, it challenges the popular view that Johnson's approach to China was marked by stagnation and sterility, exploring the administration's relationship to both the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution. By documenting Johnson's contributions to the decision-making process, the book offers a new perspective on both his capacity as a foreign-policy leader and his role in the further development of the Cold War.

Abstract only
Towards a ‘tolerable state of order’?
Thomas R. Seitz

policies were increasingly oriented toward internal security in a broad sense. This approach featured efforts to help recipients meet economic and political aspirations through economic development assistance and through attempts to foster the sound leadership practices and political institutions that would in turn promote popular legitimacy. During this period, US policy was intended to help favoured leaders or political factions win the internal political competition that characterized so many developing countries, not simply to suppress that competition. Normative

in The evolving role of nation-building in US foreign policy
Eisenhower and the Overseas Internal Security Program
Thomas R. Seitz

agents thereof, holding these countries together and ensuring that their peoples were left to get on with their own development. Less attention was devoted to ensuring that these peoples had the means to build their own societies along Western lines, as substantial public-sector development assistance was still missing from American foreign aid efforts. The findings of the OCB survey, indicating that the developing world found the communist example more attractive, provided something of a jolt to US policy-makers, but it did not make them look beyond their ideological

in The evolving role of nation-building in US foreign policy
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

with Nixon in 1969–70 he had personally irritated the president. His appointment of John Freeman, an ardent critic of Nixon, as UK ambassador to Washington in 1968 was especially unwelcome.9 Personal characteristics aside, Wilson’s insistence that Britain keep its accelerated plans for an East of Suez withdrawal, along with his unwillingness to offer a greater commitment to NATO, only vexed US policy-makers further.10 For Wilson, the fashion in which Washington ignored his efforts at 04_Strained_partnership_128-174.indd 129 06/11/2013 13:50 130 A strained

in A strained partnership?
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

largely ignored them. Wilson was right to conclude that the United States had little intention of permanently severing the defence relationship it had with London. However, he miscalculated just how seriously the defence cutbacks affected how US policy-makers viewed the United Kingdom as an ally. As his successor, James Callaghan, would find out, this would have serious consequences for British interests during the 1976−77 IMF crisis. Book organisation The book is divided into four core chapters which are, broadly speaking, chronologically organised and focus upon the

in A strained partnership?
David P. Calleo

allies. But the trend towards a more balanced and autonomous transatlantic relationship seems unlikely to be reversed. Russia’s reaction US policies that irritated the Europeans in the 1990s infuriated the Russians. Arguably, NATO’s first enlargement – to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – was not very significant to the Russians. They seemed less interested in blocking the enlargement than in extracting as many concessions from it as possible. Similarly, the Russians did not so much oppose the Kosovo intervention as insist upon joining it, and thus limiting

in Limiting institutions?
European Union policy in South-east Europe
Anthony Welch

evident in Kosovo, which will be used to illustrate the problems in resolving these issues. Under the two administrations of George W. Bush, and in the aftermath of September 11, US policy priorities have shifted from the Balkans towards the Middle East and the ‘War on Terror’. Thus, the EU, already a large contributor to the region, has now assumed the primary position in funding and managing

in The security dimensions of EU enlargement
Abstract only
Stephen Benedict Dyson

it very difficult to recant the decision or resile from its consequences: ‘A confident public voice is the price war leaders must pay’, noted James Naughtie of Blair’s situation, ‘however quavering it may sound inside his own head.’1 The dynamics that had emerged in the run up to war – an eager prime minister seeking to rationalize and multilateralise US policy without having a very compelling hand to play – continued into the postwar phase. The extent to which Iraq had damaged Blair’s standing in the UK, but conversely had strengthened his core foreign policy

in The Blair identity
America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo crisis 1960– 1964

In 1962, Congo was catapulted into the international consciousness as the scene of conflict and confusion when a civil and constitutional crisis erupted just a week after the independence ceremony. The breakdown of law and order began when the Congolese army, the Force Publique, mutinied against their Belgian officers, leading to violence and chaos in the capital Leopoldville. This book reinterprets the role of the United Nations (UN) Organization in this conflict by presenting a multidimensional view of how the UN operated in response to the crisis. The United States (US) and Britain were directly involved with formulating UN Congo policy, through an examination of the Anglo-American relationship. The book analyses how the crisis became positioned as a lightning rod in the interaction of decolonisation with the Cold War, and wider relations between North and South. It establishes why, in 1960, the outbreak of the Congo crisis and its successive internationalisation through UN intervention was an important question for Anglo-American relations. The book highlights the changing nature of the UN from 1960 to 1961. It focuses on the emergence of a new US policy in New York. Discussing the role of United Nations activities in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo), it explains why military incursions into Katanga in September, and again in December of 1961, proved damaging to the Anglo-American relationship. The invigoration of the Secretariat, demands of the Afro-Asian bloc, Operation UNOKAT, and efforts to construct a Western friendly regime in the Congo are also discussed.