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This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
, the rise of Nazism, and the economic crisis and sense of national humiliation which had helped bring it about, were largely a consequence of Britain’s treatment of Germany at the Versailles conference. Germany’s reaction to this treatment, even if part of that reaction was an unacceptable anti-Semitism, was a natural consequence. The Manchester Quakers sought to retain a friendly relationship with Germany, including an annual exchange of students, until the outbreak of war. While the London Quakers were prepared from 1933 to lend organised support to refugees
struck him as unrefined and indolent. He sold his magnificent library of 20,000 books, assembled over the previous two decades, to the Japanese for £35,000; after his years of diligent care in the library of his courtyard house on Morrison Street, they were damaged by flood almost as soon as they were brought ashore in Tokyo. Becoming seriously unwell during a trip to Europe in 1919, in which he represented China at the disastrous Versailles conference which would lead to the protests of the May Fourth Movement, he consulted a long list of
victory of the entente powers in the First World War. At the Versailles Conference after the war, the Americans made the redrawing of the European map conditional upon the consent of the governed, sometimes in referendums and occasionally in elections. While he did not use the term “self-determination of the people”, Wilson made clear that peoples “Should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous
5 New mobilities in construction I n December 1920, The Times served up a surprise to its readers. In recent years, they had been treated to news of the Russian Revolution and the break-up of the old world order at the Versailles Conference. It now seemed that revolutionary ferment was getting closer to home; first with a disruptive miners’ strike and then with a new, disturbing headline, ‘Buildings seized by the unemployed – Town Halls now guarded’.1 Unemployed workers in London had occupied a dozen public buildings: drill halls, town halls and swimming baths
issues until the end of the Versailles Conference. They also provided a number of key personnel at Versailles itself, especially Tyrrell, Nicolson, Vansittart and Rex Leeper. The PID was clearly initially seen as suspect both by the Foreign Office establishment and by the Establishment in the wider sense. This was a group of ‘experts’, a genre viewed with great suspicion at the time, and moreover a group of sixteen experts who were of a very ‘catholic’ background. The need for it was nonetheless widely realised by the end of the Conference, and General Smuts, who
Versailles, and those who designed and implemented it, form a central part of his overall critique. One way of responding to his critique is obviously to examine how the individuals involved in the elaboration of the Treaty and Covenant actually behaved. As a participant himself, although rather more as one on the sidelines, he must have been aware of the currents that were flowing at Versailles in 1919 and it is reasonable to expect that he was influenced by them. During the key part of the Versailles Conference, between March and July MUP/Williams/ch2 59 23/10/98, 11
January 1919 as a technical adviser to the British delegation and unofficial counsellor/translator to Prince Feisal’s Arab delegation. 6 Kipling strongly encouraged him to write up his account of the Arab Revolt, which Lawrence commenced towards the end of the Versailles Conference. The same year, through his Oxford connections he fell into the clutches of Lionel Curtis – former member of Lord Milner
process running up huge debts which then informed the Versailles Conference and the ‘Carthaginian Peace’ imposed on Germany. President Wilson came with his fourteen-point plan for a post-war world of international cooperation but was unwilling to forgive allied debts, and the British and French in turn demanded reparations from Germany. By this time, Keynes had become the principal Treasury representative. He saw the negotiations first hand and was contemptuous both of the leading participants and of the final Treaty. Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919
arrangements this next week, by which students and professors in all the universities of the kingdom can borrow books free of expense, and without expense of transportation to us, through the library of the university of Rome. 61 By the time of the Versailles conference, Ambassador Page’s position