At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European Union (EU) stands out as an important regional organization. This book focuses on the influence of the World Bank on the EU development cooperation policy, with special emphasis on the Lomé Convention. It explains the influence of trade liberalisation on EU trade preferences and provides a comparative analysis of the content and direction of the policies developed towards the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), the Mediterranean, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. It looks at the trade-related directorates and their contribution to the phenomenon referred as 'trade liberalisation'. This includes trends towards the removal or elimination of trade preferences and the ideology underlying this reflected in and created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO). The book examines the role of the mass media because the media are supposed to play a unique role in encouraging political reactions to humanitarian emergencies. The bolting on to development 'policy' of other continents, and the separate existence of a badly run Humanitarian Office (ECHO), brought the lie to the Maastricht Treaty telling us that the EU really had a coherent development policy. The Third World in general, and Africa in particular, are becoming important components in the EU's efforts to develop into a significant international player. The Cotonou Agreement proposes to end the preferential trade margins accorded to non-least developed ACP states in favour of more liberal free trade agreements strongly shaped by the WTO agenda.
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
many mistakes with respect to multilateralism. A significant one was to
give less attention to the WTO [the WorldTradeOrganisation]. He focused much more on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership than global agreements. The Republicans also invested in the FTAA [Free
Trade Area of the Americas], but, in my opinion, there was more commitment to economic
multilateralism under Bush than under Obama.
With another Republican president, the pendulum might have swung back anyway, but it is
swinging fast with Trump. Now, I am not sure which sectors of American
including but not exclusively the WorldTradeOrganisation (WTO) Agreements,
re ect the ascendancy in political and economic spheres of a free trade
orthodoxy. In turn, they play their own part in embedding and reinforcing
that orthodoxy in international economic relations. However, the negotiating
framework established in accordance with the principles of state
sovereignty, economic self-determination, sovereign
‘Common But Differentiated Debates: Environment, Labour and
the WorldTradeOrganisation’ 45 ICLQ ( 1986 ) 592.
See, e.g. H. Cullen ‘The Limits of
International Trade Mechanisms in Enforcing Human Rights: The Case
of Child Labour’ 7 Int’l J. of Children’s
Rights ( 1999 ) 1; J. M. Diller and D
4.2 Taxation under the WorldTradeOrganisation
Taxation is implicated as a
potential trade barrier under several different WTO obligations. As the
WTO now has 135 Members and 36 observers, the obligations arising from
WTO obligations are an important source of limitations on tax
jurisdiction, regardless of whether WTO rules re ect in any respects
Governed by the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in GATT in GATT
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
1994 . For an account, see e.g. P. T. B. Kohona
‘Dispute Resolution Under The WorldTradeOrganisation: An
Overview’ 28(2) JWT ( 1994 ) 5; E
ratification of the US–Russia START I Treaty reducing intercontinental
nuclear missiles; the entry into force of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty limiting troop levels all over Europe; and NATO’s
Partnership for Peace programme, also including Russia.
The European Union’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) collapsed
in 1993 but was revived in a more flexible form, permitting plans for
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to proceed. The conclusion of
the Uruguay Round and the establishment in 1995 of the WorldTradeOrganisation meant a major push for Europe toward
This chapter seeks to identify the main determinants of the European Union (EU) trade policy in relation to the developing countries. It asks why the EU has adopted trade liberalisation rather than any other option for the future of its relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, and in stark contrast to the previous policies. The chapter looks at the general policy environment in which EU policy towards the Lomé countries has been made. It then looks at the trade-related directorates and their contribution and response to the phenomenon referred to here in shorthand as 'trade liberalisation'. This includes trends towards the removal or elimination of trade preferences and the ideology underlying this, which is reflected in and created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO). The chapter provides an analysis of the political interests at stake in the trade liberalisation debate.
The potential and limits of EU development cooperation policy
Anna K. Dickson
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on concepts discussed in this book. The book assesses the record of development cooperation from the Treaty of Rome to Lomé, and beyond to Cotonou. It also assesses the implications of the trends identified for future development policy and to conceptualise the role of European Union (EU) external action in the realm of development. Development policy constitutes a key aspect of EU foreign policy. The negotiations for future African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EU trade aim to create free trade areas between the European Community (EC) and sub-regions of the ACP group. The Cotonou Agreement proposes finally to end the preferential trade margins accorded to non-least developed ACP states in favour of more liberal free trade agreements strongly shaped by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agenda.
long-term Brexit impact, percentage of GDP over ten
Institute for Government.
The other major scenario modelled
was the “hard” Brexit, where WorldTradeOrganisation
rules come into force. In this scenario, tariffs of between 1.5% and 19%