In 1997, Stuart Clark published the first monograph since the time of Jules Michelet to focus on pre-modern ideas about witches. The language of belief in witchcraft studies betrays an anachronistic, modernist and dismissive approach to a mental universe quite different from our own. This book makes the male witch visible, to construct him as a historical subject, as a first step toward a deeper understanding of the functions and role of gender in pre-modern European witch-hunting and ideas about witches. The overtly political dimension to the study of witches in early modern Europe demands a high level of consciousness and reflexivity regarding language, representation, and meaning. William Monter provides a wealth of data about male witches, in an 'unremarkable province' close to 'the heart of northern and western Europe'. Here, men comprised the majority of those tried and executed for witchcraft. The book examines cases in which men were accused of witchcraft. The examples are drawn from several different regions, in order to test conventional generalisations about male witches. The agency theory posits that actors always have choices; 'agent-centred' morality proposes a novel twist on both traditional Kantian internalist categories. The problems of both male and female witches' agency and selfhood are discussed. The book also presents data compiled from ten canonical works, and a brief discussion of demonological illustrations. Finally, it addresses the question of what it means to label a man as a witch within a framework that explicitly and implicitly feminised witchcraft.
civil courts of late medieval Valencia. In doing so, it is clear that socioeconomic status and immigration greatly influenced women’s marital
strategies, providing labouring-status women with the ability to act
on their own behalf in choosing spouses, gathering marital assets and
protecting that property once married.
Use of agencytheory
Although often utilized by historians to characterize the actions of those
deemed powerless in the past, agencytheory is inherently problematic in
many ways. Most notably, the concept of agency carries with it distinct
of resistance and the role of the accused witch in
shaping the narrative of his or her confession. To speak as if confession
under torture were simply inevitable erases the struggles of accused
witches. 1 On the other
hand, it is possible to take the recognition of agency too far,and to
distort experiences and motivations. Women and men were influenced by the
operations of power, but also influenced these in turn. Agency
This book explains the direct link between the structure of the corporation and its limitless capacity for ecological destruction. It argues that we need to find the most effective means of ending the corporation’s death grip over us. The corporation is a problem, not merely because it devours natural resources, pollutes and accelerates the carbon economy. As this book argues, the constitutional structure of the corporation eradicates the possibility that we can put the protection of the planet before profit. A fight to get rid of the corporations that have brought us to this point may seem an impossible task at the moment, but it is necessary for our survival. It is hardly radical to suggest that if something is killing us, we should over-power it and make it stop. We need to kill the corporation before it kills us.
Persuasion and the value of a concept to mainstreaming co-operation
this sense, ‘agency’ is not dissimilar to the agency of contemporary
economics. Here, an agent is an individual or firm acting at the behest
of a principal, another individual or firm;14 the authority to act is thus
delegated by the principal, even as she expects to benefit from the action
of the agent, who usually therefore requires remuneration. The widespread contemporary nature of this phenomenon has spawned a branch
of rational-choice economics, ‘agencytheory’, itself involving a number
of different approaches, designed to analyse problems of control where
( 1984 ), ‘ The new economics of organization ’, American Journal of Political Science , 28 : 4 , 739–77 .
Nielson , Daniel L.
( 2003 ), ‘ Delegation to international organizations: Agencytheory and World Bank environmental reform ’, International Organization , 57 : 2 , 241–76 .
Nordås , Ragnhild
poorly economically, yet it is important that
they be kept in public hands for social, economic, or environmental reasons, a limited amount of competition – with private or even
other public enterprises – may serve to improve performance.
The second issue is that of autonomy (sometimes referred to as
managerial or operational autonomy) and its effect on efficiency. The
focus on the effects of autonomy has its roots in various management
theories and schools of thought, including agencytheory, property
rights theory, and New Public Management (NPM). ‘These theories
. Brown et al., Moving beyond Self-Interest , is an edited collection which provides interdisciplinary perspective. Self-interest is also discussed in academic journals; there are recent contributions in fields such as political science, economics and psychology, e.g. Douglas A . Bosse and Robert A . Phillips ( 2016 ) ‘ AgencyTheory and Bounded Self-Interest ’, Academy of Management Review , 41 : 2 , 276–97 ; Valerie Braithwaite ( 2009 ) ‘ Attitudes to Tax Policy: Politics, Self-interest and Social Values ’, Research Note 9, Centre for Tax System
. Agencytheory, which emerges from foundational anthropological and sociological work by Bourdieu, Giddens, and colleagues, takes the position that individual members of society can creatively manipulate the larger social structures that frame and order their relationships, their practices, and their embodied experiences (Dobres 2000 ; Dornan 2002 ). Archaeologists working within this framework have re-oriented attention onto non-normative features, activities, or traces in the archaeological record – effectively those elements that might be read as showing evidence
, ‘Afterword’ in Steven M. Cohen and Paula E. Hyman (eds),
The Jewish Family: Myths and Reality (New York, 1986), pp. 233.
6 James, Family Capitalism, pp. 41–71.
7 Freedeman, ‘Joint stock business organizations’.
the family business
8 Le Bret, Frères d’Eichthal, p. 384. Elisabeth Paulet makes the same point in ‘The
Péreire Brothers: bankers or speculators? An interpretation through agencytheory paradigm’, Journal of European Economic History 35 (2006), 476.
9 Panthéon des Illustrations Françaises au XIXe