(Nordin and Weissmann 2018 ).
From a political point of view the impact of the financial crisis added fuel to populist right-wing arguments against migration. Since 2016 many countries have started to face the empowerment of populist parties, politicians or ideologies, either through referendums such as the one on Brexit (June 2016) or through elections as in the US (November 2016). These pro-nationalist and anti-globalisation movements have severely criticised the EU project and in particular the idea of an “Ever Closer Union”. Within the EU there
’s currency of choice and the US market is
the world’s largest, richest and most open. For all of these reasons,
anti-globalisation efforts single out the United States; anti-globalisation
protests are often indistinguishable from anti-American rants.
Sixth and finally, there is a global demographic shift taking place. The
post-war generation in Europe, Korea, Japan and Australia is leaving
centre stage. The impact of the passing of the generational torch cannot
be underestimated. Previously, governing elites in Western Europe and
the United States all shared the historical
dissenting voices are almost never heard. The ‘war on
terrorism’ is currently one of a great many kinds of political
discourses, and it is attempting – with considerable success
– to become hegemonic over alternative discourses, such as
pacifist, human rights based, feminist, environmentalist or
Importantly, discourses, particularly political
of names, including the ‘global justice movement’ (e.g. Bogad, 2016 ), the ‘movement of movements’ (e.g. Harvie, Milburn, Trott et al., 2005 ; Klein, 2002 ) or less charitably the ‘anti-globalisation movement’ 1 – has two intertwining and mutually constitutive purposes. On the one hand, it seeks to challenge the violence that sustains a system in which a handful of national governments claim a global mandate for market-led programmes of development (cf. Blair, 2005 ). On the other, it attempts to create alternative modes of association and affinity that reach
, security and political success. This order is already under attack from multiple sources: domestic populism, anti-globalisation, the rise of authoritarian states, and income inequality, among others. A United States which does not proactively engage in the process of managing this transition may find itself on the wrong side of change with the cards stacked against it when the dust settles.
China: The biggest winner
Xi Jinping has made it clear that China aspires to its share of global leadership, pledging the ‘renewal of the Chinese nation’ and ensuring what he sees
and rather unstable property (Townshend 2002 : 7).
After all, just as German citizens worked in munitions factories during
World War II, it is possible to argue that the civilian workers in the
Pentagon could not strictly be considered ‘innocent’.
Post-modernists and anti-globalisation critics have demonstrated that
everyone is implicated to some degree in global structures of power and
that the attacks could be read as being
connected to American foreign policy. The attackers are thus denied a
voice and their reasons are deconstructed and replaced by other (more
acceptable) reasons (see Lincoln 2002 : 27). The
language implies that as the attacks were ‘totally
irrelevant’ to the Middle East conflict, they must have been
caused by hatred of democracy and freedom, anti-globalisation