This book reviews a variety of approaches to the study of the European Union's foreign policy. Much analysis of EU foreign policy contains theoretical assumptions about the nature of the EU and its member states, their inter-relationships, the international system in which they operate and the nature of European integration. The book outlines the possibilities for the use of discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy. It sets out to explore the research problem using a political-cultural approach and seeks to illuminate the cognitive mind-maps with which policy-makers interpret their political 'realities'. The book provides an overview and analysis of some of the non-realist approaches to international relations and foreign policy, and proposes an analytical framework with which to explore the complex interplay of factors affecting European foreign policy. The book suggests one way of seeking theoretical parsimony without sacriﬁcing the most deﬁning empirical knowledge which has been generated about Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) over the years. It argues that while the sui generis nature of CFSP presents an acute problem for international relations theory, it is less pronounced with regard to traditional integration theory. The book discusses the dimensions of European foreign policy-making with reference to the case of arms export controls. Situated at the interface between European studies and international relations, it outlines how the EU relates to the rest of the world, explaining its effort towards creating a credible, effective and principled foreign, security and defence policy.
The European union’s policy in the field of arms export controls
to the case of armsexportcontrols.
EPC in the 1970s and 1980s had already
allowed the EC member states to build channels of communication and methods
of socialisation among their diplomats in order to define common objectives
and coordinate the first joint diplomatic actions (de Schoutheete de
Tervarent 1986 ; Pijpers 1991 ; Nuttall 1997 ). The CFSP continued this
criticised for not going far enough. The claim that the Code is
‘the most comprehensive international armsexportcontrol
regime’ 24 is probably true. However, this is due to a lack of
competition, rather than to it necessarily achieving its objective, to
make a significant impact on combating diversions, the risks of
diversions and proliferation. 25 For example, the Code still only calls for
February 15, 2019) , https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf , p.
192; U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Legislative Counsel, ArmsExportControl Act (Public Law 90–629) (As Amended Through P.L. 115–232, Enacted
August 13, 2018) , https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Arms%20Export%20Control%20Act.pdf , p. 15.
G. T. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of decision: Explaining the
Cuban missile crisis (Reading, MA: Longman, 2nd edn, 1999
Partisan politics, carte blanche and policy variation
for which no contract existed and which was not mentioned in joint statements.
Furthermore, there was no notification to the Department of State or the Senate.
In May 2019, President Trump invoked emergency authority codified in the ArmsExportControl Act, citing ‘the need to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East’, to offer the UAE immediate sales of precision-guided missiles worth $1 billion. The same month, the State Department