Once held up as a 'poster child' for untrammeled capitalist globalisation, the Irish Republic has more recently come to represent a cautionary tale for those tempted to tread the same neoliberal path. The crash in the world economy had especially grave repercussions for Ireland, and a series of austerity measures has seen the country endure the most substantial 'adjustment' ever experienced in a developed society during peacetime. This book delineates the reactionary course that Ireland has followed since the ignominious demise of the Celtic Tiger. It argues that the forces of neoliberalism have employed the economic crisis they caused to advance policies that are in their own narrow interests, and that the host of regressive measures imposed since the onset of global recession has fundamentally restructured Irish society. The book discusses the mechanisms by which finance in Ireland sustains and reproduces itself, in particular how it was able to protect itself during the 2008 crisis. Property was at the centre of the second phase of the Celtic Tiger boom after US investment in manufacturing began to decline, leading to the Irish economic crash. The years since the onset of the recession in Ireland in 2008 have been characterised not by passivity and quietism but by extreme violence. In December 2009 as part of the first wave of austerity, the Community Development Project was informed that the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs proposed not to continue funding the project beyond the end of 2009.
Europe open to a world that resists capitalistglobalisation and open to the world … a democratic Europe’ being more akin to slogans that real policies (European Left, 2004 ).
In a similar spirit, the 2004 manifesto was a very broad, aspirational and detail-free document. It argued that ‘new hope’ and a ‘new option for a change’ were emerging in Europe, which was ‘a space for the rebirth of struggles for another society’. This new hope would be based on the ‘values and traditions of socialism, communism and the labour movement, of feminism, the feminist movement and
of globalisation,2 these factors also force us to rethink many key aspects
of radical political theory. This refers not only to the fact that radical political
struggles can no longer be confined to national spaces and concerns, but also to
the new forms of identification and activism central to these struggles. I will
explore this in greater detail later; however, it is clear that capitalistglobalisation
increasingly forms the horizon of radical politics today. So far in the book, I
have touched on a number of different aspects of this horizon: the emergence of
This book explores the development of Robert Lepage’s distinctive approach to stage direction in the early (1984–94) and middle (1995–2008) stages of his career, arguing that globalisation had a defining effect in shaping his aesthetic and professional trajectory. It combines examination of Lepage’s theatremaking techniques with discussion of his work’s effects on audiences, calling on Lepage’s own statements as well as existing scholarship and critical response. In addition to globalisation theory, the book draws on cinema studies, queer theory, and theories of affect and reception. As such, it offers an unprecedented conceptual framework, drawing together what has previously been a scattered field of research. Each of six chapters treats a particular aspect of globalisation, using this as a means to explore one or more of Lepage’s productions. These aspects include the relationship of the local (in Lepage’s case, his background in Québec) to the global; the place of individual experience within global late modernity; the effects of screen media on human perception; the particular affect of ‘feeling global’; the place of branding in contemporary creative systems; and the relationship of creative industries to neoliberal economies. Making theatre global: Robert Lepage’s original stage productions will be of interest to scholars of contemporary theatre, advanced-level undergraduates with an interest in the application of theoretical approaches to theatrical creation and reception, and arts lovers keen for new perspectives on one of the most talked-about theatre artists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
At a time when monolingualist claims for the importance of ‘speaking English’ to the national order continue louder than ever, even as language diversity is increasingly part of contemporary British life, literature becomes a space to consider the terms of linguistic belonging. Bad English examines writers including Tom Leonard, James Kelman, Suhayl Saadi, Raman Mundair, Daljit Nagra, Xiaolu Guo, Leila Aboulela, Brian Chikwava, and Caroline Bergvall, who engage multilingually, experimentally, playfully, and ambivalently with English’s power. Considering their invented vernaculars and mixed idioms, their dramatised scenes of languaging – languages learned or lost, acts of translation, scenes of speaking, the exposure and racialised visibility of accent – it argues for a growing field of contemporary literature in Britain pre-eminently concerned with language’s power dynamics, its aesthetic potentialities, and its prosthetic strangeness. Drawing on insights from applied linguistics and translation studies as well as literary scholarship, Bad English explores contemporary arguments about language in Britain – in debates about citizenship or education, in the media or on Twitter, in Home Office policy and asylum legislation – as well as the ways they are taken up in literature. It uncovers both an antagonistic and a productive interplay between language politics and literary form, tracing writers’ articulation of linguistic alienation and ambivalence, as well as the productivity and making-new of radical language practices. Doing so, it refutes the view that language difference and language politics are somehow irrelevant to contemporary Britain and instead argues for their constitutive centrality to the work of novelists and poets whose inside/outside relationship to English in its institutionalised forms is the generative force of their writing.
than a mere historical curiosity, for the movement seems to prefigure
some of the preoccupations and interests of a new generation of young
activists, who have risen up around the world in protest against such
issues as capitalistglobalisation, the threat of ecological catastrophe,
and resurgent tendencies towards war and militarism. Some of the cultural and political means through which contemporary youth demonstrate their discontents bear a family resemblance to those employed by
RAR between 1976 and 1981. With this in mind, we might like to consider how RAR
states like the United States, as architects of globalisation. The marketplace, the logic of capital accumulation as stipulated by Marx, is the
architect. In fact, it was suggested on more than one occasion by Rees that,
from the perspective of nation-states, globalisation has happened by accident.
States are fundamentally reactive to the interests of capital. In general, then, the
SWP did not look to nation-states to reverse capitalistglobalisation. While this
approach was obviously coloured by the perceived undesirability of reversing
globalisation, Rees also argued
transfer of power in knowledge creation from lay practitioners to experts through
the industrialisation of agriculture has, according to Fonte (2008), interrupted the evolution of Europe’s rich stock of lay knowledge in recent decades.
Neoliberal, capitalistglobalisation has strongly influenced the sector with farm
development trajectories focusing on achieving economies of scale to input
cheap commodities to food processing and retailing multinationals. As Massey
(2005) opines, this logic turns geography into history; places unsuited to the
dominant model of
bankruptcy of the Fortress Europe approach; in favour of a European peace policy; and for the abolition of NATO’ (Hudson, 2012 : 50). The Athens Congress also specifically targeted the Bolkestein Directive (on the liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the lengthening of the working week) as the fruit of ‘capitalistglobalisation’ and contrasted these measures with the goals of full employment, reduction in working hours and the importance of collective labour contracts (Calossi, 2011 : 201).
The theses for the second Congress
‘there is no alternative’ to economic liberalism, that
free markets, free trade and capitalistglobalisation are the best and only way for
modern societies to develop. This has been the Conservative mantra over the past
thirty years, but it has also been to a large extent that of New Labour between
the mid-1990s and 2008.
Yet, one of the defining characteristics of traditional social democracy in
Europe had always been a critique of capitalism. From its origins as a revolutionary political movement in continental Europe (notably in Germany), social