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This chapter discusses the extent to which the collective security system established in the Charter could function in the 1990s in spite of the non-implementation of Arts. 43 et seq . of the Charter. Alongside the dilatation of the notion of threat to peace, the frequent authorisation of the use of force granted to Member States is certainly
Although at variance with the collective security system envisaged in the Charter, the so-called authorisation practice guarantees a minimum of international control over the use of force. Its functioning, however, depends on the lasting agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council. As soon as such an agreement fades away, States may be
This Chapter describes the collective security system as envisaged in the United Nations Charter. It deals with the legal basis of the Security Council’s powers and the conditions under which such powers can be exercised. These powers are then analysed following the two-fold distinction between non-military and military measures. Particular
This book is the collective use of force within the framework of the Charter, whose ambitious project is based on the premise that armed force can be resorted to exclusively in the common interest. It begins with a short discussion of the powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the conditions under which these powers may be exercised. The United States, supported by its NATO allies, or at least some of them, openly challenged the authority of the Security Council and attempted to downgrade its authorisation from a legal requirement to a matter of political convenience. The book deals with the use of force by States either individually or jointly. Through the lenses of the interaction between the Charter and customary international law, it considers the evolution of the right to self-defence, the only exception expressly provided for in the Charter, and the possible re-emergence of other exceptions. The book focuses in particular on the controversial question concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in self-defence and of the pre-emptive military action against threats posed by these weapons. Often referring to the recent Iraqi crisis, it further deals with the collective and unilateral means at the disposal of the United Nations and its members to enforce disarmament obligations and tackle the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The collective security system and the unilateral or joint use of force are not sealed compartments. Their interaction is manifest in Art. 51 of the Charter, which temporally limits the right to self-defence until the Security Council discharges its responsibilities. Perhaps less evident, but nonetheless equally important, is the function of
describes the collective security system as envisaged in the Charter. It begins with a short discussion of the powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the conditions under which these powers may be exercised. The discussion touches upon the Security Council’s powers related to measures not involving the use of force in order
to mitigate the non-operation of the chapter VII collective security system through the use of the veto 112 and has been increasingly used in the 1980s and 1990s. 113 The scope of peacekeeping In 1992 the then Secretary-General described the conditions of success for peacekeeping as: a clear and practicable mandate, party co-operation in implementing that mandate, the
Concluding remarks The expectations that arose at the end of the Cold War of revitalising the ambitious collective security system established under the Charter proved to be misplaced. On only one occasion, during the Somali crisis, did the United Nations directly take the military action necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Although carried out by the armed forces
. It was certainly too weak to shield small states from integrative nationalism and the imperial ambitions of great powers. The concert system was not an environment that could support a reversal of the trend of declining numbers of small states. However, the concert system did not lead to the abolishment of all small states, either. It had few supportive features that helped small states to survive, but it was not geared towards the complete destruction of small statehood. 228 Small states in world politics Inducing proliferation: collective security systems
This book explores the evolving African security paradigm in light of the multitude of diverse threats facing the continent and the international community today and in the decades ahead. It challenges current thinking and traditional security constructs as woefully inadequate to meet the real security concerns and needs of African governments in a globalized world. The continent has becoming increasingly integrated into an international security architecture, whereby Africans are just as vulnerable to threats emanating from outside the continent as they are from home-grown ones. Thus, Africa and what happens there, matters more than ever. Through an in-depth examination and analysis of the continent’s most pressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges—from failing states and identity and resource conflict to terrorism, health, and the environment—it provides a solid intellectual foundation, as well as practical examples of the complexities of the modern African security environment. Not only does it assess current progress at the local, regional, and international level in meeting these challenges, it also explores new strategies and tools for more effectively engaging Africans and the global community through the human security approach.