Countering terrorism effectively and at the same time ethically presents a formidable challenge. In the pursuit of an effective strategy
counterterrorist forces are often led to adopt morally questionable
means. The realist might argue that this is further evidence of
the fundamental incompatibility of war and morality; terrorism
cannot be defeated without betraying (albeit temporarily and in
extremis) the values that the counterterrorist is fighting to uphold.
And yet a case can be made (partly on realist grounds) that the
most effective way
This book analyses the evolving Anglo-American counter-terror propaganda strategies that spanned the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as reconstruction, between 2001 and 2008. It offers insights into the transformation beyond this period, tracking many key developments as much as possible up to the time of writing (2013) and providing a retrospective on the 'war on terror'. Using empirical data located within multiple spheres, the book draws on sociology, political science and international relations, developing an interdisciplinary analysis of political communication in the international system. It shows how media technologies presented legal, structural and cultural problems for what were seen as rigid propaganda systems defined by their emergence in an old media system of sovereign states with stable target audiences. Propaganda successes and advances were an inconsistent by-product both of malfunction and of relationships, cultures and rivalries, both domestically and between the partners. The differing social relations of planners and propagandists to wider society create tensions within the 'machine', however leaders may want it to function. The book demonstrates that the 'messy' nature of bureaucracy and international systems as well as the increasingly fluid media environment are all important in shaping what actually happens. In a context of initial failures in formal coordination, the book stresses the importance of informal relationships to planners in the propaganda war. This situated Britain in an important yet precarious position within the Anglo-American propaganda effort, particularly in Iraq.
Until relatively recently, democratic Spain has been plagued with serious campaigns of political violence. Between the end of the Francoist regime in 1975 and the announcement of a ceasefire in 2010, the Basque separatist group ETA (Euskadi (e)Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom) unquestionably played a central part in this deadly process. In response to ETA’s increasingly violent actions, Spain adopted a determined counter-terrorist stance, establishing one of the most formidable anti-terrorist arsenals among Western democracies. Less well known were the extra-judicial strategies Spain used to eradicate ETA. In the 1980s, initiatives to reopen channels to ETA by the Spanish government were twinned with an astute strategy of enhanced police and judicial co-operation with France on the one hand and a covert campaign of assassination of ETA members on the other. Between 1983 and 1987, mercenaries adopting the pseudonym GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) paid by the Spanish treasury and relying upon national intelligence support were at war with ETA. This establishment of unofficial counter-terrorist squads in a liberal democracy was a blatant detour from legality. More than thirty years later, the campaign of covered-up assassinations continues to grip Spain. Counter-terror by Proxy assesses the political and institutional context of the inception of Spain’s resort to covert and illegal counter-terrorist strategies, which predate the current global fight against terrorism by decades, going on to examine the wider implications of the use of such strategies in a liberal democracy.
established pattern of al Shabaab actions.
Events at Westgate encapsulated the recurring dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya. First, the attackers chose a ‘soft’ target. As in the past, this resulted in maximum media attention and a high number of civilian deaths, non-Muslims in particular. Second, despite warnings that such an attack was imminent, the assault evidenced a slow and uncoordinated response by security forces. 6 Finally, the attackers imagined their actions to be retaliation for those of Kenyan security forces domestically and in
This chapter seeks to describe how Indonesia has dealt with the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 era. However, beyond merely identifying the country's counterterror policies, the analysis is placed within the broader context of how the state has historically dealt with internal security threats. This chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’, Indonesia's counterterrorism policies are neither a specific response to transnational terror networks, nor simply a by-product of the post-9/11 era. Instead, Indonesia
An ad hoc response to an enduring and variable threat
On 26 November 2008, the world watched in horror as ten armed men in a series of coordinated attacks wrought havoc on the Indian coastal city of Mumbai. Terrorism in India had made the headlines – again. While these were neither India's, nor indeed Mumbai's, first major terrorist attacks, their sheer scale and innovation, the high number of foreigners killed, and the inability of India's security apparatus to respond in a timely and effective manner quite rightly focused the world's attention upon India's counterterrorism (CT
"This book examines the intersection between national and international counter-terrorism policies and civil society in numerous national and regional contexts. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) against the United States led to new waves of scholarship on the proliferation of terrorism and efforts to combat international terrorist groups, organizations, and networks. Civil society organizsations have been accused of serving as ideological grounds for the recruitment of potential terrorists and a channel for terrorist financing. Consequently, states around the world established new ranges of counter-terrorism measures that target the operations of cCivil society organizsations exclusively. Security practices by states have become a common trend and have assisted in the establishment of a “‘best practices”’ among non-liberal democratic or authoritarian states, and are deeply entrenched in their security infrastructures. In developing or newly democratized states (those still deemed democratically weak or fragile), these exceptional securities measures are used as a cover for repressing opposition groups considered by these states as threats to their national security and political power apparatuses. This book serves as a critical discussion accounting for the experiences of civil society in the enforcement of global security measures by governments in the America’s, Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, Europe (Western, Central, and Eastern), and the Middle East.
The post-9/ 11 global security regime and the securitization of civil society
Richard McNeil- Willson and Scott N. Romaniuk
It argues that the inequalities of counter-terrorism represent an
internalization of racism associated with colonialism into the heart
of the Westernized (but not Western) state model through the
language of security. This has blurred the line between what have
been traditionally defined as “democratic,”
“authoritarian,” and “hybrid” states to
such an extent that they are
returns, veiled Syrian wife in hand, to his parents’ farm in
Tunis. A few days later, his father, Mohamed, denounces the
radicalized son to the police ( The Economist , 2018 ; Joobeur, 2018 ).
The plot of this short film by Meryam Joobeur describes a possible
example of non-state counter-terrorism. But the film, which is
called Brotherhood , can also be considered an example of
One of the fundamental points
of debate in the world since 9/11 has been that of
counter-terrorism. The events of 9/11 no doubt ushered the
international community into a new realm of collective actions
against terrorism, with the United Nations, European Union, United
States, and many other states along with multilateral actors