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This book examines the intellectual frameworks within which the case for war in Iraq has developed in the US and the UK. It analyzes the neoconservative roots of the decision to go to war. The book also analyzes the humanitarian intervention rationale that was developed in the context of the Kosovo campaign, Tony Blair's presentation of it, and the case of Iraq. It looks at the parallel processes through which the George Bush administration and Blair government constructed their cases for war, analyzing similarities and divergences in approach. The book considers the loci of the intelligence failure over Iraq, the lessons for the intelligence communities, and the degree to which the decision to go to war in Iraq represented a policy rather than an intelligence failure. It then complements the analyses of US prewar intelligence failures by analysing what post-war inquiries have revealed about the nature of the failure in the UK case. The book discusses the relationship between intelligence and policymaking. It looks at how US Congress dealt with intelligence before the war. The book also examines how the Bush administration tried to manage public opinion in support of its war policies. It then looks at the decisionmaking process of the Bush administration in the year before the war in Iraq. Finally, the book also provides excerpts from a number of speeches and documents which are key to understanding the nature of national security decisionmaking and intelligence failure.
the need for planning for a lengthy occupation of the country. 2 Neither did he listen to the advice from many intelligence professionals who called into doubt the supposed link between Saddam and al Qaeda and Iraq’s nuclear capacity. 3 This chapter will begin with an account of the run-up to the war in Iraq. It will then turn to a critique of the national security decisionmaking process that led up to
problem is, I can apologise for the information that turned out to be wrong, but I can’t, sincerely at least, apologise for removing Saddam.” 10 Trade and Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt, a member of a Cabinet denied a full role in the decisionmaking process that led to war, repeated this formula, telling a television audience: “All of us who were involved in making an incredibly difficult decision are very sorry and do
This book analyses the use of the past and the production of heritage through architectural design in the developmental context of Iran. It is the first of its kind to utilize a multidisciplinary approach in probing the complex relationship between architecture, development, and heritage. It uses established theoretical concepts including notions of globalism, nostalgia, tradition, and authenticity to show that development is a major cause of historical transformations in places such as Iran and its effects must be seen in relation to global political and historical exchanges as well as local specificities. Iran is a pertinent example as it has endured radical cultural and political shifts in the past five decades. Scholars of heritage and architecture will find the cross-disciplinary aspects of the book useful. The premise of the book is that transposed into other contexts, development, as a globalizing project originating in the West, instigates renewed forms of historical consciousness and imaginations of the past. This is particularly evident in architecture where, through design processes, the past produces forms of architectural heritage. But such historic consciousness cannot be reduced to political ideology, while politics is always in the background. The book shows this through chapters focusing on theoretical context, international exchanges made in architectural congresses in the 1970s, housing as the vehicle for everyday heritage, and symbolic public architecture intended to reflect monumental time. The book is written in accessible language to benefit academic researchers and graduate students in the fields of heritage, architecture, and Iranian and Middle Eastern studies.
Auditors, Presidency, etc.), so that they can actively participate in the decisionmaking process. Understandably, this topic is a high priority for the smallest Member State, all the more so since attempts were made in the run-up to the institutional reforms to reduce the disproportionately strong influence of small states. In this respect the Grand Duchy vigorously resists any attempts to marginalise its position, by unequivocally voicing its opinion on equal representation in the principal institutions. Hence, Luxembourg is not prepared to give up ‘its seat’ in the
pressure to explain their policies. If Charles deserves even part of his reputation for being secretive and untrustworthy, his behaviour would seem to owe something to his father’s style of rule, as well as to his own personality and political circumstances. One of the consequences of James’s habit of concealing information and hiding his intentions was that he was able to present a sometimes misleading impression of what was likely to happen in the future. The King’s privileged access to information and his position as the final arbiter in the decisionmaking process
. Although the British said they did not want to stay permanently in Egypt, proposals to evacuate to Cyprus were never taken up. It was far better to dominate a place you had significant interests in than a place detached from its periphery where you had few, even if you enjoyed its occupation and administration. The failure of the Cyprus venture raises questions on the decisionmaking process. It was the men
first formal recognition of the regional level in the EU’s institutional architecture and for promoting collaboration among Europe’s regions, and among regions and EU institutions. Despite certain misgivings, discussed below, the Basque government has been actively involved in the CoR, largely because it is ‘the only body in the decisionmaking process that allows the participation of regions as such’ (Gobierno Vasco 2004: 5). It has also provided, according to the Basque government, an opportunity to project a positive image of the Basque Country in general, its
mechanisms for decision-making in cases of conflicting objectives of sectoral development and environmental quality. There are now regulatory and administrative mechanisms and incentives for bringing attention to such conflicts early on in the planning and decisionmaking process (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:50, p. 18). Still, however, the final and authoritative balancing of policy and sectoral objectives should come through the overarching 2579Ch5 12/8/03 132 11:54 AM Page 132 Sweden and ecological governance budgetary and regulatory decisions by the Parliament
, the judicial counterpart to Europol, also began its operations. It was also in the wake of 11 September that the EU began producing a public assessment of terrorist trends across its membership. Equally, in the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings, the EU created another couple of institutions, including the Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator (initially Giis de Vries, until 2006, when he was replaced, in September 2007, by Gilles de chap1.indd 8 26/05/2010 09:25:38 Introduction Kerchove), to try and bring some coherence to an occasionally chaotic decisionmaking