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T H E E N D O F E C O N O M I C S T A T E C R A F T 169 9 The end of economic statecraft: David Hume’s History of England The chronologies of David Hume’s career as a political economist and his career as a historian are closely intertwined.1 Political Discourses, the collection of essays containing his principal contribution to political economy, was published in January 1752.2 The work went on to secure Hume a Europe-wide reputation as a writer on economic affairs and was, as he noted in his autobiography, his only book ‘successful on the first
E C O N O M I C S T A T E C R A F T A N D E C O N O M I C P R O G R E S S 155 8 Economic statecraft and economic progress: William Guthrie’s General History The middle years of the eighteenth century saw the emergence of a new, enlightened approach to history. Underpinning this mode of writing was the assumption that the level of progress achieved in modern-day Europe distinguished it from any previous historical period.1 To an extent, the novel qualities of the present were conceived of in political terms. With regard to England in particular, there was
C H R O N O L O G Y A N D C O M M E R C E 83 4 The English Civil War and the politics of economic statecraft The relationship between historical writing and the political and religious conflicts of the 1640s was a complex one.1 Historians of the period generally emphasised that their loyalty was to the ‘truth’ rather than to any particular faction or party. Hamon L’Estrange, for example, used the frontispiece to his The Reign of King Charles (1655) to claim that this was a work ‘Faithfully and Impartially delivered’.2 Similarly, in the preface to his
In the context of political transitions taking place at the domestic, regional and international levels, this book maps a series of key Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) bilateral relations incorporating the Middle East, the US, Europe, China, Russia, the Horn of Africa, India, Pakistan, Japan, Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia. It argues that established modes of analysis such as riyal politik and the Islamisation of Saudi foreign policy are somewhat redundant in a changing economic climate and amid evidence of uncertain returns, whilst political consolidation amounting to Sultanism tells only part of the story. The book underscores the role of youth, background, and western affinity in leadership, as well as liberalisation, hyper-nationalism, secularisation, ‘Push East’ pressure and broader economic statecraft as being the new touchstones of Saudi and UAE foreign policy. This volume also sheds light on aspects of offensive realism, dependency theory, alliance patterns, ‘challenger states’ and political legitimacy in a region dominated by competition, securitisation and proxy warfare.
posited that authoritarian regimes can pass the costs of coping with sanctions impacts on to their people ( Haggard and Noland, 2017 : 6), which informs Pyongyang’s ability to endure sanctions through repression for average citizens and rewards for the elite ( Peksen, 2016 ). Past research has considered sanctions against the DPRK from a number of perspectives, including political economy ( Frank, 2006 ; Haggard and Noland, 2010 ), international trade ( Noland, 2009 ), economic statecraft ( Haggard and Noland, 2017 ), US policy ( Stanton et al. , 2017 ) and
expansionist, interventionist foreign economic policy and security posture? Is there a policy learning curve in effect, such that we can track formation of policy goals, and a widening or contracting deployment of specific mechanisms of statecraft? Two additional concepts help our explanation of why. First, the concept of economic statecraft. Economic statecraft is using economic means to achieve foreign policy ends. It is economic policy deliberately formulated to promote the foreign policy goals of the state. 9
central role in Saudi foreign policy. 24 Baldwin argued that economic instruments in foreign policy can work to exert influence, forming economic statecraft, 25 a concept which Young points to in the analysis of UAE policies towards Egypt post-2011. 26 As Malik notes, the existing rentier state theory (RST) literature overstates the role of oil on the economy. 27
produce an expansion of trade, a bad one would initiate a period of commercial decline. Such approaches both enabled economic statecraft to function within a conventional humanist framework and allowed it to fulfil a polemical, political function. By mid-century, however, other ideas were coming to the fore. Indeed, even a self-consciously political historian such as Catharine Macaulay argued that while the actions of a monarch such as James I had done much to undermine the constitution, English trade had ‘increased much in [his] reign’.9 As such, in Macaulay’s work
sources of dependency vis-Ã -vis select allies. Whilst oil is found to be the dominant source of Saudi external influence, the reasons for this are becoming more diffuse than ever. It reflects the kingdom's continued status as a swing producer, its centrality in the global economy, the energy security considerations of many Asian states and maintaining political stability in weak states through the direction of oil revenues or energy transfers. Riyal politik and economic statecraft have been vital to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in pursuing (counter
politik and broader economic statecraft, proxy warfare and military intervention. Special attention is given to Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Libya and Yemen. The Arab uprisings are a major point of reference, whereby states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE perceived their interests in binary terms: stability versus radicalism. These events also provided a point of acceleration and metamorphosis from overriding domestic security concerns to a more active, robust and expansive series of foreign policies targeting