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How inclusive are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU)? The enlargement of both organisations seems to give some substance to the vision of a ‘Europe whole and free’ articulated at the Cold War's end. Yet more recently, enlargement's limits have increasingly come to be recognised, bringing an important debate on the balance to be struck between inclusion and exclusion. This book examines that sometimes awkward balance. Its analytical starting point is the characterisation of much of Europe as a security community managed by a system of security governance. The boundary of this system is neither clear nor fixed, but a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion can be said to exist by reference to its most concrete expression—that of institutional enlargement. On this basis, the book offers an elaboration of the concept of security governance itself, complemented by a historical survey of the Cold War and its end, the post-Cold War development of NATO and the EU, and case studies of two important ‘excluded’ states: Russia and Turkey.
has neither been sought nor obtained by all European states. This poses two analytical issues: what is the status of the EU and NATO as the core of European security relations and what is the relevance and impact of those states that remain outside these two bodies? Put another way, what is the relationship between these enlarging but not fully pan-European organisations and ‘excluded’ states? This, in a nutshell, is
: 48). Recall the empirical argument in Chapter 2 that, from a broader European perspective, the counterposition of (majoritarian) Westminsterism and (non-majoritarian) consociationalism, as if these exhausted the alternatives, excludes states which are ‘plural’ in Lijphartian terms and yet operate with ‘majoritarian’ systems. Only if ‘communities’ are conceived as homogeneous political
’s decisions to include or exclude states could damage the credibility of the borders of the EU. Finally, the doubts of new member states about EU legitimacy could be carried with them into the EU. The perceived lack of external legitimacy could thus feed into perceptions of a lack of internal legitimacy. Legitimisation of foreign policy may be provided through a second logic of action – a logic of appropriateness. Policy would
Globalising Space’, in J. Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 171, 175. 71 M. Webber, ‘Security Governance and the Excluded States of Postcommunist Europe’, in A. Cottey and D. Averre (eds), New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing
“Excluded” States of Central and Eastern Europe’, in Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds), Ten Years after 1989: New Security Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 43–67. 4 Cited in Webber, ‘Security Governance’. 5 This assumption is central to rational choice theorists. See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, International Organization, 55:4 (2001), pp. 761–99. 6 This assumption is central to realist accounts of international politics. See, inter
seem to have improved matters. Europe was the only place where self-determination had been tried post-Versailles and it had led to the rise of National Socialism.48 The State Department thus became increasingly keen to see a ‘well-rounded union’, not just for Western Europe but also for Central Europe. One concern that echoes down the years in the debate stimulated by Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘spheres of civilisation’ was the suggestion that this union would exclude states that were Orthodox Christian, ‘thus one potential source of disturbance could be reduced to a
cases is how few there are. Few states have experienced terrorism in the absence of insurgency, attempted insurgency, or wider-scale warfare.35 The count of states that fits these criteria comes to thirteen. This count excludes states with almost no history of terrorism, as well as micro-states and island nations. Incidentally, micro-states and island nations have almost no history of terrorism. Their locations range almost as widely as their number is small. Europe figures more prominently than any other region in this list, with the persistence of terrorism without