as a necessary intermediary step toward the full democracy he envisioned for Iraq. Table 7.1 Rumsfeld’s exit strategy Rumsfeld thought that the advent of the Allawi government should mark the end of US obligations in Iraq. Saddam had gone, the CPA
This book surveys the elite state of play in Britain as it is now. It argues that the Establishment, as it has been conceived, is coming to an end. The book looks at how elites, by trying to get ahead, have destabilised the very institutions on which their power is based. It also looks at how leaders have adapted to get to the top. Those most suited to pleasing their assessors get there first. The book reveals some of the ways elites use to stay at the top once they get there. It looks at the secrets and lies that underpin elite power and control. Some are systematic and organised, and some are simply the lies leaders tell themselves. The book shows how leadership has been transformed into a numbers game because numbers can be tallied up in a way that ideas cannot. And because elites co-create the game, they can also change the rules as and when they need to. The book focuses on exit strategies and how canny elites survive when it all goes wrong. It briefly explores what solutions there might be to the current problems of leadership.
digital work despite skills trainings by NGOs, then what purpose are these trainings actually serving? The possibility that these programmes perpetuate restrictive host country policies surrounding refugees’ (lack of) right to work, or endorse donors’ exit strategies rather than offer refugees protection and dignity, as current rhetoric on digital inclusion suggests (e.g. UNHCR, 2022 ), are concerns with which organisations must further reckon. Allaying these concerns requires robust M
transition criteria for foreign military, and other governmental actors from Assisting States. b) Assisting militaries have defined transition and exit strategies. c) Assisting militaries remain beyond the critical response phase. d) Some foreign militaries have defined exit strategies and others have not. e) Only those foreign military assets needed to meet known humanitarian gaps have been deployed in theatre. f) Unique capability of assisting militaries remains beyond 90-day post disaster at the request of the Affected State. 8. Government actors incorporate
culture and ideas, and adopting dominant norms and positions, no matter how nonsensical. Chapter 6 looks at the secrets and lies that underpin elite power and control. Some are systematic and organised, and some are simply the lies leaders tell themselves. Chapter 7 shows that leadership has been transformed into a numbers game because numbers can be tallied up in a way that ideas can't. And because elites co-create the game, they can also change the rules as and when they need to. Part IV focuses on exit strategies and how canny elites
the Pact, this chapter will begin by examining the distinctive nature of the agreement and the formation process in light of aspects of the negotiations which shaped and were shaped by the state of minority government. Thereafter, we will consider aspects that have been overlooked, including the confrontation over raising petrol tax which shaped the renegotiation, the strategic discourse during the renewal of the Pact, the Government’s changing strategic approach during the course of the Pact and the development of an exit strategy. Some aspects which play an
longer term, more coherent exit strategy is needed. Assessing the role of rule of law in transformation The progress made in terms of building physical institutions, creating new security protocols and legal codes and training domestic staff since the end of the conflict in Kosovo is considerable. As one officer recounted in 2005, ‘I got here two months after the war . . . my first job was to clean rooms out of a building to make a police station, and now there’s 275 KPS in there that are going to be running it themselves in three weeks’ (I84). Ordinary crime levels
The chapter provides an assessment of the two Memoranda that accompanied Greece’s bailouts. It is argued that initial assessments over the sustainability of the Greek debt were overly optimistic and based on projections that did not account for the realities of the Greek economy. The same is also true for some of the assumptions of the second Memorandum. The severe austerity paradigm that underpinned the two programmes was based on a defensive reading of the crisis and a high degree of moralism. Fiscal discipline, although necessary, does not, on its own, constitute a credible exit strategy from the crisis.
This chapter looks at the functioning and effects of border regimes in relation to marriage migration from rural Kosovo to Western Europe, and here especially to Germany and Austria, which restricted the opportunities for marriage migration considerably over recent years. The restrictions are based on gendered and ethnicised assumptions of marriage migration as being patriarchal and a threat to German and Austrian society. Shedding light on a rather unexplored perspective, the chapter focuses on young women in Kosovo’s south, who aim to move to Western Europe via marriage, and the barriers they meet and struggle to overcome. It explores how prospective migrants position themselves towards marriage migration, and how they experience the increasingly restrictive European border regime in terms of family and marriage migration. It furthermore questions the meaning of polity borders in such intimate realms as marriage. The chapter argues that with the new policies and measures concerning marriage migration, Western European states externalise their borders and put enormous pressure on prospective marriage migrants. These borders, partly gendered, can be bodily felt, often postpone migration, and may alienate partners. Contrary to the stated aims of such policies, these measures do not necessarily support women in their free choices in intimate realms, but interfere in intimacies and restrict their agency. Still, women also act as agents by relying on family support in order to realise their imaginations, or by choosing exit strategies when the pressure on them becomes too burdensome or realities are too far away from their imaginations.
By sending additional troops to Iraq, a decision reached in late 2006 and announced 10 January 2007 – George W. Bush brought US strategy in line with his goals. Bush finally perceived that Rumsfeld’s exit strategy was not going to achieve his aims of securing Iraq and paving the way for a democracy. 1 In making the decision to surge, Bush defied the advice of