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Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.

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Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

it unfolded in the German Bundestag – the debate’s major public forum – in the period between the first Gulf War in 1991 and the war against Iraq in 2003. It analyses how external events and pressures influenced the debate and how Germany’s actual policy towards the international crises of the post-Cold War era responded. It aims to understand why German policy makers abandoned the policy of strict military abstention in out-of-area conflicts and to discern the premises of the new policy that has taken its place. In other words, it seeks to answer the questions what

in Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement
Stephen Benedict Dyson

– ‘Op Plan 1003’ – did not fit the secretary’s goals for transformational warfare. Op Plan 1003 was essentially a formula for re-fighting the first Gulf War which had, after all, been spectacularly successful from an American military standpoint. To Rumsfeld, though, it was unsatisfactory. Op Plan 1003 relied upon the Powell doctrine principles of a long, slow build-up of a large, overwhelming ground

in Leaders in conflict
British foreign policy in the era of American hegemony

This book intends to fill an important gap in the body of research on the special relationship by exploring it from the perspective of post-war British governments, asking: how have they perceived the special relationship? How have they perceived and performed their foreign policy role within it? And have they viewed this role as being successful? Looking beyond the rhetoric of Churchill's Fulton speech and the innate cultural and historical ties between the British and Americans, the book demonstrates how the 'special relationship' that emerged between the two governments at this time was in fact the product of hard-nosed geopolitical brinkmanship, during a period of Anglo-American power struggles. It concludes that since its conception the special relationship has never quite been the alliance that the Churchill government hoped to create and that the tensions it caused between governments in Britain, America, Europe and the Commonwealth represent the genesis of themes that run as leitmotivs throughout post-war British foreign policy. This leads us onto the book's second aim, which is to show how at key moments of post-war international crisis successive British governments have attempted to perform the same active foreign policy role within the special relationship that Churchill's government defined in 1945. The book provides counterbalance to the prevailing view in academia that post-war British governments have accepted their declining status and influence in the special relationship since 1945, and that the rate of this decline accelerated markedly following the events of the Suez crisis in the late 1950s.

Spyros Blavoukos

recognized the legitimate and political rights of the Palestinian people while in return the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in conditions of peace and security (Rynhold 2007 : 423). Problems and policies Like in the Greek case discussed above, international developments, in particular the end of bipolarism but more importantly the 1991 first Gulf War, brought along new preoccupations in the Israeli foreign policy. First, the United States put pressure on Israel to foster closer relations

in Foreign policy as public policy?
Ben Cohen
Eve Garrard

constituency I am talking about not only opposed the Iraq War, but also opposed the intervention in Afghanistan before that, and in Kosovo before that, and so on back to the first Gulf War that evicted Saddam Hussein’s armies from Kuwait. And Berman’s other reasons – (1), and (3) through (6) – did not figure, or did not figure every time, in the previous conflicts I have mentioned. But the United States as the foremost embodiment of global capitalism, on one side, and (speaking loosely) regimes and movements of an utterly ghastly kind politically, on the other-these have

in The Norman Geras Reader
A. J. Coates

an assumption that, if left uncontested, may well become a fact. It appears that armed force, even in the late twentieth century and even against an unprincipled opponent, can continue to be effective without becoming inherently disproportionate and indiscriminate. The experience of the First Gulf War suggests that the capacity (as distinct from the will) to fight a war proportionately and discriminately has in fact improved since the Second World War – an improvement that might be expected to continue with technological advances (like the development of non

in The ethics of war
Screening war in Kosovo and Chechnya
Cerwyn Moore

first Gulf War. In his book, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat, Wesley Clarke reflects on the Bosnian conflict, noting that modern communications and the media – actions that were relatively small could have potentially large political impact, and therefore affect the course of an entire campaign. Such an incident occurred in the Gulf War, when our aircraft struck a command bunker that was being used as a bomb shelter by families. The lesson wasn’t lost on us: watch the political impact of every decision and event.21 Clarke of course went on

in Contemporary violence
Abstract only
Limits and possibilities of the new consensus
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

quick glance, Iraq did not herald a new Germany emancipating itself from bonds and alliances. On the contrary, the counterbalancing of the US was arguably precisely an expression of the ingrained German inclination to avoid standing alone on important international issues. From Iraq to Iraq: full circle? An external observer might conclude, that Germany by 2003 had come full circle: from abstinence in the first Gulf War via a temporary change in its view on the use of military means, and back to a policy of abstinence when the second Gulf War broke out in 2003. The

in Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement
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British foreign policy and the special relationship in the Cameron era and beyond
Simon Tate

, John Major to George Bush Senior in the First Gulf War … I fear that if we continue as at present we may combine the maximum exposure with the minimum of real influence over decisions. The sooner we rediscover the right balance the better for Britain and our alliance. This is not anti-American. This is what America wants. (David Cameron, September 2006)1 If the British media’s interest in the future of the special relationship was frenzied, the new government itself did little to dampen this and seemed clear that the relationship in its current form was not tenable

in A special relationship?