This book complements extant histories of diplomacy by discussing change in the form of tipping-points, understood as the culmination of long-term trends. The first part of the book discusses social evolution on the general level of institutions. The diplomatic institution has undergone four tipping-points: between culturally similar small-scale polities, between culturally different large-scale polities, permanent bilateral diplomacy, and permanent multilateral diplomacy. The consular institution has seen three: the emergence of the consul as the judge of a trading colony, the judge as a representative of the state, and the imbrication of the consular institution in unitary foreign services. The second part challenges extant literature’s treatment of diplomacy as a textual affair and an elite concern. It lays down the groundwork for the study of visual diplomacy by establishing diplomacy’s visual genres, discussing how diplomats spread images to wider audiences and drawing up a taxonomy of three visual strategies used for this purpose: a hegemonic and Western strategy, a national strategy, and a strategy that is spiteful of Western hegemony. Two case studies discuss the evolving place of the visual in one diplomatic practice, namely accreditation, and the importance of the social imagination. One possible evolutionary effect of the latter seems to be as a lair of hibernation for the otherwise threatened idea that diplomacy is not about dialogue but about the confrontation between good and evil. The book concludes by seeing the future of diplomacy in a continued struggle between state-to-state-based diplomacy and diplomacy as networked global governance.
A Framework for Measuring Effectiveness in Humanitarian Response
Vincenzo Bollettino and Birthe Anders
establish and maintain relationships with civilian organisations. They also point out that civilian or non-governmental organisations should not be seen as one coherent sector, but that views on engagement with militaries are diverse. The goal of the IF is related to the compass for civil–military engagement suggested by Rietjens et al. , although the IF is designed specifically for assessing interaction between military and humanitarian organisations and thus not, for example, civilian agencies active in the field such as foreignministries.
As Zyck has pointed out
-Korean humanitarian aid without Seoul’s approval since 2010. In 2018, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha raised the possibility of revisiting the measures. The ForeignMinistry later clarified that there was no government-wide review of the measures, and they continue to remain in place.
An example, though by no means the only source, of such data is the DPRK Humanitarian Country Team’s annual ‘Needs and Priorities’ document.
See Zadeh-Cummings and Harris (2020) .
The DPRK, the United States and other major players do not share a consensus
took safe delivery of it. Meanwhile, in June 2012, the General Director of MSF
France informed the authorities in Damascus, via Syria’s permanent
mission in Geneva, that an MSF team had entered Syria to work in a medical and
surgical unit in the rebel zone in Idlib province. This announcement was
intended to guarantee that this unit would be respected and protected from
attacks. One week later, the foreignministry made the following response, also
minister’s/cabinet offices, foreignministry, permanent representation, finance department and legal advisers). It also briefly reflects on the changing role of sub-national players over the past decade.
Mapping the networks
The common strategic agenda for both networks has remained broadly constant since accession. Simply put, it has been to ensure that officials in Brussels are well prepared and ‘sing from the same hymn sheet’; that the government’s position is presented with clarity and precision; and to facilitate
keep a low profile throughout his time in Germany.
At that time, Israel’s official policy towards Germany was one of economic and political boycott. Formally, Israel declared that it was in a state of war against it on the very same day of its foundation, on 14 May 1948. And yet, in its day-to-day life the Israeli ForeignMinistry was pushed to grant one exception after the other, as commercial exchanges between the two countries, covertly, multiplied. The trade included goods as diverse as citrus fruits (from Israel to Germany) and MAN trucks (from Germany to
for the first time in a decade. The
agreement was signed in July 1950 and John Belton was appointed ‘General
Consul’ to West Germany to handle trade relations. In late 1950, the West
German government expressed an interest in establishing a Consulate-General in
Dublin and the negotiations commenced.2
West Germany gained the right to initiate and conduct full and normal diplomatic relations on 13 March 1951 when its cabinet agreed to a revision of the
Occupation Statute to establish a foreignministry. Underlining the centrality
of enhancing the FRG’s foreign
Department of the Russian ForeignMinistry) were brought to the attention of the wider Russian public and not
only to elite circles. We will also include the contemporary critique of
Russia’s policy and the questioning of whether its humanitarian motives were
Russian foreign policy and the Eastern
The overall picture
The geo-schizophrenia’ 1 of Russia, situated between Europe and Asia,
created in the
received German citizenship and, in 1950, joined the Federal Foreign Service. His appointment to Tel Aviv followed earlier postings in Tunisia, Togo and Bonn. The reaction of the Israeli public to his appointment was of shock and disgust – but after an internal investigation the ForeignMinistry confirmed Török’s fitness for the post, where he remained until 1968.
But the West Germans, in turn, were uneasy with the person who had been chosen to represent the State of Israel in Bonn, Asher Ben-Natan. Originally from Austria, Ben-Natan had illegally migrated to Palestine
proactively drive forward their own agenda on Europe. 23 Hence there was no attempt to emulate the more autonomous and commanding position occupied by their UK counterpart.
The distinction between the substantial formal role of foreignministries, and their relative power within the EU network, is critical to understanding the reshaping of patterns of power dependency under the Blair and Ahern governments. By blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic policy, accession in theory gave foreign