International organisation, globalsecurity
and the NWO
In any discussion about how to achieve an NWO the question of how to
implement that order has always been paramount. However, it has often
been observed that ‘one man’s order is another man’s repression’, in other
words, that order is a normative concept. The many different models
suggested for achieving it – balance of power, alliance systems, ‘concerts’
and ‘leagues’ – are all underpinned by a dialectic between those who see the
aim of the order so created as a
This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
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share of fragile, unstable states and impoverished
societies, the continent was once seen almost exclusively as an incubator of instability and insecurity; a venue for addressing rising challenges
and an exporter of globalsecurity threats. But this is no longer the case.
Africa, like everywhere else in the world, is becoming increasingly integrated into a globalizedsecurity system, whereby Africans are just as
vulnerable to threats emanating from outside the continent as they are
from home-grown ones. Globalization, more so than any other factor,
September 2001, the President of France, Jacques Chirac, referred to
France’s particular aptitude for grasping cultural divergences and
forging cohesion despite differences. Throughout all three crises, the
French leaders focused on preserving the globalsecurity community that
was guaranteed by the UN.
Conclusion: norms in their own right
or as resources for community
describing Iraq in
terms of a perpetual and exceptional threat to globalsecurity, the
German, French and Russian leaders defined it as a problem strictly
related to the potential existence of weapons of mass destruction on
Iraqi soil. They interpreted the UN resolution as aiming to do nothing
more than verify that Iraq did not have and could not develop weapons of
mass destruction: a change of regime, for
surrounding a particular nation. In the Swedish case systemic changes in
the international system, as well as the global call for military contributions to international peace operations, particularly at the end of Cold War,
prompted the revision of Sweden’s role and place in the globalsecurity architecture (Bergman Rosamond 2012). Sweden’s armed forces also reformed
and internationalised, moving from conscription in 2010 to specialised allvolunteer forces designed for international crisis management missions and
rapid deployment. This has led to a
for 17 per cent of global energy use
in 2009, a figure set to rise to 22 per cent by 2035 (Krauss 2010).
From the global economy to globalsecurity and from climate change
to human rights, China will play a major role in global governance.
China was a largely absent partner in global governance after 1945.
The US refusal to recognise the PRC meant that it did not join the
United Nations (UN) until 1971. China also stayed outside other
major institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT – the predecessor of the WTO), the International Monetary
and arrest. It is worth noting that this state of
emergency was not initially opposed by the Socialist opposition in the French
National Assembly: thus we see a new political consensus forming around the
idea of ‘security’.
The global ‘security’ state
With these developments the very distinction between liberal democratic and
authoritarian regimes seems to be losing its clarity. A new paradigm is emerging, in which the liberal democratic state passes imperceptibly into tyranny
without any apparent contradiction – this is the paradigm of the ‘security state’.