structures suffer from an underlying ‘citizenism’.
That is, in order to be seen as a full participant in the global
system, usually a person must first be recognised as a citizen of a
state. 2 This produces
contradictions in globalgovernance projects, which I show in this
chapter through two examples. First, while
Twentieth-century systems, 1919–2016
Small state survival and proliferation in
twentieth-century systems of collective
security and globalgovernance, 1919–2016
… to fight … for the rights of nations great and small…1(Woodrow
In the twentieth century, a hybrid system of power politics, collective
security, and growing globalgovernance prevailed. How did the small
state fare in this environment? Interestingly enough, small states did
remarkably well and during the height of the Cold War small state proliferation actually doubled their total
Urban disorder and the transformation of
Global processes take concrete and localised forms in large cities around
the world. These localised forms represent what globalisation is about.
‘Globalization does not operate simply in cyberspace; there are developments, correlated with globalizations, operating within cities, at the low end
of the social scale’ (Body-Gendrot et al. 2012: 360). At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, metropolises, the recipients of flows of capital, people,
innovations and ideas, are
This book complements extant histories of diplomacy by discussing change in the form of tipping-points, understood as the culmination of long-term trends. The first part of the book discusses social evolution on the general level of institutions. The diplomatic institution has undergone four tipping-points: between culturally similar small-scale polities, between culturally different large-scale polities, permanent bilateral diplomacy, and permanent multilateral diplomacy. The consular institution has seen three: the emergence of the consul as the judge of a trading colony, the judge as a representative of the state, and the imbrication of the consular institution in unitary foreign services. The second part challenges extant literature’s treatment of diplomacy as a textual affair and an elite concern. It lays down the groundwork for the study of visual diplomacy by establishing diplomacy’s visual genres, discussing how diplomats spread images to wider audiences and drawing up a taxonomy of three visual strategies used for this purpose: a hegemonic and Western strategy, a national strategy, and a strategy that is spiteful of Western hegemony. Two case studies discuss the evolving place of the visual in one diplomatic practice, namely accreditation, and the importance of the social imagination. One possible evolutionary effect of the latter seems to be as a lair of hibernation for the otherwise threatened idea that diplomacy is not about dialogue but about the confrontation between good and evil. The book concludes by seeing the future of diplomacy in a continued struggle between state-to-state-based diplomacy and diplomacy as networked global governance.
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
In this interview, Celso Amorim, former Brazilian foreign minister, discusses changes in
global governance and their likely impact on international cooperation. He critically reflects
on his experiences in positioning Brazil on the world stage and democratising human rights. And
he considers whether the influence of Brazil and other Southern states is likely to continue
Freedoms, set out in 1941,
provided particularly American inspiration for the post-war development of liberal globalgovernance. 1 But the principles of great-power
trusteeship and balancing, reflected in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in 1944, were decisive in
the creation of the United Nations. 2 Despite
the early proliferation of liberal institutions under the aegis of the UN, Cold War prerogatives
undermined cosmopolitan aspirations for world government. Cancelling each other out in the
Security Council, the US and the Soviet Union
collectively from a long battle within the American establishment, in which the military has, for
the time being, gained the upper hand over civil servants and career politicians, with their
cosmopolitan project of liberal order and rules-based globalgovernance, initiated after the
Second World War and expanded after the Cold War. If this victory is consolidated, it will bring
an end to the American messianism of the twentieth century, with its division of the world
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, its globalising imperative to reorganise
the world through the
Gender Equality and Culture in Humanitarian Action1
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