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Today’s global governance structures suffer from an underlying ‘citizenism’. That is, in order to be seen as a full participant in the global system, usually a person must first be recognised as a citizen of a state. 2 This produces contradictions in global governance projects, which I show in this chapter through two examples. First, while
5 Twentieth-century systems, 1919–2016 Small state survival and proliferation in twentieth-century systems of collective security and global governance, 1919–2016 … to fight … for the rights of nations great and small…1(Woodrow Wilson, 1915) In the twentieth century, a hybrid system of power politics, collective security, and growing global governance prevailed. How did the small state fare in this environment? Interestingly enough, small states did remarkably well and during the height of the Cold War small state proliferation actually doubled their total
13 Sophie Body-Gendrot Urban disorder and the transformation of global governance Global processes take concrete and localised forms in large cities around the world. These localised forms represent what globalisation is about. ‘Globalization does not operate simply in cyberspace; there are developments, correlated with globalizations, operating within cities, at the low end of the social scale’ (Body-Gendrot et al. 2012: 360). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, metropolises, the recipients of flows of capital, people, innovations and ideas, are
This book complements extant histories of diplomacy by discussing change in the form of tipping-points, understood as the culmination of long-term trends.
The first part of the book discusses social evolution on the general level of institutions. The diplomatic institution has undergone four tipping-points: between culturally similar small-scale polities, between culturally different large-scale polities, permanent bilateral diplomacy, and permanent multilateral diplomacy. The consular institution has seen three: the emergence of the consul as the judge of a trading colony, the judge as a representative of the state, and the imbrication of the consular institution in unitary foreign services. The second part challenges extant literature’s treatment of diplomacy as a textual affair and an elite concern. It lays down the groundwork for the study of visual diplomacy by establishing diplomacy’s visual genres, discussing how diplomats spread images to wider audiences and drawing up a taxonomy of three visual strategies used for this purpose: a hegemonic and Western strategy, a national strategy, and a strategy that is spiteful of Western hegemony. Two case studies discuss the evolving place of the visual in one diplomatic practice, namely accreditation, and the importance of the social imagination. One possible evolutionary effect of the latter seems to be as a lair of hibernation for the otherwise threatened idea that diplomacy is not about dialogue but about the confrontation between good and evil. The book concludes by seeing the future of diplomacy in a continued struggle between state-to-state-based diplomacy and diplomacy as networked global governance.
In this interview, Celso Amorim, former Brazilian foreign minister, discusses changes in global governance and their likely impact on international cooperation. He critically reflects on his experiences in positioning Brazil on the world stage and democratising human rights. And he considers whether the influence of Brazil and other Southern states is likely to continue expanding.
Freedoms, set out in 1941, provided particularly American inspiration for the post-war development of liberal global governance. 1 But the principles of great-power trusteeship and balancing, reflected in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in 1944, were decisive in the creation of the United Nations. 2 Despite the early proliferation of liberal institutions under the aegis of the UN, Cold War prerogatives undermined cosmopolitan aspirations for world government. Cancelling each other out in the Security Council, the US and the Soviet Union
. ( 1999 ), ‘ Can We Ever Rely on Refugee Statistics? ’, Radical Statistics , 72 , www.radstats.org.uk/no072/article1.htm . Beerli , M. J. ( 2017 ), ‘ The Power to Count and the Stakes of Counting: An Inquiry into the Quantified Production of Humanitarian Insecurity ’, Global Governance , 23 : 1 , 57 – 70
collectively from a long battle within the American establishment, in which the military has, for the time being, gained the upper hand over civil servants and career politicians, with their cosmopolitan project of liberal order and rules-based global governance, initiated after the Second World War and expanded after the Cold War. If this victory is consolidated, it will bring an end to the American messianism of the twentieth century, with its division of the world between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, its globalising imperative to reorganise the world through the
. ( 2023 ), ‘ Diplomats, Soldiers, and Armed Conflict Databases: Another French Exception? ’, Global Studies Quarterly , 3 : 2 , doi: 10.1093/isagsq/ksad027 . Beerli , M. J. ( 2017 ), ‘ The Power to Count and the Stakes of Counting: An Inquiry into the Quantified Production of Humanitarian Insecurity ’, Global Governance
), Negotiations: 1972–1990 ( New York : Columbia University Press ). Derrida , J. ( 1992 ), ‘ Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority” ’, in Cornell , D. , Rosenfeld , M. and Carlson , D. G. (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice ( New York : Routledge ). Duffield , M. ( 2001 ), Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security ( London : Zed Books ). Duffield , M. ( 2005 ), ‘ Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial Present ’, Conflict, Security