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Can Russia, the European Union and the three major EU member states adopt a unified policy line in the global arena? This book investigates the cohesiveness of ‘greater Europe’ through the detailed scrutiny of policy statements by the leadership elites in the UK, France, Germany, Russia and the EU in connection with three defining events in international security. The crisis in Kosovo of 1999; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq crisis of 2003. This extensive empirical enquiry results in a critical constructivist response to neorealist understandings of European security. The book contrasts the EU's new way of ‘doing security’ with the established, competitive bilateral interplay in the European security sphere and provides a clue to the kind of security politics that will prevail in Europe. A joint Moscow Brussels approach would improve the chances of both increasing their relative strength vis-a-vis the USA, but serious cleavages threaten to undermine such a ‘greater European’ common view on security. The book considers the extent to which the major European players pursue similar objectives, and assesses the possible implications for and the chances of greater Europe emerging as a cohesive global actor.
Dividing lines between European leaderships The purpose of this book is to assess whether the major European players defend similar referent-objects of security and pursue similar objectives, and to suggest implications for greater Europe’s chances of emerging as a cohesive global actor. Do Russia, the EU and the three major EU member states
focus is on the relationship between the EU and Russia, but also on bilateral relations between Russia and the major EU member states. The term ‘Europe’ needs clarification. This volume distinguishes between ‘EU-Europe’, which includes the EU and its member states, and ‘greater Europe’, which envisages Russia, the EU and its member states. It would be unsatisfactory to limit the analysis to Russia and the
How is Brexit likely to affect efforts to complete the European Single Market for capital and financial services? Brexit will shrink European capital markets by roughly 25 per cent, with even larger declines in equity markets and pension funds, and losing the UK will undoubtedly complicate EU financial reform efforts. This chapter assesses the technical rationale behind two key European financial reforms – banking union and European Capital Markets Union, before identifying the priorities of three key players in shaping these reforms: the European Commission, United Kingdom, and Germany. Looking at these priorities through the lens of Dirk Schoenmaker’s financial trilemma, Brexit seems likely to mean that European financial markets will evolve more in line with German preferences. In practice, this means that banks will continue to play a leading role in European finance, with protective niches carved out for nationally sensitive financial actors, and concern over moral hazard stemming from mutualized liabilities will likely outweigh arguments calling for greater European solidarity.
2504Chap12 7/4/03 12:42 pm Page 226 12 The EU and Eurasia: a bounded security role in a greater Europe Simon Serfaty Entering the twentieth century, the most important strategic location in the world was said to be a ‘pivot area’ that consisted of the northern and interior portion of the Eurasian continent, ‘where the rivers flow either to the icebound Arctic Ocean or inward to salt seas and salt lakes having no oceanic outlets.’1 So it was viewed then, and so it is often viewed now as other ‘Great Games’ are being staged in or around this same ‘pivot area
opposed to a straightforward question of whether Britain should be in or out of Europe, and British politicians faced a largely Eurosceptic press. Indeed, as Roy Greenslade of the Observer wrote: ‘The British newspaper is a nationalist enterprise, beset by the realisation that its own power is threatened by greater European integration’ (Greenslade, Observer , 28 April 1996, cited in Dewey, 2009 ). Following the outcome of the 2016 referendum in which the majority of the electorate voted to leave the EU, the British press remains largely Eurosceptic. The issue
verse is the clash of two violent international orders experienced in the life of Martín Fierro, both instances of a ‘practical, engaged universality’, as Tsing puts it, and thence a ‘guide to the yearnings and nightmares’ of history (2005: 1). On the one hand, there is an effort to build Argentina on a model akin to nation states run by Europeans and by descendent settler populations elsewhere in the Americas in the nineteenth century, to make it part of the vast expansion of ‘Greater Europe’ as the historian John Darwin has dubbed it (Darwin 2007: 245). Whether in
, the socialists formed the largest group in the European Parliament and interpreted the concept of ‘Social Europe’ in ways which highlighted its redistributive, egalitarian and socially cohesive potential. A supranational welfare state was therefore seen by some in Britain as being able to advance the social welfare ambitions of social democrats while at the same time furnishing a basis for greater European social cohesion and solidarity in the face of trans-national capital. More specifically, in place of the existing competitive pursuit of TNC-related inward
Polish unions to engage in coordination. This trend is associated with Polish subsidiaries of MNCs. A Solidarność official emphasized the extent to which the union was in favour of greater Europeanization of bargaining in this domain; it was reported that Solidarność shared information with other unions within MNCs and that this led to increased expectations concerning wage rises in Poland. Reference was also made to changes in the attitudes of Polish unions. Though it had been traditionally thought that a precondition for the continuing presence of MNCs in Poland was
from fragmentation to system failure’. 27 Perhaps some of the grimmest scenarios can still be avoided if EU decisionmakers put aside their campaign to undo the nation-state and treat it instead as a partner in a common emergency that needs to be overcome. Multi-level governance failed to promote the solidarity which a nation normally invokes. The members of the eurozone jockeyed among themselves to derive the greatest advantage from the currency union and rarely thought in terms of any greater European cause (whether conceived in supra-national or inter