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This book addresses the special relationship from the perspective of post-Second World War British governments. It argues that Britain's foreign policy challenges the dominant idea that its power has been waning and that it sees itself as the junior partner to the hegemonic US. The book also shows how at moments of international crisis successive British governments have attempted to re-play the same foreign policy role within the special relationship. It discusses the power of a profoundly antagonistic relationship between Mark Twain and Walter Scott. The book demonstrates Stowe's mis-reading and mis-representation of the Highland Clearances. It explains how Our Nig, the work of a Northern free black, also provides a working-class portrait of New England farm life, removed from the frontier that dominates accounts of American agrarian life. Telegraphy - which transformed transatlantic relations in the middle of the century- was used by spiritualists as a metaphor for the ways in which communications from the other world could be understood. The story of the Bolton Whitman Fellowship is discussed. Beside Sarah Orne Jewett's desk was a small copy of the well-known Raeburn portrait of Sir Walter Scott. Henry James and George Eliot shared a transatlantic literary network which embodied an easy flow of mutual interest and appreciation between their two milieux. In her autobiography, Gertrude Stein assigns to her lifelong companion the repeated comment that she has met three geniuses in her life: Stein, Picasso, and Alfred North Whitehead.
Moscow feared less the response of the no-longer-hegemonic US, something seemingly confirmed by Obama’s decision not to strike militarily in 2013. Yet domestic factors again, particularly the significance of leading personnel, should not be overlooked. Russian President Vladimir Putin did not decide to act independently, but rather was subject to Iranian lobbying. Despite Iranian support and reorganisation, by spring 2015 Assad was still losing ground and a new rebel coalition (primary backed by Turkey), the Jaysh al-Fateh, was
accession, EU engagement in Latin America came late. Moreover, non-institutionalised political dialogues between shifting governments and civil society actors cannot compete with the solid institutional structure of the inter-American system under a still hegemonic US leadership, albeit in decline due to internal ideological divisions on Venezuela and the imposition of Trump's candidate Mauricio Claver-Carone as president of the IADB. Firstly, the Organisation of American States is a regional organisation (the first ever created); secondly, it works as a community of
been able to overwhelm the Spaniards and gain independence without US intervention. By contrast, most major Cuban historians (well before the arrival of Castro), including Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, Herminio Portell Vilá and Fernando Ortiz, dispute this hegemonic US paradigm. 143 They argue that the Cuban forces were on the verge of winning, and that the intervention of the US was unnecessary and ‘robbed them of their fruits of victory’. 144 But a minority of equally reputable Cuban
weapons of mass destruction has spurred widespread debate in the Middle East about the real purpose of the recent war, which most Arab commentators now see as a bid by the United States to consolidate its regional and global hegemony. U.S. threats against Iran and Syria play into this fear, increasing a general determination to resist. And the
of their existence”’ ( Bourdieu 1998b , 99). In this case, extending to the organisation’s propagandised narratives, AQ’s exploitation of and benefit from US trading activity in the region operates in a reflexive dialectic with the rampant globalisation of hegemonic US economic activity. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Islamic charities themselves have been accused by the US Department of State of financing AQ-affiliated terrorism. Once more, these examples explicate ideological tension in AQ’s donated finance, given its stated rejection of US economic influence
Kupchan 1990; Wang 2003).9 For example, Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that hegemonic US socialised secondary states ‘at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs’.10 For them, socialisation leads to elites in secondary states ‘buying into’ the hegemon’s normative agenda (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 283). Socialisation for Ikenberry and Kupchan occurs in three instances. First, socialisation occurs as a result of the external inducement of the hegemon. Compliance is underpinned by the threat of coercion which they argue leads to a substantive shift in
confirmed by the White House, which claimed that a NATO decision had been made, but in fact NATO consultations had not been completed. The way the United States appeared to close the door to further discussion stunned the allies and was instantly interpreted by the French and others as just one more sign of hegemonic US behavior. The United States had always been “first among equals” in NATO, where decisions are taken by consensus but where US preferences almost always carried the day. Nonetheless, the allies resented what seemed to them a cavalier US approach to the