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04 Crimes Against Humanity 098-112 3/12/10 10:11 Page 98 4 Humanitarian intervention We have seen in the preceding chapters that the concept of crimes against humanity implies a limit to state sovereignty. It is natural, therefore, that discussion of the concept, and especially of its beginnings, should make reference to an earlier tradition within international law to which that same limit is germane – I mean the tradition of humanitarian intervention. In fact, the principle of humanitarian intervention stands not only at the origin of the offence of
(This chapter is extracted from Crimes against Humanity: Birth of a Concept , Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011) We have seen in the preceding chapters * that the concept of crimes against humanity implies a limit to state sovereignty. It is natural, therefore, that discussion of the concept, and especially of its beginnings, should make reference to an earlier tradition within international law to which that same limit is germane – I mean the tradition of humanitarian intervention. In fact, the principle of humanitarian intervention stands not
(This article was first published on ‘Normblog’, 24 March 2010) An article by Mark Mazower for the journal World Affairs may seem, at first, to strike an odd note. It characterizes the concept of humanitarian intervention as ‘dying if not dead’ and links this judgement with the hypothesis of a ‘new era of pragmatism ... in the making’ that sounds as though it might have the author’s approval. For me there is a jarring element in that coupling. Humanitarian intervention is an option that is available when the assumed protections of state sovereignty have
Humanitarian intervention – that is, military intervention aimed at saving innocent people in other countries from massive violations of human rights (primarily the right to life) – entered public consciousness around 1990 as never before in the course of the twentieth century. It has earned a central place in scholarly research and in the preoccupations of decision-makers and international organizations and has captured the imagination of the wider public in a
aim of the aggregation of societies established by nature is ‘mutual assistance in order to perfect themselves [states] and their condition’. 26 The duties to humanity become the nooumental link between civil and international society which champions a principle of humanitarian intervention. However, the question remains as to whether it is a moral or a legal duty. Vattel considers specific
Advocates and opponents of humanitarian intervention From the 1860s onwards, international law became an academic discipline in its own right in Europe and the Americas, taught separately from philosophy, natural law or civil law, and came to be written by professional academics or theoretically inclined diplomats. 1 Until then what existed was the droit public de l’Europe or ‘external public law’. Britain in particular had to
presumptively a moral obligation’. 38 Thus, if humanitarian intervention comes to enjoy the viewpoint of a moral ideal, as was overwhelmingly claimed during the Kosovo operation, 39 whereas non-intervention does not, the latter is defective in the focal meaning. 40 Legal orders do not always satisfy the ideal order and attribute the quality of law to rules which are outside the fringes of the focal meaning. However, unjust laws are not
NATO’s employment of military power against the government of Slobodan Milosevic over Kosovo has been among the most controversial aspects of the Alliance’s involvement in South East Europe since the end of the Cold War. The air operations between March and June 1999 have been variously described as war, ‘humanitarian war’, ‘virtual war’, intervention and ‘humanitarian intervention’ by the conflict
This book is an attempt at a comprehensive presentation of the history of humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century, the heyday of this controversial doctrine. It starts with a brief presentation of the present situation and debate. The theoretical first part of the book starts with the genealogy of the idea, namely the quest for the progenitors of the idea in the sixteenth and seventeenth century which is a matter of controversy. Next the nineteenth century ‘civilization-barbarity’ dichotomy is covered and its bearing on humanitarian intervention, with its concomitant Eurocentric/Orientalist gaze towards the Ottomans and other states, concluding with the reaction of the Ottomans (as well as the Chinese and Japanese). Then the pivotal international law dimension is scrutinized, with the arguments of advocates and opponents of humanitarian intervention from the 1830s until the 1930s. The theoretical part of the book concludes with nineteenth century international political theory and intervention (Kant, Hegel, Cobden, Mazzini and especially J.S. Mill). In the practical second part of the book four cases studies of humanitarian intervention are examined in considerable detail: the Greek case (1821-1831), the Lebanon/Syria case (1860-61), the Balkan crisis and Bulgarian case (1875-78) in two chapters, and the U.S. intervention in Cuba (1895-98). Each cases study concludes with its bearing on the evolution of international norms and rules of conduct in instances of humanitarian plights. The concluding chapter identifies the main characteristics of intervention on humanitarian grounds during this period and today’s criticism and counter-criticism.
failure of its internal aspect would affect sovereignty as a whole and this is of particular interest to humanitarian intervention. Thus, we need to consider the constitution of state sovereignty and revisit the contract theories. According to Locke, the protection of people’s natural rights endows the state with the political right to sovereignty. 8 Consequently, the morality invested in sovereignty