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International organisations are a central component of modern international society. This book provides a concise account of the principles and norms of international law applicable to the intergovernmental organisation (IGO). It defines and explains inter-governmentalism and the role of law in its regulation. The book presents case studies that show how the law works within an institutional order dominated by politics. After a note on the key relationship between the IGO and its member states, it examines the basic relationship between the UN and states in terms of membership through admissions, withdrawal, expulsion, suspension, and representation. The debate about the extent of the doctrine of legal powers is addressed through case studies. Institutional lawmaking in the modern era is discussed with particular focus on at the impact of General Assembly Resolutions on outer space and the Health Regulations of the World Health Organization. Non-forcible measures adopted by the UN and similar IGOs in terms of their legality (constitutionality and conformity to international law), legitimacy and effectiveness, is covered next. The different military responses undertaken by IGOs, ranging from observation and peacekeeping, to peace enforcement and war-fighting, are discussed in terms of legality and practice. The book also considers the idea of a Responsibility to Protect and the development of secondary rules of international law to cover the wrongful acts and omissions of IGOs. It ends with a note on how the primary and secondary rules of international law are upheld in different forms and mechanisms of accountability, including courts.
From the outset, this text makes it clear that the law of international organisations is dominated by the UN and is actually best understood through a focus on that organisation. It defines and explains inter-governmentalism and the role of law in its regulation. The chapters in the new edition are not only re-ordered (with some merging), but have largely been rewritten with the insertion of a number of case studies that help to bring home how the law works within an institutional order dominated by politics. The case studies highlight the debates that surround
theoretical lenses. Starting with the orthodox legal position, positivism, these approaches help the reader to understand the differing viewpoints on the nature and function of IGOs which, as will be seen, have a profound impact on the way law is understood, interpreted and applied to IGOs. Inter-governmentalism The focus of this work is on inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and it is, therefore, correct to state that such organisations are created by, and consist of, states, though other subjects of international law (including other organisations) and other
of an overall objective to organise ‘police co-operation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism’ (Art. K: 9 (9)). Yet, in 1997, counter terrorism was made a separate objective of the slimmed-down Third Pillar in its own right. The other major change was the introduction of a shared right of initiative for the Commission in what remained of the Third Pillar. Having introduced the Third Pillar’s basic institutional structure, it is worth highlighting the backdrop to these changes, namely the constant battle between communitarisation and inter-governmentalism
series of predominantly economic co-operation programmes, and ASEAN regards the EU as an important point of reference (Wong, 2012; Allison, 2015). Inherently, the differences between the EU’s and ASEAN’s founding motivations and norms of interaction – the EU as aspiring towards greater supranationalism and the ASEAN focusing strictly on inter-governmentalism and the norms of non-interference – have traditionally limited the EU’s influence on ASEAN to the economic domain (Allison, 2015). In 1997, Paul Stares and Nicolas Régaud argued that the European Union had distinct
Justice operate in a way which places constraints on national sovereignty. Inter-governmentalism . The primacy of governments in decision-making (i.e. decisions are between governments and not over them). Sovereignty . The (old-fashioned) idea that each state is able to do whatever it likes, without constraint. Subsidiarity . The idea that decisions should be made at the lowest practicable level. The Lisbon Treaty was designed to build on the failed draft constitution by incorporating much of its thinking in seeking to streamline the decision-making processes
‘emergency brake’ procedure, similar in language to the previous Luxembourg and Ionian compromises, whereby – if a state believes that a proposal adversely affects fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system – it can refer the matter to the European chap7.indd 190 26/05/2010 09:27:24 Looking back, looking forward 191 Council for a decision within four months. There is, therefore, an attempt to balance off within Lisbon the trends of communitarisation and some residual inter-governmentalism, although legal and political commentators were split as to the likely
tight governmental control with policy-making. Inter-governmentalism is a term used to describe cooperation between governments, but because of the intensity of cooperation within EPC, ‘governments did not monopolize the system to the extent assumed by intergovernmental approaches’ (M. E. Smith 1998a : 308). Without necessarily accepting that ‘transgovernmentalism was the key feature of EPC from the
European foreign policy can be described and analysed as essentially an intergovernmental process. This suggests that the governments of the member states effectively control a process where unanimity is the rule. The problem with this model of policy-making is that the notion of inter-governmentalism also implies that member states remain the ‘classical sovereign states of realist theory’, independent and
have written: In principle, it [the Commission] should have had no formal part, but Delors, Emile Noel, and Francois Lamoureux, his institutional expert, attended the working meetings of foreign ministers and officials. These meetings were used to define the agenda and impede governments from advancing ideas of their own. The Commission used its familiarity with the integration agenda to freeze out or discredit proposals meant to uphold inter-governmentalism. All proposals were drafted by these three, without reference to other Commissioners. 19 Most of