It has been accepted since antiquity that some restraint should be observed during armed conflict. This book examines the apparent dichotomy and introduces any study of the law of armed conflict by considering the nature and legality of war. The purpose of what is known as the law of armed conflict or, more commonly, the law of war is to reduce the horrors inherent therein to the greatest extent possible, bearing in mind the political purpose for which the war is fought, namely to achieve one's policies over one's enemies. The discussion on the history and sources of the law of armed conflict pays most attention to warfare on land because that is the region for which most agreements have been drawn up, although attention has been accorded to both aerial and naval warfare where it has been considered necessary. Traditionally, international law was divided into the law of war and the law of peace, with no intermediate stage between. Although diplomatic relations between belligerents are normally severed once a conflict has commenced, there remain a number of issues, not all of which are concerned with their inter-belligerent relations, which require them to remain in contact. War crimes are violations of the and customs of the law of armed conflict and are punishable whether committed by combatants or civilians, including the nationals of neutral states. The book also talks about the rights and duties of the Occupying Power, civil defence, branches of international law and prisoners of war.
Uses and Misuses of International Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian
conference; that is to say, the project had resonated favourably both in the halls
of power and in public opinion, and imperial France seemed particularly open to it.
The first president of the new humanitarian society was a former officer in Napoleon
III’s army: Swiss general Guillaume-Henri Dufour. This serves as a reminder that the lawsofwar ( jus in bello ) are
first and foremost the business of the belligerents – the political powers
– and that the terms of humanitarian conventions have
ethical positioning that brings into question all forms of violence, most especially the legitimate violence constituted through the force of law. Denying the constituted embodiment of life, lawful violence is dehumanising. This in turn gives rise to claims about the universal rights of humans in international law and its associative lawsofwar.
Violence is the Result of Underdevelopment
Domesticated in the shadow of juridical power by the threat of incarceration, critics of the previous position might also point to our shared material gains and sense of
The Law and Politics of Responding to Attacks against Aid Workers
Julia Brooks and Rob Grace
( Los Angeles : Sage ), pp.
77 – 101 .
Bridges , K. M. ( 2010 ), ‘ Between Aid and Politics: Diagnosing the Challenge of Humanitarian Advocacy in Politically Complex Environments – the Case of Darfur, Sudan ’, Third World Quarterly , 31 : 8 , 1251 – 69 .
Brooks , J. ( 2015 ), Humanitarians Under Attack: Tensions, Disparities, and Legal Gaps in Protection .
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
Cambridge, MA .
Bussmann , M. and Schneider , G. ( 2016 ), ‘ A Porous Humanitarian Shield: The LawsofWar, the Red Cross, and the Killing of Civilians
Traditionally, international law was
divided into the lawofwar and the law of peace, with no intermediate
stage between. 1 When
hostilities began, usually following a declaration of war, 2 and non-parties to
the conflict were held by the belligerents to be subject to the duties
of, and they claimed the rights pertaining to, neutrals, 3 war was recognised
and the lawofwar came into operation. Frequently
violations of the lawsofwar.
Beyond Nuremburg and Tokyo:
responses to ethnic cleansing and genocide after the Cold
The ICTY and the ICTR were the first
mechanisms for international criminal justice since the post-World War
II Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals. Although heavily criticised, both at
the time and in later years, especially over
One of the oldest rules of the lawofwar provides for the protection of the civilian noncombatant
population and forbids making civilians the direct object of
This rule appears in the Hague Regulations’ ban on the bombardment
of undefended places, the requirement that an attacking officer should
terrorism is generally thought to fall is the lawofwar, which is twofold. It is customarily divided into ‘ jus ad bellum , the justice of war’ and ‘ jus in bello , justice in war’. 5 Detailed discussion of the principles of international law can be found here in the essay of Michael Byers and the very significant response by Dino Kritsiotis. I wish to make just two points about it here. First, international law is not an immutable code that stands forever remote from public opinion. There are grounds for saying that the Bush government has sought and even obtained a
Gerald de Barri and regnal solidarity in early thirteenth–century England
In his Invectives Gerald de Barri, writing c. 1200, declared the English to be ‘of all peoples under heaven the most worthless; for they have been subdued by the Normans and reduced by the lawofwar to perpetual slavery ( in servitutem perpetuam belli iure redactam ). ... In their own land the English are the slaves of the Normans, and the most worthless of slaves.’ 1 Prima facie this opinion, one of Gerald’s more famous pronouncements, appears to clash with the view of many modern historians who have thought that although after the Norman Conquest, as
that jurisdiction over war crimes is universal, any country holding a
war criminal would possess jurisdiction to try him.
Allegations by one state of breaches of the lawofwar by
another may lead to reprisals, so long as these are still permissible;
or, subject to the special rules concerning its jurisdiction, be
submitted for adjudication by the International Court of Justice which
can, at the most