Nationalism has reasserted itself today as the political force of our times, remaking European politics wherever one looks. Britain is no exception, and in the midst of Brexit, it has even become a vanguard of nationalism's confident return to the mainstream. Brexit, in the course of generating a historically unique standard of sociopolitical uncertainty and constitutional intrigue, tore apart the two-party compact that had defined the parameters of political contestation for much of twentieth-century Britain. This book offers a wide-ranging picture of the different theoretical accounts relevant to addressing nationalism. It briefly repudiates the increasingly common attempts to read contemporary politics through the lens of populism. The book explores the assertion of 'muscular liberalism' and civic nationalism. It examines more traditional, conservative appeals to racialised notions of blood, territory, purity and tradition as a means of reclaiming the nation. The book also examines how neoliberalism, through its recourse to discourses of meritocracy, entrepreneurial self and individual will, alongside its exaltation of a 'points-system' approach to the ills of immigration, engineers its own unique rendition of the nationalist crisis. There are a number of important themes through which the process of liberal nationalism can be documented - what Arun Kundnani captured, simply and concisely, as the entrenchment of 'values racism'. These include the 'faux-feminist' demonisation of Muslims.
-economic or geopolitical – in response to which
they have offered diagnoses and policy prescriptions. The counterculture of the 1960s and
energy crisis of the following decade inspired the writings of Irving Kristol and Norman
Podhoretz; ‘second generation’ neoconservatives such as Robert Kagan enjoyed
prominence in wake of 9/11. 4 Sections two and three
consider the eras of the ‘ungovernability thesis’ and ‘war on terror’
While neoconservatives have espoused liberalnationalism and produc-tivism,
The European ambitions of some of the Italian delegates were a relic of early
liberalnationalism but were out of touch with the realism that began to dictate
international relations after 1860. Italy’s vision of Europe was very different
from that of other countries. In its enthusiasm, Italy had reverted to an obsolete
ideology, as if it could shore up its own legitimacy by making a bold appeal
for a European future. Most of Europe’s governments had long considered that
1 U. Pesci, Firenze Capitale (1865–1870) (Florence 1904), p. 387
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has written extensively on the European Union.
This is the only in-depth account of his project. Published now in a second
edition to coincide with the celebration of his ninetieth birthday, a new
preface considers Habermas’s writings on the eurozone and refugee crises,
populism and Brexit, and the presidency of Emmanuel Macron. Placing an
emphasis on the conception of the EU that informs Habermas’s political
prescriptions, the book is divided into two main parts. The first considers the
unfolding of 'social modernity' at the level of the EU. Among the
subjects covered are Habermas's concept of juridification, the
latter's affinities with integration theories such as neofunctionalism, and
the application of Habermas's democratic theory to the EU. The second part
addresses 'cultural modernity' in Europe – 'Europessimism'
is argued to be a subset of the broader cultural pessimism that assailed the
project of modernity in the late twentieth century, and with renewed intensity
in the years since 9/11. Interdisciplinary in approach, this book engages
with European/EU studies, critical theory, political theory, international
relations, intellectual history, comparative literature, and philosophy. Concise
and clearly written, it will be of interest to students, scholars and
professionals with an interest in these disciplines, as well as to a broader
readership concerned with the future of Europe
neoconservatives such as Robert Kagan enjoyed prominence in wake of 9/11.4
Sections two and three consider the eras of the ‘ungovernability thesis’ and
‘war on terror’ respectively.
While neoconservatives have espoused liberalnationalism and productivism, Habermas has called for further rationalisation. The choice for
liberal-democratic politics, this would seem to suggest, is either a reification
of the early modern political concepts or their transcendence; the third
option of Nietzschean disavowal is viewed with alarm by neoconservatives
and Habermas alike. Indeed, to the
, nationalism is characterised at
a fundamental level by the belief, demand even, that each nation should be
governed by its own sovereign state.
We can usefully sub-divide nationalism
into three categories:
liberalnationalism; reactionary nationalism; radical nationalism.
According to this school of thought,
mankind is naturally divided into nations, all of which have
and failing to see exactly what the Nizam of Hyderabad did, had
no chance of observing the others do homage. 6
The Gaekwad of Baroda was Sayaji Rao
III, the young prince whom the Prince of Wales had met in 1875. He had
recently converted to a liberalnationalism, making contributions to the
Indian National Congress and Dadabhai Naoroji’s British
Or, as is put succinctly by Jason Read, paraphrasing Balibar’s unflinching
interrogation of civic nationalism: ‘the very idea that one’s own nation has
transcended [ethnic] nationalism is itself a kind of [ethnic] nationalism’.14
Liberalnationalism and integration
Let us put this more precisely. Those racialised denizens who fall outside
the parameters of a pre-given, automated body politic (i.e. the white ethnic majority seen as constitutive of the nation) are said to encounter liberal
democracy from a position of want or lack, a liberal deficit that
Bordering intimacy is a study of how borders and dominant forms of intimacy, such as family, are central to the governance of postcolonial states such as Britain. The book explores the connected history between contemporary border regimes and the policing of family with the role of borders under European and British empires. Building upon postcolonial, decolonial and black feminist theory, the investigation centres on how colonial bordering is remade in contemporary Britain through appeals to protect, sustain and make family life. Not only was family central to the making of colonial racism but claims to family continue to remake, shore up but also hide the organisation of racialised violence in liberal states. Drawing on historical investigations, the book investigates the continuity of colonial rule in numerous areas of contemporary government – family visa regimes, the policing of sham marriages, counterterror strategies, deprivation of citizenship, policing tactics, integration policy. In doing this, the book re-theorises how we think of the connection between liberal government, race, family, borders and empire. In using Britain as a case, this opens up further insights into the international/global circulations of liberal empire and its relationship to violence.
Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) returned to public discourse in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union imploded and globalization erupted. Best known for The Great Transformation, Polanyi’s wide-ranging thought anticipated twenty-first-century civilizational challenges of ecological collapse, social disintegration and international conflict, and warned that the unbridled domination of market capitalism would engender nationalist protective counter-movements. In Karl Polanyi and Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, Radhika Desai and Kari Polanyi Levitt bring together prominent and new thinkers in the field to extend the boundaries of our understanding of Polanyi's life and work. Kari Polanyi Levitt's opening essay situates Polanyi in the past century shaped by Keynes and Hayek, and explores how and why his ideas may shape the twenty-first century. Her analysis of his Bennington Lectures, which pre-dated and anticipated The Great Transformation, demonstrates how Central European his thought and chief concerns were. The next several contributions clarify, for the first time in Polanyi scholarship, the meaning of money as a fictitious commodity. Other contributions resolve difficulties in understanding the building blocks of Polanyi's thought: fictitious commodities, the double movement, the United States' exceptional development, the reality of society and socialism as freedom in a complex society. The volume culminates in explorations of how Polanyi has influenced, and can be used to develop, ideas in a number of fields, whether income inequality, world-systems theory or comparative political economy. Contributors: Fred Block, Michael Brie, Radhika Desai, Michael Hudson, Hannes Lacher, Kari Polanyi Levitt, Chikako Nakayama, Jamie Peck, Abraham Rotstein, Margaret Somers, Claus Thomasberger, Oscar Ugarteche Galarza.