Total war tends to create a situation that falls back on established social and cultural discourses and institutional arrangements at the same time that it provides the opportunity for a shifting and renegotiation of these arrangements. This book explores how the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) drew upon, and/or subverted cultural mythologies to make sense of their wartime service. It focuses on this renegotiation of gender and examines seven key themes implicit in this process. The first theme concerns the ways women's military organizations utilized traditional notions of genteel femininity and its accompanying nurturance, cheerfulness and devotion in their promise of service, yet went beyond the parameters of such cultural mythologies. The second focuses on the gendering of military heroism. The third theme addresses the context of female military service in terms of the preparation women received, the opportunities they were given and the risks they took, and focuses on their coping behaviours. Theme four focuses specifically on women's transgression into the masculine terrain of driving and mechanics and shares the ways they developed skills and competencies previously off-limits for women. Such transgressions almost invariably led to women having to negotiate masculine authority and develop skills in autonomy, independence and assertiveness - the focus of theme five. The last two themes discussed in the book address the integration and consolidation of women's organizations as the war progressed and their service became indispensable.
This chapter deals with the Harmel report and the involvement during 1967 of Britain and Germany in the reappraisal of NATO and its future tasks, proposed by Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister. That such a reappraisal was both necessary and urgent was evident after the French withdrawal from the military organization of NATO and in the light of questioning by public opinion in NATO countries of the utility of the organisation. For Germany, the exercise was regarded as an important opportunity to reinforce its own Ostpolitik and to ensure that the German problem was deemed by members of the Alliance as an essential ingredient of a settlement in Europe. An important consideration, in terms of Anglo-German relations, was that Britain and Germany co-operated closely as co-rapporteurs for one of the Harmel study working groups.
that terrorists who do not act as distinguishable members of a regular militaryorganization either have or could have combatant status.
The laws of war are not direct adaptations of the principles of morality to the circumstances of war. 11 They are human creations designed to serve certain purposes. The main purpose they are intended to serve is the separation of war from other human activities. They are designed to insulate ordinary civilian life from the destructive and disruptive effects of war. Combatant status is a legal artefact that has a crucial
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
one of its aims. I hope that it will also generate further reflection
on the links between war, militarization and the environment, as well as
encourage debate on how militaryorganizations control, manage, and
modify vast areas of our planet.
This book has stressed how militarized environments have acted as
contact zones between military and civilian actors and how anti-base
protesters mobilized nature imaginatively and physically to challenge
militarization. I want to end by exploring the military–civilian character of militarized environments at two sites in
The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.
Raiding war and globalization in the early modern world
activities were often highly organized, employing tactical systems and
strategic objectives that suggest militaryorganization. Anthropologists and historians have found numerous cases of indigenous societies reorganizing their military
systems in response to commercial developments and colonial incursions during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.9 Further, raiding warfare was hardly confined to indigenous societies in the early modern period. I have argued in War and
Conflict in the Early Modern World that historians need to investigate ‘the new forms
them, doubts which seem logical enough on the surface. One could
34 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990 (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 81.
35 One could go back to Otto Hintze, ‘MilitaryOrganization and the Organization of the State’ (originally 1906), in Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed.
by Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 178–215;
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, I: A History of Power from
the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986);
Charles Tilly, Coercion
’ (Shachtman, 2007 ). Of course, the explicit statement by elected officials that
‘the well-being of our soldiers must remain the first priority of a
state’ (Cohen and Shelton, 1999 , p. 27) may not give the true reason why professional militaryorganizations are keen not to expose their members’ lives to risk
unnecessarily. It may be explained by the fact that a significant number of
casualties might negatively impact the recruitment of potential
The expansion and significance of violence in early modern
that most Africans would not recognize the terminology: ‘precolonial’ remains a
popular, generic term for much of what happened before c.1880. But perhaps any
objection is a question of nomenclature, rather than of periodization itself.5 What is
clear is that by the second half of the fifteenth century, much of the continent was
on the threshold of a new and violent era, and the ensuing four centuries would see
innovative forms of militaryorganization, new wars, as well as new ways of fighting
them, and novel cultures of militarism underpinning such systems