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An exercise in pluralist political theory
Author: Allyn Fives

This is a book about parents, power, and children and, in particular, the legitimacy of parents' power over their children. It takes seriously the challenge posed by moral pluralism, and considers the role of both theoretical rationality and practical judgement in resolving moral dilemmas associated with parental power. The book first examines the prevailing view about parental power: a certain form of paternalism, justified treatment of those who lack the qualities of an agent, and one that does not generate moral conflicts. It proposes an alternative, pluralist view of paternalism before showing that even paternalism properly understood is of limited application when we evaluate parental power. According to the caretaker thesis, parental power makes up for the deficits in children's agency, and for that reason children should be subjected to standard institutional paternalism. The liberation thesis stands at the other end of the spectrum concerning children's rights. The book then addresses the counter-argument that issues of legitimacy arise in the political domain and not in respect of parent-child relations. It also examines the 'right to parent' and whether parents should be licensed, monitored, or trained children's voluntariness and competence, and the right to provide informed consent for medical treatment and research participation. Finally, the book talks about parents' efforts to share a way of life with their children and the State's efforts to shape the values of future citizens through civic education. The overall approach taken has much more in common with the problem-driven political philosophy.

Matt Sleat

demands of liberal legitimacy. The freedom of non-liberals is preserved in a liberal regime, and the legitimacy of that regime to rule over them, only by equating their will with the will of liberals. But this is, in effect, to ignore their will completely. Hence the question of the legitimacy of coercing non-liberals, and how they are treated as free and equal in a liberal order that they reject, remains.21 03-Liberal_realism_(Chap 3)_071-088.indd 75 07/02/2013 15:17 76 Liberal realism Secondly, it does seem strange to begin with the position of moral pluralism

in Liberal realism
Abstract only
Allyn Fives

to speak of parents’ paternalism, then we should use Gert and Culver’s pluralist definition. Their definition is of great importance for the discipline of political philosophy, for it draws attention to moral pluralism and moral dilemmas. We have seen that moral dilemmas can arise when we evaluate parental power. According to Williams, a moral dilemma arises ‘where there is a conflict between two moral judgments that a man is disposed to make relevant to deciding what to do’. In addition, I would add that we are faced with moral dilemmas when we cannot identify a

in Evaluating parental power
Stuart White

, then one is rejecting the idea of human rights, not calling for a more pluralistic interpretation of the concept. Mouffe does not want to go this far. She says that her version of moral pluralism nevertheless holds that ‘some ethico-political conditions need to be fulfilled in order for a regime to qualify as just’. So she accepts some degree of moral universalism, i.e., that there are some standards of just treatment applicable to all societies. It would be interesting to know more about the content of this universalism; and about how its content compares to

in Religion and rights
Open Access (free)
Some philosophical obstacles and their resolution
David Heyd

our response to beliefs and practices that we hold to be legitimate even though contrary to our own views. Such a concept of tolerance is typical of value pluralism: we refrain from persecuting other religions, from hindering the life plans that look to us wasteful and silly, or from trying to convince people that their aesthetic tastes are cheap, since we recognise them as legitimate even if wrong in our eyes or lacking in value. Pluralism has many versions: there is moral pluralism of the kind Isaiah Berlin (probably on the basis of J. S. Mill’s view) has

in The culture of toleration in diverse societies
Abstract only
Allyn Fives

pluralism (or, as she refers to it, ‘moral pluralism’): The liberalism of fear in fact does not rest on a theory of moral pluralism. It does not, to be sure, offer a summum bonum toward which all political agents should strive, but it certainly does begin with a summum malum , which all of us know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself. To that extent the liberalism of fear makes a universal and especially a cosmopolitan claim

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
Richard Boyd

call social or cultural pluralism. Within broad limits, citizens are not expected to share deeper religious, moral, or cultural values; these are private matters about which citizens are free to agree or disagree. Yet Shils also envisions a more fundamental kind of pluralism – what we might call moral or philosophical pluralism – whereby conflicts exist not just among divergent religious or cultural traditions, but in the very nature of moral systems themselves. One of his clearest statements of this moral pluralism is the following: ‘Above all, civil politics

in The calling of social thought
India’s response to the ‘ghosts of the republic’
Pragna Paramita Mondal

) ‘ Reproductive tourism as moral pluralism in motion ’, Journal of Medical Ethics , 28 , 337 – 341 . Pennings , G. , de Wert , G. , Shenfield , F. , Cohen , J. , Tarlatzis , B. , and

in Statelessness, governance, and the problem of citizenship
Duncan Wilson

.130 He also believed that the need for collaboration resulted from ‘the moral pluralism of our society’, which had given ‘all of mankind reason to ask how much longer we can go on assuming that what can be done has to be done or should be, 82 The making of British bioethics without uncovering the ethical principles we mean to abide by’.131 In his preface to The Patient as Person, Ramsey argued that all sides benefited from interdisciplinary dialogue ‘about the urgent moral issues arising in medical practice’.132 He claimed that doctors and scientists could

in The making of British bioethics
Stephen Turner

. MacIntyre makes this point relentlessly, when he argues that the existence of moral pluralism, in contemporary society, and in English society in the nineteenth century, meant that there was no such common base. MacIntyre makes another point, which bears directly on the problem of the need for a non-reflexive basis for social life. He said that the very lack of a common project meant that society elevated and depended on what he called ‘the secondary virtues of co-operation, of compromise, of a pragmatic approach, of

in Post-everything