1969. Doing so will also help contextualise subsequent analysis. For example, the discussion on Northern Ireland will consider, among other issues, the use of law against subversion, what on-island terrorism meant for the Defence Forces’ operational posture and the challenges which border security posed for the frontline agencies. Finally, and by way of placing contemporary Irish national security
). On September 25 the government, through its spokesman, confirmed that Ireland was not under threat of a direct attack but could suffer ‘collateral damage’ in the event of an attack close by (O’ Connor and Minihan 2001). Days later, on October 3, the State’s national security policy was significantly revised, with the introduction of new management structures for emergency planning (O’ Connor 2001b
On the afternoon of September 11 2001 the Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach), Bertie Ahern ordered the ‘heads of the security services of key government departments’ to undertake a complete re-evaluation of measures to protect the state from attack. Hence, underway within hours of the 9/11 outrage in the United States was potentially the most far-reaching review of Irish national security in decades. This book, an academic investigation of Irish national security policy as it has operated since 9/11, provides a theoretically informed analysis of that re-evaluation and the decisions that were taken as a consequence of it up until September 2008. In so doing, it draws on unprecedented access to Ireland's police, security and intelligence agencies; over twenty senior personnel agreed to be interviewed. Questions are raised over the effectiveness of the Irish agencies, the relative absence of naval and airborne defence and the impact on national security of the policy imperative to transform the Defence Forces, particularly the army, for more robust missions overseas. The book also considers the securitisation of Irish immigration policy and the apparent absence of a coherent integration policy despite international evidence suggesting the potential for radicalisation in socially marginalised western communities. Theoretically, the book demonstrates the utility to the analysis of national security policy of three conceptual models of historical institutionalism, governmental politics and threat evaluation.
This book examines the intellectual frameworks within which the case for war in Iraq has developed in the US and the UK. It analyzes the neoconservative roots of the decision to go to war. The book also analyzes the humanitarian intervention rationale that was developed in the context of the Kosovo campaign, Tony Blair's presentation of it, and the case of Iraq. It looks at the parallel processes through which the George Bush administration and Blair government constructed their cases for war, analyzing similarities and divergences in approach. The book considers the loci of the intelligence failure over Iraq, the lessons for the intelligence communities, and the degree to which the decision to go to war in Iraq represented a policy rather than an intelligence failure. It then complements the analyses of US prewar intelligence failures by analysing what post-war inquiries have revealed about the nature of the failure in the UK case. The book discusses the relationship between intelligence and policymaking. It looks at how US Congress dealt with intelligence before the war. The book also examines how the Bush administration tried to manage public opinion in support of its war policies. It then looks at the decisionmaking process of the Bush administration in the year before the war in Iraq. Finally, the book also provides excerpts from a number of speeches and documents which are key to understanding the nature of national security decisionmaking and intelligence failure.
3 Freedom of information and national security: where’s the harm in that? Jennifer Kavanagh Introduction National security and freedom of information are not natural bedfellows. Sometimes, undemocratic actions are thought necessary to protect the democracy on which the authority of the State is based: surveillance, stop and search policing and other security measures can present real challenges to democratic governance. Furthermore, the release of information may itself undermine the authority of the State. National security concerns for legitimate secrecy have
this scenario, the motivation for the ‘citizen warrior’ to take up arms is ultimately to shield the honour and integrity of his ‘beautiful soul’ against the perils of a dangerous and anarchic world ( Elshtain, 1987 ). Whether or not this account of warfare is accurate, it is the quintessence of the conventional rendition of national security, namely, protection of the boundaries of a nation state
The previous chapter summarised the Irish national security apparatus, considered the State’s responses to threats during the Emergency and during the Troubles and drew some comparisons between Ireland’s frontline agencies and those of other states. Attention focuses now on the literature of Irish national security policy. This review will be divided into three sections to
5 Vaccine production, national security anxieties and the unstable state in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Mexico Ana María Carrillo Introduction Since pre-Columbian times, Mexico has experienced notable periods of progress in science and technology. Political, economic and social problems have, however, often interrupted these developments, thus the country has been forced to rebuild
Second, there has been an intense scramble to conclude deals with Horn states to service the logistical requirements of the Yemen conflict. Should the conflict be resolved in a manner which contributes to Saudi national security concerns regarding Iran and other non-state actors such as the Houthis, al-Qaeda 9 and Islamic State, it could contribute to the beginning of an eventual thaw in Saudi–Iranian relations while enhancing regional and international security. At the time of writing, this eventuality looks to be
Introduction This strategy is guided by principled realism. It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests… We are also realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress . The White House, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ ( The White House, 2017