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The media and international intervention

The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq's war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the 'new Hitler' after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This book is about how the media have interpreted conflict and international intervention in the years after the Cold War. By comparing press coverage of a number of different wars and crises, it seeks to establish which have been the dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order and to discover how far the patterns established prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have subsequently changed. The key concern is with the legitimacy of Western intervention: the aim is to investigate the extent to which Western military action is represented in news reporting as justifiable and necessary. The book presents a study that looks at UK press coverage of six conflicts and the international response to them: two instances of 'humanitarian military intervention' (Somalia and Kosovo); two cases in which the international community was criticised for not intervening (Bosnia and Rwanda); and two post-9/11 interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq). There were a number of overlapping UN and US interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s. Operation Restore Hope was the first major instance of post-Cold War humanitarian military intervention, following the precedent set by the establishment of 'safe havens' for Iraqi Kurds and other minorities at the end of the 1991 Gulf war.

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Post-Cold War conflicts and the media
Philip Hammond

making sense of international conflict and cooperation. The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq’s war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the ‘new Hitler’ after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Neither the erstwhile Soviet enemy nor Arab states raised any serious objections

in Framing post-Cold War conflicts
Joseph Heller

accepted that Egypt would not be victorious and he could not risk losing a war to Israel. Furthermore, Nasser had not even challenged the presence of the UN force in the Sinai Peninsula. The balance of power had to be preserved, but Israel might be exaggerating Egypt’s military build-up. 3 The new administration did not consider Nasser a new Hitler and the Arabs would not ignore his removal from the scene

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Philip M. Taylor

’ staged for the entertainment of a global TV audience which had been primed by months of justificatory propaganda about Saddam Hussein being a ‘new Hitler’ who needed to be taught a lesson by freedom- and peace-loving nations. But, as we should by now appreciate, appearances can be deceptive. It turned out subsequently that, in fact, only about 8% of the weapons used against Iraq were ‘smart’. The vast majority of bombs used were of the old-fashioned ‘dumb’ variety, dropped by B-52 bombers from the Vietnam era from heights of around 30,000 feet on the Iraqi troops

in Munitions of the Mind
Stefanie Wichhart

conviction that Nasser was a new Hitler (or Mussolini) permeated western responses to Egypt's actions in 1956. It is therefore no surprise that the imagery of fascism, so easily recognisable to readers worldwide only 11 years after the end of the Second World War, was frequently used in political cartoons as the Suez Crisis developed. Le Canard enchaîné appropriated the Munich analogy right away in the first issue to appear after the nationalisation of the canal, with a stylised image of an ancient Egyptian with his arms and legs contorted into the shape of a swastika

in Comic empires
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A defeat borne of nationalist bloodshed
Ashley Lavelle

Nazi regime, Stalin was on occasion depicted as the new Hitler. These were uncharted waters, because previously New York intellectuals had placed communism on the left and fascism on the right. According to Wald, a highly influential work in this context was Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, first published in 1951. Written by a fellow New York intellectual, the book found parity between Bolshevism and Nazism, and it anticipated that the Soviet Union might act in the future just as the Nazi regime did in the 1930s. Such themes dominated the thinking of

in The politics of betrayal
Open Access (free)
A neoclassical realist perspective of Saudi foreign policy towards Iran in the post-2011 Middle East
May Darwich

adopted an intense anti-Iranian rhetoric with the Kingdom as the regional leader in rolling back Iranian influence in Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. He has consistently demonised Iran by blaming the Iranians for global terrorism and the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. He also held Iran responsible for sectarian militias and refered to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the ‘new Hitler’. 78 The Saudi Kingdom, under King Salman, has replaced the old glue of Wahhabism and the monarchy with a

in Saudi Arabia and Iran
Roger Spalding
Christopher Parker

devastation similar to that which resulted from the Second World War. What Rumsfeld actually said, though, was that the politicians of the 1930s did not act when they had evidence: Mein Kampf . Logically, this did not support the idea of going to war without conclusive evidence, which was what Rumsfeld wanted. 48 This was not, of course, a logical argument, but an associational one. The Secretary of State was concerned primarily to sell the war by making Saddam the new Hitler. A final approach that a historian might make to this extract would be to ask: what is the

in Historiography
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Regime change in Macbeth
Richard Wilson

problem that Shakespeare repeatedly stages in Macbeth , of the trouble, when the world-historical time comes, in making the ‘due decision’ [ 5,4,17 ]. For it was his mystique of an ideal sovereignty which compelled Kantorowicz to make the dismaying declaration, just a day in 1933 before being ejected by the new Hitler regime as a Jew from his professorship at Frankfurt, that ‘if current events are

in Free Will
Raymond Hinnebusch

). Israeli elites were, nevertheless, initially divided and the decision for war was, in some ways, a product of intra-elite power rivalries. An activist camp, dominant in the military and led by disciples of Ben Gurion such as Moshe Dayan, the hero of the Suez campaign, Yigal Allon and Shimon Peres, saw the Arabs as an implacable enemy and Nasser as the new Hitler. They were convinced that Israel enjoyed the decisive military superiority to take on the enemy (Brecher 1972: 552; Smith 1996: 196). At the same time, the irredentist Herut party of Menachem Begin was growing

in The international politics of the Middle East