This book provides an introduction to the technical aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. It considers nuclear weapons from varying perspectives, including the technology perspective, which views them as spillovers from nuclear energy programmes; and the theoretical perspective, which looks at the collision between national and international security involved in nuclear proliferation. The book aims to demonstrate that international security is unlikely to benefit from encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons except in situations where the security complex is already largely nuclearised. The political constraints on nuclear spread as solutions to the security dilemma are also examined in three linked categories, including a discussion of the phenomenon of nuclear-free zones, with particular emphasis on the zone covering Latin America. The remarkably consistent anti-proliferation policies of the United States are debated, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself, with special attention paid to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system, is frankly appraised.
This chapter is about nuclear technology and the technical interconnections between commercial and military nuclear programmes. It is also
about the spread of nuclear technology and the use to which it has been
put by a number of states, both inside and outside the NPT, to bring them
close to or even take them over the nuclearweapons threshold.
The scope of nuclear energy
Nuclear energy has peaceful applications and non-peaceful applications.
The centrepiece of all political efforts to curb the spread of nuclearweapons
In 2000, almost every state in the world (all except Cuba, India, Israel and
Pakistan) publicly subscribed once again to the principle that the spread
of nuclearweapons to states not already possessing them is dangerous
to international security and that it should therefore be energetically
discouraged.1 The occasion was the latest review conference of the 30year-old NPT, the chief international instrument for restricting nuclear
proliferation, and for reversing such proliferation as has occurred, if its
Nuclearweapons have been central to US alliance management in the post-1945
world. Successive administrations in Washington have sought to use
nuclearweapons as a means of bolstering the credibility of US global
security commitments. Yet, rather than simply being passive recipients
of US nuclear reassurances, US allies in Europe and Asia have actively
T HE A SIA -P ACIFIC IS
ONE of the most intensely nuclearized regions in the
world. It is the only region where nuclearweapons have been used in
attack, it has elicited grave international concern about nuclear
proliferation – namely in India, Pakistan and North Korea
– and it is home to three key recognized nuclearweapon
power differential between the US and its junior partners,
and because nuclearweapons are regarded by major powers as the jewel in
the crown of their military capabilities, realist theory would predict
that an alliance has negligible influence over the nature of nuclearweapons cooperation.
By contrast, institutional theory sees alliances as
independent phenomena that shape not only the structures within
Part III of the book
includes four case studies to elucidate the escalation risks associated with AI. These
studies demonstrate how and why military AI systems fused with advanced strategic
non-nuclearweapons (or conventional counterforce capabilities) might cause or exacerbate
escalation risks in future warfare. 1 They
also illuminate how these AI-augmented capabilities would work; despite the risks associated
with their deployment, great military powers will likely deploy them. Military commanders
Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare offers an innovative and counter-intuitive study of how and why AI-infused weapon systems will affect the strategic stability between nuclear-armed states. The book demystifies the hype surrounding AI in the context of nuclear weapons and, more broadly, future warfare. It highlights the potential, multifaceted intersections of this and other disruptive technology – robotics and autonomy, cyber, drone swarming, big-data analytics, and quantum communications – with nuclear stability. Anticipating and preparing for the consequences of the AI-empowered weapon systems is, therefore, fast becoming a critical task for national security and statecraft. The book considers the impact of these trends on deterrence, military escalation, and strategic stability between nuclear-armed states – especially China and the US. Surprisingly little research considers how AI might affect nuclear-armed states’ perceptions of others’ intentions, rational choices, or strategic decision-making psychology. The book addresses these topics and more. It provides penetrating, nuanced, and valuable insights grounded in the latest multi-disciplinary research. The book draws on a wealth of political and cognitive science, strategic studies, and technical analysis to shed light on the coalescence of developments in AI and other disruptive emerging technologies. It sketches a clear picture of the potential impact of AI on the digitized battlefield and broadens our understanding of critical questions for international affairs. AI will profoundly change how wars are fought, and how decision-makers think about nuclear deterrence, escalation management, and strategic stability – but not for the reasons you might think.
From the start of the Cold War to the presidency of Donald Trump, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But cooperation on policy, strategy, posture and deployment of US nuclear weapons has varied significantly between US alliances and over time. Partners in Deterrence goes beyond traditional accounts that focus on deterrence and reassurance in US nuclear policy, and instead places the objectives and influence of US allies at the centre of analysis. Through a series of case studies informed by a rigorous analytical framework, it reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, Partners in Deterrence provides important lessons for contemporary policy makers and makes an essential contribution to existing scholarship on alliances and nuclear weapons.
citizens if you do not kill or torture ours. That is, the principle of reciprocity. 2 A classic example is prisoner protection. If you
torture enemy combatants you have captured, your enemy will do the same to your POWs. The same
logic goes for using chemical weapons and even nuclearweapons. This is how mutual deterrence
This fits fully with the demands of sovereignty. Agreements that work meet the interests of
both parties. This depends, of course, on the existence of a reasonable parity of capacity