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This book explains theoretical work in postcolonial and postsocialist studies to offer a novel and distinctive insight into how Yugoslavia is configured by, and through, race. It presents the history of how ideas of racialised difference have been translated globally in Yugoslavia. The book provides a discussion on the critical race scholarship, global historical sociologies of 'race in translation' and south-east European cultural critique to show that the Yugoslav region is deeply embedded in global formations of race. It considers the geopolitical imagination of popular culture; the history of ethnicity; and transnational formations of race before and during state socialism, including the Non-Aligned Movement. The book also considers the post-Yugoslav discourses of security, migration, terrorism and international intervention, including the War on Terror and the refugee crisis. It elaborates how often-neglected aspects of the history of nationhood and migration reveal connections that tie the region into the global history of race. The book also explains the linkage between ethnic exclusivism and territory in the ethnopolitical logic of the Bosnian conflict and in the internationally mediated peace agreements that enshrined it: 'apartheid cartography'. Race and whiteness remained perceptible in post-war Bosnian identity discourses as new, open-ended forms of post-conflict international intervention developed.
simultaneously. Where democratic institutions and practices do exist, they are effectively subordinated to the tactical calculus of elite negotiations. In PMs, peace agreements are not ‘political settlements’ that endure; they are elite bargains that are only likely to hold as long as the political market conditions in which they were struck persist, a type of ‘permanent political unsettlement’ ( Bell and Pospisil, 2017 : 581). Overall, these states are not moving inexorably
2002 ( Unidad de Víctimas, 2013 ), despite the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas in 2016, displacement persists ( El Tiempo , 2021 ; UARIV, 2021 ). The Colombian government has tried to manage this humanitarian crisis in recent decades. It signed Law 387 in 1997 and, consecutively, Law 1448 in 2011. Under Law 387 the Unified Register of Displaced Population (Registro Único de Población Desplazada, RUPD) was set up and the National System of Integral Attention to People Displaced by Violence (Sistema Nacional de Atención Integral a la
of civil war in Sudan and six years after the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the main rebel movement of South Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). MSF had been involved in the Sudanese conflict since 1983. Most MSF sections had remained throughout the CPA process, and health activities were ongoing at the time of independence. In November 2012, MSF-H released a report entitled South Sudan
different parts of the country). As this transition occurs, there is a greater need to align activities with the GoSS to avoid duplication and improve the efficiency of resource use ( USAID, 2012a , 2012c ). The experience leading up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (up to 2005) demonstrated a period of coherence within the donor community, as the objective was clear and shared. However, following the signing of the agreement (post 2006) the Joint Donor Team has not been able to maintain alignment, within the donor community or with the GoSS ( Bennett et al. , 2010
‘ crisis of all superlatives ’ unfolding a ‘ crushing narrative of famine ’ combining a ‘ misuse of words and data ’, and a ‘ hype over image ’. Several components would be at work in this staging: a methodological imprecision of the IPC, a will of the UN to force a peace agreement, a media hype playing of the overbidding, and the fundraising of the NGOs that continue to treat ‘famines’. These announcements are then over-dramatised by
of war elites often results in a serious tradeoff between the promotion of peace and democracy (Söderström 2015 ; see also Jarstad and Sisk 2008 ). Overall, continuity of elites tends to be the defining trait despite the upheaval of war and peace agreements. The question, then, is how the legacy of these elites has played out over the years. Among cases where the armed conflict, and particularly a civil war, ended many years ago, Cambodia is a case where the degree of elite continuity is extreme. There, following the first elections, some of the peace signatories
communist party, sought unsuccessfully to prevent the country from becoming a Muslim theocracy. Despite carrying out a wave of assassinations and bombings lasting over a year (1982–83), the Ayatollah’s forces prevailed and the dissident terrorists were either killed or forced into exile. As these examples suggest, the end of wider-scale armed confrontations do not necessarily produce peace, nor do peace agreements necessarily lead to peace. On occasion, these outcomes set the stage for new warfare. This is true of “great wars” and the peace agreements formulated at their
no war to actual peace required a path-breaking move by Sadat and external mediation, as embodied by the US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, and later Carter as well. After 1973, peace was possible not guaranteed, and the process almost stalled at several points.2 In short, military force and the resultant wars cannot compel one or both parties to sign a final peace agreement.3 Contingent factors like leadership and third-party mediation still matter for closing the diplomatic deal. That has not stopped people from alleging otherwise, that peace can be forced
to support the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants in the Great Lakes region following a Security Council request for such assistance. 40 However, states have been anxious to minimise their legal obligations to provide financial or other assistance. The Machel report pointed out that as of the date of its compilation no peace agreement had formally recognised the existence of