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MCK2 1/10/2003 10:19 AM Page 38 2 The reasonableness of pluralism Matt Matravers and Susan Mendus Introduction In ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, John Rawls remarks that the aims of political philosophy depend upon the society it addresses, and that modern, democratic societies are characterised by ‘the fact of pluralism’: they are societies in which different people have different and conflicting comprehensive conceptions of the good, different and conflicting beliefs about the right way to live morally speaking.1 Moreover, and troublingly, these
Political pluralism: Montesquieu’s conception William Connolly says that ‘pluralism is not the same as “cultural relativism”, “absolute tolerance”, or “the abandonment of all standards”’ ( 2005b : 41). He acknowledges that ‘many critics … treat these perspectives as if they were the same’ ( 2005b : 41). Connolly defines cultural relativism as ‘the view that you should support the culture that is dominant in a particular place’ ( 2005b : 41). In my language, cultural relativism specifies no principle or standard that can justify or be appealed to on moral or
9780719082542_C06.qxd 8/9/11 15:51 Page 121 6 Can human rights accommodate pluralism? Chantal Mouffe There are many ways to approach the topic selected for this year’s Oxford Amnesty Lectures. I have chosen to examine it from the following angle: Can human rights accommodate pluralism? I am especially interested in two questions: (1) Do human rights transcend cultural and religious differences? (2) What does the answer to this question imply for our understanding of democracy in a global context? I will begin by examining the supposedly universal relevance
MCK3 1/10/2003 10:21 AM Page 54 3 Toleration and the character of pluralism Catriona McKinnon This chapter addresses two influential ways of thinking about which political principles we ought to adopt. The first way of thinking starts with expectations about how persons ought to relate to one another in political discourse. Political principles are justified by reference to these expectations. The second way of thinking starts with certain values around which, it is claimed, people ought to structure their lives. Political principles are then justified by
ITLP_C10.QXD 18/8/03 10:01 am Page 150 10 Too much pluralism, not enough socialism: interpreting the unions–party link Steve Ludlam A central object of Labour’s re-branding as ‘New Labour’ was to distance it from its trade union affiliates (Gould 1998: 257–8). The relationship was tense before and after the 1997 election, when Blair reduced the unions’ formal power in the party, and restricted employment policy initiatives largely to his predecessors’ promises (Ludlam 2001). But discontent was limited by real union gains, and tension eased markedly between
the trial for evidence of Burke’s motives and psychology; more recent scholarship has recovered a compelling moral and political theory from Burke’s India speeches. 3 This chapter is an effort to read the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings as a fertile moment of what might be called the politics of legal pluralism. Burke himself understood the impeachment as a peculiar and potent form of global legal encounter, and by the end of the trial, he had come to characterise his dispute with Hastings as at bottom a controversy about law. 4 Burke regarded the trial as a
7 Edward Shils on pluralism and civility Richard Boyd Introduction: the ordeals of civility In his influential work of social theory, The Civilizing Process, Norbert Elias tells a fascinating story about how notions of civility and manners arose in the transition from medieval to early modern Europe (Elias, 2000). Conceived mainly in terms of conventions regarding etiquette, table manners, standards of personal grooming, and bodily hygiene, these incipient ideas of civility and civilization gave rise to broader sociological distinctions which functioned to
, then, a third possibility – humanitarianisms . A kind of normative pluralism. Of course, historically there have been many different ways to deal with those who suffer. This might well be the world we are entering again. But how much diversity can be tolerated? Could a humanitarian practice that argued it would help only ‘people like us’ and leave to suffer and die ‘people like them’ be judged genuinely humanitarian? If your answer is no, surely you are arguing for limits to the malleability of humanitarian social practice that aren
-development continuum or humanitarian pluralism, this recognises that all humanitarian aid should have an eye to medium to long term development and preparedness for the next event (IASC). The shelter sector, and in particular the proponents of self-recovery, see everything, except perhaps the immediate emergency distribution of tarpaulins, as a step towards eventual permanent recovery. Beyond the immediate imperatives of saving lives, supporting the injured and bereaved and preventing hunger and disease, much of the humanitarian effort is directed towards sustainable recovery
fact and value ‘motivated truth’ to highlight the overt combination of reason and sentiment that it represents. ( 2006 : 5) Accuracy plays an important role in this, as it is directly tied to organisational legitimacy. Powers holds that ‘the history of NGOs [non-governmental organisations] suggests an assiduous cultivation of such values [accuracy and pluralism] as a response to skepticism about their capacity to put forward credible claims about human