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In the social sciences, recognition is considered a means to de-escalate
conflicts and promote peaceful social interactions. This volume explores the
forms that social recognition and its withholding may take in asymmetric armed
conflicts. It discusses the short- and long-term risks and opportunities which
arise when local, state and transnational actors recognise armed non-state
actors (ANSAs), mis-recognise them or deny them recognition altogether.
The
first part of the volume contextualises the politics of recognition in the case
of ANSAs. It provides a historical overview of recognition regimes since the
Second World War and their diverging impacts on ANSAs’ recognition claims. The
second part is dedicated to original case studies, centring on specific conflict
phases and covering ANSAs from all over the world. Some examine the politics of
recognition during armed conflicts, others in conflict stalemates, and others
still in mediation and peace processes. The third part of the volume discusses
how the politics of recognition impacts practitioners’ engagement with conflict
parties, gives an outlook on policies vis-à-vis ANSAs, and sketches
trajectories for future research in the field.
The volume shows that, while
non-recognition prevents conflict transformation, the recognition of armed
non-state actors may produce counterproductive precedents and new modes of
exclusion in intra-state and transnational politics.
their own financial institutions. Decolonial finance: the Kīngitanga and Te Peeke o Aotearoa Certain Māori in the central North Island refused to engage with the Native Land Court from 1867, when its first hearings were held in the district, through the 1870s and beyond. Chief among those who remained steadfast in their opposition to the Court was Tāwhiao, Waikato rangatira and leader of the Kīngitanga, a pan-tribal Māori movement aimed at protecting the land and recovering economic and political autonomy, or mana motuhake
imperialism, they could not preserve the Raj. In 1947, the British government unilaterally terminated Anglo-Indian women’s integral involvement with British imperialism in India and acceded to the long-standing demands of Indians for political autonomy. Indian men may have derided Anglo-Indian women as ‘brainless memsahibs’, but the British government similarly scorned their
approach to development with some long-standing laissez-faire principles. Two wider political issues made Colonial Office attempts to persuade the Caribbean colonies to follow its preferred routes to industrialisation difficult, however. The increasing political autonomy of governments in the Caribbean region meant that Britain could not merely instruct its West Indian possessions to follow its edicts. In addition, it became clear that in the post-war world, the US hoped to shape development across the Caribbean along lines that it found conducive to its own interests
forces on the ground, it was hoped that political autonomy would allow the movement more latitude in relating to local conditions. The matter was discussed at the Comintern’s Seventh Congress, at which Ouzegane and Mohamed Badsi were delegates. Born 1904 in Tlemcen, Mohamed Badsi completed his military service in France, remained in Paris, met Hadj Ali Abdelkader and in the mid-1920s joined the PCF. In
Chapter four considers the overwhelmingly dominant popular understanding of Tagliacozzi’s method. The story of the ‘sympathetic snout’ had its roots in Tagliacozzi’s own lifetime, but developed significantly over the seventeenth century in poems, plays, and pseudo-scientific texts before its inclusion in the first book of Samuel Butler’s hit poem, Hudibras, cemented its domination of Tagliacozzi’s legend. This remained the popular image of Tagliacozzi into the early twentieth century: a man who took the ‘flesh’ for his ‘supplemental noses’ from a lower-status man’s ‘bum’. When the allograft donor died, the nose would also putrefy and drop off, through the medical doctrine of sympathy. The chapter therefore positions this narrative in the history of transplantation. Sympathy had always been a controversial doctrine, but in the early eighteenth century it was increasingly relegated to quackery. The sympathetic snout proved a surprisingly persistent and flexible metaphor up to the early twentieth century, satirising notions of personal and political autonomy, and producing troubling echoes for sympathy as an important interpersonal emotion.
apparatus inherited from the dictatorship. However, the strength of demands for political autonomy and cultural recognition in the Basque Country, Catalonia and (to a lesser extent) Galicia generated intense pressure and indeed the impetus for devolution. I do not claim that the devolution of power to Basque institutions has been a panacea. Basque society remains polarised; there is still significant electoral support for radical nationalist, antisystem parties and significant sectors of the Basque political class consider current arrangements insufficient. ETA has yet to
that wanted to see a Dutch Flanders within a federal Belgium; and an antiBelgian, politically nationalist camp that sought political autonomy for Flanders and the destruction of Belgium (Vos 1992). During the first post-war years the former was the sole political representative, in the form of the Frontpartij, which called for the establishment of a federalist Belgian state. Initially, it gained moderate successes in the Belgian elections: five seats in 1919, four in 1921 and six in 1925 (Fitzmaurice 1983: 37). However, by the end of the 1930s the Flemish Movement
to protect and promote democracy across the federation. Paradoxically, it is in those subjects of the federation which have been granted the most autonomy, the ethnic republics, where we find the highest levels of authoritarianism. Presidential leaders in the ethnic republics have been able to use their considerable levels of political autonomy to carve out authoritarian regime. Thus, as Whitmore notes: ‘Many of Russia’s 89 regional executives have indeed become brazenly authoritarian, flaunting the law, ignoring the country’s constitution, and routinely violating
: indigenous dispossession their (acknowledged) differences: they were destinations for growing numbers of British and Irish migrants, and they promised economic growth based on easy access to copious ‘waste lands’. As expatriate communities grew, settlers began to contemplate their limited political autonomy. Mindful of the American precedent and keen to limit imperial expenditure, Britain conceded, or bestowed, new levels of self-government to settler colonies from the 1840s onwards. By contrast, Britain’s direct control of the rest of its colonial empire – whether in the