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The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq's war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the 'new Hitler' after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This book is about how the media have interpreted conflict and international intervention in the years after the Cold War. By comparing press coverage of a number of different wars and crises, it seeks to establish which have been the dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order and to discover how far the patterns established prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have subsequently changed. The key concern is with the legitimacy of Western intervention: the aim is to investigate the extent to which Western military action is represented in news reporting as justifiable and necessary. The book presents a study that looks at UK press coverage of six conflicts and the international response to them: two instances of 'humanitarian military intervention' (Somalia and Kosovo); two cases in which the international community was criticised for not intervening (Bosnia and Rwanda); and two post-9/11 interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq). There were a number of overlapping UN and US interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s. Operation Restore Hope was the first major instance of post-Cold War humanitarian military intervention, following the precedent set by the establishment of 'safe havens' for Iraqi Kurds and other minorities at the end of the 1991 Gulf war.
History Security-risk management has long been a concern at Médecins du Monde (MdM), as it was for other humanitarian agencies operating at the height of the Cold War. However, it was in the 1990s that security had to address its own set of issues. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the post-Cold War conflicts created safety issues for humanitarian agencies: a booming aid sector led to an increase in exposure, together with a trend for
, civil wars and concentration camps. If there was ever a time in history where there was no regard for either the principle of mercy or the value of human life, it was the ‘short twentieth century’ (1914–91) – far more than the last thirty years. The supposed decline in humanitarian norms is assumed to have resulted from the changing nature of contemporary conflicts, which are now intra-, rather than inter-, national. It is true that most post-Cold War conflicts have been
making sense of international conflict and cooperation. The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq’s war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the ‘new Hitler’ after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Neither the erstwhile Soviet enemy nor Arab states raised any serious objections
West should understand and respond to post-Cold War conflicts. Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this book (page 17), it is possible to discern some overall patterns in the way that conflicts and the international responses to them have been framed in press coverage. Ethnic war and genocide One of the most misunderstood elements
states and international institutions to put an end to the most radical acts of mass violence – as had been the case in other post-Cold War conflicts in countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Chechnya and Angola. By the same token, they also revealed the flaws in international aid agencies’ operating procedures with their failure not only to deliver appropriate and timely aid but also to prevent
the work of Samuel Huntington ( 1996 ), who predicted that most post-cold war conflict would be based on a clash of culture or civilization, and most conflict would have religion as either the main or complementary element. While Huntington’s thesis generated a major debate, it does appear to be the case that not only can the vast majority of contemporary conflicts be classified as intrastate in
to devise the strategy for, and lead the NATO campaign in Kosovo, walking the tightrope of lessons learnt from the US experience in conflict, and marshalling the military requirements of a campaign supported by different European political and civil elites. He drew on his military experience to avoid the strategic problems faced by the US in another post-Cold War conflict ‘to ensure that the military commander had the necessary legal authority to fulfil his limited and clearly specified responsibilities … to avoid a repeat of Somalia’.22 In short Clarke recognised
. Neither the peace of the bullies nor the peace of the braves, the peace achieved by the EU is a peace of contentment and assimilation that was initially guaranteed by NATO. No gain, however construed, could compensate the ‘winners’ for the losses that would result from a war between EU countries, whatever its origin. In truth, within the EU, there is no threat of a return to past conflicts: in the 1990s, 239 2504Chap12 7/4/03 12:42 pm Page 240 Institutions of security governance post-Cold War conflicts in Europe all took place in countries that were not eligible
international settlement of post-Cold War conflicts that made democratisation and enhancement of human rights important elements of the post-conflict peace-building process. Given the Bosnian conflict’s large-scale ethnic cleansing, another key normative feature embedded in the Dayton agreement was the re-building of a multicultural society. To this end, Annex 4 made constitutional provision that ‘all refugees and displaced persons