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This volume takes the metaphorical character of the Cold War seriously and charts how the bomb was used as a symbol for nuclear war at the very heart of this conflict. The contributions consider the historical relevance of the political, cultural and artistic ramifications of nuclear weapons as signifiers for a new type of conflict. Tis understanding of the metaphorical qualities of the Cold War is encapsulated in the notion of an imaginary war, or, more precisely, a war against the imagination. As an attack against the imagination, the nuclear threat forced politicians and ordinary people to accept the notion that preparations for nuclear annihilation would contribute towards peace, and that the existence of these weapons, and the anticipation of large-scale destruction that came with them, were an inescapable corollary of security, freedom and future prosperity on both sides of the Cold war divide.
about the place of Basque institutions within the Spanish state and appropriate means for recognising Basque difference. The book’s conclusions do not close debate about the impact of the EU on Basque politics. Nevertheless, it does identify something of what is at stake in the changing context of postwar European politics. Devolution in Spain – and indeed elsewhere in Europe – has been an instrument for political accommodation which will probably continue to evolve. Devolution can help soothe political tensions by addressing key issues at the heart of nationalist
to expand the imaginary scope of individuals in the present is crucial to understanding its importance for postwar Europe. I identify two ways that collective memory can act as a cognitive resource for political change. First, ruptures help to expand the imaginary scope of individuals. Reflecting on the past helps them push the boundaries of the thinkable, allowing them to consider ideas that would previously have been dismissed. In speaking about the influence of the Second World War on his thought, Habermas notes that the experience of Nazism expanded his
instrument and as a conceptual device for ordering interstate relations, could well prove a dangerous choice in the changed Eurasian security environment. Alliance theory has provided the framework for understanding not only the evolution of the postwar European security order, but that of the European state system since 1648. The contemporary debate has been largely framed by the question of whether states balance power, interests or 12 2504Introduction 7/4/03 12:37 pm Page 13 Eurasian security governance threats.26 There are two ancillary questions driving this
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has written extensively on the European Union.
This is the only in-depth account of his project. Published now in a second
edition to coincide with the celebration of his ninetieth birthday, a new
preface considers Habermas’s writings on the eurozone and refugee crises,
populism and Brexit, and the presidency of Emmanuel Macron.
Placing an
emphasis on the conception of the EU that informs Habermas’s political
prescriptions, the book is divided into two main parts. The first considers the
unfolding of 'social modernity' at the level of the EU. Among the
subjects covered are Habermas's concept of juridification, the
latter's affinities with integration theories such as neofunctionalism, and
the application of Habermas's democratic theory to the EU. The second part
addresses 'cultural modernity' in Europe – 'Europessimism'
is argued to be a subset of the broader cultural pessimism that assailed the
project of modernity in the late twentieth century, and with renewed intensity
in the years since 9/11.
Interdisciplinary in approach, this book engages
with European/EU studies, critical theory, political theory, international
relations, intellectual history, comparative literature, and philosophy. Concise
and clearly written, it will be of interest to students, scholars and
professionals with an interest in these disciplines, as well as to a broader
readership concerned with the future of Europe
Does European integration contribute to, or even accelerate, the erosion of intra-party democracy? This book is about improving our understanding of political parties as democratic organisations in the context of multi-level governance. It analyses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on power dynamics, focusing on the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (PS), and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The purpose of this book is to investigate who within the three parties determines EU policies and selects EU specialists, such as the candidates for European parliamentary elections and EU spokespersons.
The book utilises a principal-agent framework to investigate the delegation of power inside the three parties across multiple levels and faces. It draws on over 65 original interviews with EU experts from the three national parties and the Party of European Socialists (PES) and an e-mail questionnaire. This book reveals that European policy has largely remained in the hands of the party leadership. Its findings suggest that the party grassroots are interested in EU affairs, but that interest rarely translates into influence, as information asymmetry between the grassroots and the party leadership makes it very difficult for local activists to scrutinise elected politicians and to come up with their own policy proposals. As regards the selection of EU specialists, such as candidates for the European parliamentary elections, this book highlights that the parties’ processes are highly political, often informal, and in some cases, undemocratic.
world wars – one following so closely on the other – gave postwar European leaders who had lived through these events the specific cognitive, motivational, and justificatory resources that led them to endorse the creation of the first European community , which was not merely an international organisation or confederation. My basic conclusion is that the development of the ECSC proceeded on this model, ‘Only because certain leaders … chose “community” projects.’ The supranational character of the EU – in the sense that it is able to make decisions independently of
compensation.’ 22 Although these statements were honest expressions of feelings in the region, it is also clear that the leaders of postcommunist Europe were well aware of the constitutive role the past had played in postwar Europe and had no compunctions about using the motivational and justificatory resources of the past to their advantage. Despite the clear western feelings of guilt and responsibility, historical apologies did not flow uniformly from west to east. In the aftermath of the Second World War many communist regimes purged their societies of ‘bourgeois
American republic sought to create a democratic people who could legitimately constitute their own government by ‘seiz[ing] the mantle of authorization … even as they explicitly [broke] from the established procedures or rules for representing popular voice,’ postwar Europe has tried to move beyond the traditional logic of the nation-state by separating the ethnos of national belonging from the demos of political membership. 11 To this end, the next section examines the role of memory as a source of stability and political innovation within the founding of the
which makes European society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which Russian communism is now exploiting.26 In fact, in the context of postwar European recovery, military assistance provided under the MDAA and economic aid supplied under the ECA emerged as complementary elements of containment. The success of the overall European Recovery Program (ERP) informed and helped shape an approach to containing communism. The ERP’s use of military elements to shield processes of economic stabilization and growth was codified in Washington