This volume takes the metaphorical character of the Cold War seriously and charts how the bomb was used as a symbol for nuclear war at the very heart of this conflict. The contributions consider the historical relevance of the political, cultural and artistic ramifications of nuclear weapons as signifiers for a new type of conflict. Tis understanding of the metaphorical qualities of the Cold War is encapsulated in the notion of an imaginary war, or, more precisely, a war against the imagination. As an attack against the imagination, the nuclear threat forced politicians and ordinary people to accept the notion that preparations for nuclear annihilation would contribute towards peace, and that the existence of these weapons, and the anticipation of large-scale destruction that came with them, were an inescapable corollary of security, freedom and future prosperity on both sides of the Cold war divide.
about the place of Basque institutions within the Spanish state and
appropriate means for recognising Basque difference.
The book’s conclusions do not close debate about the impact of the EU
on Basque politics. Nevertheless, it does identify something of what is at stake
in the changing context of postwarEuropean politics. Devolution in Spain –
and indeed elsewhere in Europe – has been an instrument for political accommodation which will probably continue to evolve. Devolution can help
soothe political tensions by addressing key issues at the heart of nationalist
to expand the imaginary scope of individuals in the present is crucial to understanding its importance for postwarEurope.
I identify two ways that collective memory can act as a cognitive resource for political change. First, ruptures help to expand the imaginary scope of individuals. Reflecting on the past helps them push the boundaries of the thinkable, allowing them to consider ideas that would previously have been dismissed. In speaking about the influence of the Second World War on his thought, Habermas notes that the experience of Nazism expanded his
instrument and as a conceptual device for ordering interstate relations, could well prove a dangerous choice in the changed Eurasian
Alliance theory has provided the framework for understanding not only
the evolution of the postwarEuropean security order, but that of the
European state system since 1648. The contemporary debate has been
largely framed by the question of whether states balance power, interests or
Eurasian security governance
threats.26 There are two ancillary questions driving this
, a prophetic optimism – that is, paradoxically, consonant
with both the Christian typos of the Second Coming and the Nietzschean
metaphor of the childlike Superman – that a postwarEurope and a
postcolonial Ireland might emerge in some radically new form from the
chaos and strife of epochal transition.
Nietzsche was a scandal, a revelation, an explosive intellectual force. Soon after he ceased to write, the German philosopher was hailed widely as a leading emissary of ‘the modern’, but his message of cultural transformation resonated nowhere more powerfully than in Ireland. Nietzsche and Irish modernism traces the circulation of the philosopher’s ideas in the work of Irish writers and, more broadly, the Irish public sphere during the early decades of the twentieth century. George Bernard Shaw styled himself an ‘English (or Irish) Nietzsche’, as he developed a ‘drama of ideas’ to advance his radical political philosophy. W.B. Yeats adopted an ethos of ‘proud hard gift giving joyousness’ from Nietzsche as he sought to establish a national theatre in Ireland. James Joyce playfully, and repeatedly, evoked the philosopher’s ideas in his fiction, as the novelist surveyed the cultural resources that might remake the conscience of his compatriots. Before long, Irish priests, politicians, and propagandists also summoned the name of the German philosopher as they addressed a tumultuous period of Home Rule agitation, world war, revolution, civil war, and state building. His thought would ultimately come to play a role in imagining a different future for both postcolonial Ireland and postwar Europe. Recounting this cultural history in meticulous detail, the study demonstrates how Nietzsche provided Irish culture with the potential for new, disruptive modes of thinking and writing, which spoke to both local political circumstances and the predicaments of modernity at large.
This chapter explores the phenomenon of ‘intellectual relief’, that is, aid that was aimed specifically at intellectuals and intellectual institutions, in the era of the Great War. Beginning in 1914, a wide range of humanitarian agencies in North America and Britain were involved in myriad different forms of intellectual relief in the postwar period, many of which continued into the 1930s. This chapter interrogates the meaning and significance of intellectual relief in a period where humanitarian action is often associated with universal suffering. Yet the relief of intellectuals was built not upon humanitarian universalism but upon difference; distinctions such as class, education, and cultural attainment were essential in identifying those in need and allocating bespoke aid. Both agencies and those seeking assistance used the language of humanitarianism to justify intellectual need and the metaphor of ‘intellectual hunger’ was frequently invoked. The chapter looks at intellectual relief from 1914 to 1933, demonstrating that, while relief to intellectuals after 1933 is a well-known topic, humanitarian interventions to save scholars was a response to the conditions created by the Great War. While it utilised the language of humanitarianism, intellectual relief was premised upon the stabilisation of postwar European societies and the promotion of democracy in the face of Bolshevism. Fundamentally, it was about expertise rather than empathy. The chapter challenges what we think we know about the history of humanitarianism. By highlighting the widespread phenomenon of aid given to traditional elites rather than destitute children it questions just how universal Great War humanitarianism really was.
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has written extensively on the European Union.
This is the only in-depth account of his project. Published now in a second
edition to coincide with the celebration of his ninetieth birthday, a new
preface considers Habermas’s writings on the eurozone and refugee crises,
populism and Brexit, and the presidency of Emmanuel Macron. Placing an
emphasis on the conception of the EU that informs Habermas’s political
prescriptions, the book is divided into two main parts. The first considers the
unfolding of 'social modernity' at the level of the EU. Among the
subjects covered are Habermas's concept of juridification, the
latter's affinities with integration theories such as neofunctionalism, and
the application of Habermas's democratic theory to the EU. The second part
addresses 'cultural modernity' in Europe – 'Europessimism'
is argued to be a subset of the broader cultural pessimism that assailed the
project of modernity in the late twentieth century, and with renewed intensity
in the years since 9/11. Interdisciplinary in approach, this book engages
with European/EU studies, critical theory, political theory, international
relations, intellectual history, comparative literature, and philosophy. Concise
and clearly written, it will be of interest to students, scholars and
professionals with an interest in these disciplines, as well as to a broader
readership concerned with the future of Europe
Does European integration contribute to, or even accelerate, the erosion of intra-party democracy? This book is about improving our understanding of political parties as democratic organisations in the context of multi-level governance. It analyses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on power dynamics, focusing on the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (PS), and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The purpose of this book is to investigate who within the three parties determines EU policies and selects EU specialists, such as the candidates for European parliamentary elections and EU spokespersons. The book utilises a principal-agent framework to investigate the delegation of power inside the three parties across multiple levels and faces. It draws on over 65 original interviews with EU experts from the three national parties and the Party of European Socialists (PES) and an e-mail questionnaire. This book reveals that European policy has largely remained in the hands of the party leadership. Its findings suggest that the party grassroots are interested in EU affairs, but that interest rarely translates into influence, as information asymmetry between the grassroots and the party leadership makes it very difficult for local activists to scrutinise elected politicians and to come up with their own policy proposals. As regards the selection of EU specialists, such as candidates for the European parliamentary elections, this book highlights that the parties’ processes are highly political, often informal, and in some cases, undemocratic.
The Eurozone crisis, Brexit, and possible disintegration
Peter J. Verovšek
compensation.’ 22 Although these statements were honest expressions of feelings in the region, it is also clear that the leaders of postcommunist Europe were well aware of the constitutive role the past had played in postwarEurope and had no compunctions about using the motivational and justificatory resources of the past to their advantage.
Despite the clear western feelings of guilt and responsibility, historical apologies did not flow uniformly from west to east. In the aftermath of the Second World War many communist regimes purged their societies of ‘bourgeois