An anthology dedicated to the works of John Harris

From Reason to Practice in Bioethics: An Anthology Dedicated to the Works of John Harris brings together original contributions from some of the world’s leading scholars in the field of bioethics. With a particular focus on, and critical engagement with, the influential work of Professor John Harris, the book provides a detailed exploration of some of the most interesting and challenging philosophical and practical questions raised in bioethics. The book’s broad range of chapters make it a useful resource for students, scholars, and practitioners interested in the field of bioethics, and the relationship between philosophical and practical ethics. The range of contributors and topics afford the book a wide international interest.

Swamp Thing and the intertextual reader

narrative paradox. In the cover image and first few pages of ‘The Sleep of Reason’, he and Abigail Cable play flirtatiously at ‘creature from the black lagoon’, the vulnerable beauty suddenly grabbed by a vile creature emerging from below, a humorous salute to the pulp horror of the comic’s origins and simultaneously an assertion of having transcended them. 6 When

in Alan Moore and the Gothic Tradition
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2 Nature and reason T he Metalogicon (I. 1) opens with a portrayal of the enemy of reason – the so-called ‘Cornificius’ (the name of one of Virgil’s detractors, repurposed by John to represent the ignorant scholar) – who is bound through hasty and overambitious scholarship to destroy the study of the liberal arts. The enemy of eloquence, he is described by John as a foe to human bonds, charity and the exercise of duties.1 Implicitly contrasting his followers, the Cornificians, with the wise man described at the start of Cicero’s De inventione, who through the

in John of Salisbury and the medieval Roman renaissance

MCK4 1/10/2003 10:24 AM Page 71 4 Toleration, justice and reason Rainer Forst In contemporary debates about the idea and the problems of a multicultural society the concept of toleration plays a major but by no means clear and uncontested role. For some, it is a desirable state of mutual respect or esteem, while for others it is at best a pragmatic and at worst a repressive relation between persons or groups. In the following, I want to suggest an understanding of toleration that both explains and avoids these ambiguities. First, I distinguish between a

in The culture of toleration in diverse societies
A disputed Enlightenment

3 Reason, faith and progress: a disputed Enlightenment It served the didactic and rhetorical purposes of early nineteenthcentury enthusiasts to characterise the previous century’s attitudes to the crusades as uniformly hostile or ignorant, at least until William Robertson’s reappraisal in his History of the Reign of Charles V (1769). Superficially, they had a point. Fashionable and influential eighteenth-century intellectuals, even more than their predecessors, tended to use the crusade not as a historical study in its own right but as a tool in conceptual

in The Debate on the Crusades

first was that he was wrong when defining the Covenant as ‘eternall’, as in doing so he did not allow for any change by any kind of authority whatsoever. Secondly, the recent change of government ‘was made by the present supreme power of the people’, and the reason wherefore ‘both the Houses laid the exercise of regal power aside for some years’ and replaced it by the Commons, was ‘s alus populi suprema

in Order and conflict

reverse is true. Such a judgement would be incoherent if the maker of that judgement could not say why it would be better or worse in these and these circumstances.’1 In this passage, which appears in The Value of Life, John Harris suggests that for a person’s actions to be moral, that is, for those actions to be part of an attempt to live by ethical standards, that person must be able to say why those actions are right and must be able to show, through the use of reason-giving, how those actions are justified. He also argues that it would be incoherent to have beliefs

in From reason to practice in bioethics
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, great harm is likely when science with such medical promise is blocked. On these central points, I am on John Harris’s side. But there are reasons for giving the role of intuitive responses in ethics a rather more positive emphasis than he perhaps allows. So this chapter is partly in support of his views and partly in qualification of them. I will start with the support and then go on to the qualifications. Prejudice and Lord Devlin’s moral nose The moral climate changes. Forty years ago there was what now seems a strange piece of olfactory moral philosophy. In 1965

in From reason to practice in bioethics

this law student became a legal academic she met that most ‘reasonable person’, Professor John Harris. I will assume that Harris would agree that he meets his own criteria for personhood. He is without doubt the most stimulating of colleagues, a brilliant philosopher, and the kindest of men. I owe him an immense debt of gratitude for his help and guidance over twenty-five years. Yet I now propose to be churlish. Harris is a consistent, eloquent advocate of rationality. He appeals to reason, thrusting aside superstition and sentimentality.7 I shall argue that reason

in From reason to practice in bioethics
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Hamlet and early modern stage ghosts
Elisabeth Bronfen and Beate Neumeier

modern drama, and the fascination of what exceeds mortal understanding was eagerly taken up by some of the dramatist’s own contemporaries. Perhaps they, too, detected in Hamlet a direction in which fiction might extend its reach. If so, no wonder later Gothic novelists, exploring, behind the back of the Enlightenment, anxieties that reason preferred to ignore, saw in Shakespeare

in Gothic Renaissance