Search results

Abstract only
Series: Pocket Politics
Author: Edward Ashbee

This book explores how a candidate who broke with almost every single norm governing candidate behaviour, appeared to eschew the professionalised forms of campaigning, and who had been more or less disowned by Republican elites, prove victorious? The focus is on Trump and his campaign; the account does not go beyond the November election and its immediate aftermath. The book argues that the Trump campaign, like earlier populist insurgencies, can be explained in part by considering some defining features of US political culture and, in particular, attitudes towards government. It explains the right-wing populism that has been a recurrent and ingrained feature of the political process over a long period. The book discusses structural characteristics of the American state that appear to be of particular significance in shaping attitudes, as well as some other ideas and frames brought to the forefront by the Trump campaign during the course of 2015 and 2016. It also considers the shifts and swings amongst voters and suggests that these, alongside ideas about the state and the 'entrepreneurial' efforts of the campaign, form part of the explanation for Trump's eventual victory. The book assesses Trump's ascendancy as a function of, and reaction to, the strategies and discourses pursued in the years preceding 2016 by Republican Party elites. 'Trumpism' and European forms of populism are still in some ways weakly embedded but they may intensify the battles and processes of group competition between different constituencies.

Edward Ashbee

mistake to explain the Trump campaign or other outbursts of right-wing populism in the US by considering American history alone. After all, populist sentiments have a comparable place in many European countries. For example, as polls conducted in the second half of 2016 suggested, attitudes towards immigration, Islam and ‘political correctness’ were very similar in the US and Denmark (although, having said that, only 4 per cent of Danes admitted to supporting Trump's presidential campaign) (Motta, 2016 ). Nonetheless, although there were movements such as Poujadisme

in The Trump revolt
Abstract only
Unsettling dominant narratives about migration in a time of flux
Kirsten Forkert, Federico Oliveri, Gargi Bhattacharyya, and Janna Graham

This concluding chapter summarises the key insights of the book. It also reflects on how these might apply to the current political moment, which at the time of writing is characterised by political flux and emerging right-wing populism (within which anti-immigration politics plays a central role). This situation underlines the persistence of questions of international responsibility and the role of the media in covering conflicts (and those who flee them). It ends by calling for networks of solidarity to challenge white amnesia and postcolonial innocence.

in How media and conflicts make migrants
Abstract only
Richard Dunphy and Luke March

Italy a combined list of the PRC and SI managed only 2.8 per cent. This means that for the first time ever not a single French or Italian communist will be present in the European Parliament. In France, Mélénchon's La France Insoumise (see Conclusion) took the lion's share of the radical left vote, although the six MEPs that it won were far less than it had hoped for. In Italy, the resurgent forces of right-wing populism completely swamped the radical left. Yanis Varoufakis’ DiEM25 movement made little impact, failing to win any seats. In the whole of Eastern and

in The European Left Party
Open Access (free)
Mark B. Brown

to the popular branch of systems of ‘mixed government’ that combined democratic, aristocratic and monarchical elements (Wood, 1992). Liberal elites worried about the corrupting influence of the unwashed masses and the ‘tyranny of the majority’. As John Stuart Mill noted in 1859, ‘The “people” who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised’ (Mill, 1978 [1859]: 4). The recent increase of xenophobic right-wing populism in both Europe and the United States lends new urgency to such concerns, including questions 170 Science

in Science and the politics of openness
Abstract only
Donald Trump, neoliberalism and political reconfiguration
Edward Ashbee

European and American forms, right-wing populism put the nation, class, race and the role of the state back on the agenda. In doing so it was capturing and building upon shifts that had been evident for some years. In the US, references to a ‘working class’ had been few and far between long before the advent of the neoliberal era. In most discourses, almost everyone was subsumed within the American ‘middle class’. Yet, under the weight of the crisis class made a re-appearance. According to Gallup polling in the US, only 33 per cent called themselves working class in 2000

in The Trump revolt
Abstract only
Quo vadis democracy?
Matt Qvortrup

Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia, which now present themselves as anti-establishment and hence claim to be the real alternative. Thus, by focusing on consensus, post-political politics has become a breeding ground for extreme right-wing populism. Interestingly, though Mouffe does not make this point, the reverse was true in the 1960s when left-wing populism emerged in response to Butskellism, i.e. the post-1950 consensus between Labour and the Conservative Party. (The term Butskellism was invented by the Economist to capture the overlap between the economic

in The politics of participation
Abstract only
Marcel H. Van Herpen

Carl Schmitt. Although right-wing populism lacks fascism’s violent, putschist, militaristic, and imperialistic dimension, it is fascism’s “junior partner” in many other dimensions. Between right-wing populism and fascism there seems to exist what Germans call a Wahlverwandtschaft , an elective affinity of mutual attraction and resemblance. This affinity can be observed also in fascism’s country of origin: Italy, where on several occasions right-wing populist leaders have openly praised the benefits of Benito Mussolini’s regime. Silvio Berlusconi repeatedly

in The end of populism
A pragmatist notion of critique as mediation 
Klaus Geiselhart

judgments and hence of adequate striving and adequate choice” ( Dewey, 1929 , 426) and populists’ manipulation strategies take advantage of this fact. For example, the economic development of recent decades has had a disproportionately negative impact on middle- and low-skilled workers, which makes this segment of the population particularly susceptible to right-wing populism ( Gest et al., 2017 , 3). Populism refers to such negative experiences and thereby implicitly promises relief. Establishing emotional connections between lived experiences and simplified truths has

in The power of pragmatism
Abstract only
Clara Eroukhmanoff

’ and African countries ‘shitholes’. The return to overt racism under right-wing populism has been accompanied by a discourse on loss of status for white male voters in a changing America who consider themselves victims of identity politics and victims of programmes empowering minority groups, such as affirmative action. Right-wing populism exploits this loss of power by establishing triadic politics – that is, a vertical politics that pits the masses against an elite at the top who are themselves accused (‘crooked Washington’) of coddling a third group, usually

in The securitisation of Islam