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9 The European Union’s security strategy in the ASEAN region Reuben Wong The EU has a military dimension as well: our economic face is the one most Asians (and also most Europeans!) are more familiar with. … We are one of the major investors in this continent, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and the biggest development donor. … But our engagement with Asia goes well beyond trade, investment, and aid. It’s political. It’s strategic(al). And it needs to develop more also in the security field. (Federica Mogherini, High Representative of EU CFSP, VP
Introduction This strategy is guided by principled realism. It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests… We are also realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress . The White House, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ ( The White House, 2017
limited to operating in countries under Western tutelage, but even those inspired by anti-communism were cautious about structural integration into Western security strategies. At the beginning of the 1990s, NGOs shrugged off their scepticism for the morality of state power, working more closely with Western military forces. Private and government funding for humanitarian operations increased. With the help of news media, humanitarian agencies boosted their political capital, presenting themselves as providers of public moral conscience for the
the differences between the two fields of practice. This article also builds on academic literature on the negative impacts of existing staff-security strategies on humanitarian action and on the limits of humanitarian approaches to the protection of civilians (see, for example, Bradley, 2016 ; Duffield, 2012 ; Fast, 2014 ; Ferris, 2011 ). However, even this more critical literature almost invariably focuses either on aid workers or on the wider
security strategy’, ‘using the local community to be our protection’, and ‘rely[ing] so heavily on explaining who we are, and what we stand for, and how we work, and how decisions are made, and that’s the embodiment of humanitarian principles’. Approaches rooted in ‘protection’ tend to be seen as a necessary evil of security management, to be employed in particularly volatile environments when other approaches appear infeasible or ineffective. Furthermore, creating physical barriers between humanitarian actors and their operational environment can even hinder
development. With the accession of ten new member states in just under two months’ time, an enlarged EU will comprise over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s gross national products. There is no doubt that the European Union is a global player. Our size and wealth brings not only opportunities but also obligations. As Presidency, Ireland is facilitating the dynamic to enhance the role of the EU as a force for peace. This is the thinking behind the European Security Strategy, which was adopted by the European Council last December. The increasing MUP
approaches that stress the fundamental ambivalence of the everyday (Huysmans, 2014 ), we nevertheless maintain the distinction between elite and non-elite knowledge in order to identify the specificity of the latter in containing the capacity to challenge the former. In 2008 and 2010 the UK government published, and then subsequently revised, its National Security Strategy. As well as
international order informed by US values and interests. 3 The Trump administration is the first in the post-war era to question explicitly the desirability of America’s hegemonic aspiration and the durability of its hegemonic role. Its “America First” rhetoric and objectives signal a preference to depart from order maintenance in favour of the more transactional politics of the balance of power. Its National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017 explicitly casts China and Russia as competitors, rather than as potential partners in the US hegemonic project. Strategic
North Korea – as an ‘axis of evil’, and by adopting a National Security Strategy allowing for first strikes. 2 In Jan Hallenberg’s analysis, the decision to get rid of Saddam Hussein’s regime had already been taken in principle in the United States at the presidential level in the autumn of 2001. 3 On 28 January 2003 US President George W. Bush announced what he had already indicated in September 2002
and threats. All major Russian conceptual documents were approved in the pre-September 11 era, before the global ‘War on Terror’ and the controversy in Iraq. As a result, the perceptions in the 2000 doctrines are partly outdated, containing thin touches of Cold War thinking. The Security Council is (at the time of writing) still preparing the National Security Strategy to replace the 2000 document. It