The European Union (EU) has emerged as an important security actor qua actor, not only in the non-traditional areas of security, but increasingly as an entity with force projection capabilities. This book investigates how the concept of security relates to or deals with different categories of threat, explores the relationship between forms of coordination among states, international institutions, and the provision of European security and the execution of security governance. It also investigates whether the EU has been effective in realising its stated security objectives and those of its member states. The book commences with a discussion on the changing nature of the European state, the changing nature and broadening of the security agenda, and the problem of security governance in the European political space. There are four functional challenges facing the EU as a security actor: the resolution of interstate conflicts, the management of intrastate conflicts, state-building endeavours, and building the institutions of civil society. The book then examines policies of prevention, particularly the pre-emption of conflict within Europe and its neighbourhood. It moves on to examine policies of assurance, particularly the problem of peace-building in south-eastern Europe. EU's peace-building or sustaining role where there has been a violent interstate or intrastate conflict, especially the origins and performance of the Stability Pact, is discussed. Finally, the book looks at the policies of protection which capture the challenge of internal security.
The Member States between procedural adaptation and structural revolution
. One major conclusion
is thus: political and administrative strategies have in all states been
geared to use existing constitutional and institutional opportunity structures and to improve forms of intra-stateco-ordination.
Constitutional changes have occurred only in some countries and are
limited in scope and even more limited in their impact on the national
policy-cycle. Changes are not linked specifically to the implementation of
the Maastricht Treaty; rather, as in the Spanish case, they are related ‘to
the natural evolution and adaptation of the . . . public
through its Industrial Development Authority
(IDA) advance factory sites and other facilities to attract inward development. But the nature and extent of stateco-ordination in these cases
came to differ. Taiwan had a Japanese-style state bureaucracy where
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Irish adventures in nation-building
civil servants and even politicians tended to have specialist skills – for
example, qualifications in engineering. Ireland inherited an English-style
bureaucracy dominated by non-specialist civil servants. This
’ in its role of
safeguarding ‘private interests and the liberation of private energies’ (Gamble,
1994: 72-3). The webs of power surrounding and suffusing industrialisation
are revealed to produce the ‘individual’ as the central actor in social change.
The cotton industry appeared to require little in the way of statecoordination, enabling small-scale private entrepreneurs to ‘launch themselves’
into an international marketplace (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hobsbawm, 1975).
The cotton industry was launched, like a glider, by the pull of the colonial
trade to which it was
Situating peripheries research in South Africa and Ethiopia
Metadel Sileshi Belihu
Divine Mawuli Asafo
Ethiopia. In these contexts, statecoordination is more evident, although we can recognise that the extent of planning or state intervention is ‘loosening’ in the South African cases relative to that witnessed during the apartheid era (Harrison and Todes, 2015 ).
We explored the work of Caldeira ( 2017 ) and her concept of peripheral urbanisation but found it to be less useful. It collapses peripheral urbanisation into auto-construction, and uses it to describe practices of producing cities rather than examining urban peripheries per se. Auto
-pervasive statism. 190 He also doubted planning was as innovative as often claimed. 191 Rather than Statecoordination, Polanyi stressed ‘dynamic orders of spontaneous formation and autonomous continuation’ as the best response to totalitarianism: Mannheim’s allowance for ‘regions’ of unplanned spontaneous creativity was, in his view, insufficient. 192 Complex societies needed not more planning but more ‘individual initiative’. 193 Polanyi also critiqued Mannheim’s view of culture for being relativist and based on social determinism (though Mannheim saw himself as opposing
This chapter investigates the EU's emerging role as a provider of internal security policies, what we call the policies of protection. The EU has targeted two general threats to internal security, organised crime and terrorism. The rationale for collective or coordinated action to combat organised crime and terrorism is highly developed. An elaborate set of policy principles define the balance between member-state and EU prerogatives. The EU has sponsored a series of institutional innovations that have created general networks between law enforcement and judicial authorities as well as networks specific to certain categories of crime or security threat. There are three major initiatives in the area of policing, particularly when it comes to serious crime. They are the broadening Europol competencies, the creation of joint investigation teams (JIT), and efforts to generate threat assessments of organised crime towards facilitating common policies within the EU.