economist János Kornai, those in responsible posts found themselves ‘putting out fires’. There are echoes of this in post-Soviet Russia. Since Vladimir Putin was first elected president in 2000, forecasts, concepts, strategies, and programmes have become central to the governance of Russia. The Russian leadership has devoted considerable attention to establishing a long-term horizon to economic, social, and security decision making, an activity designated “strategic planning”. Indeed, many documents relating to strategic planning have been published
This book offers a nuanced and detailed examination of Russia’s international activity. In broad terms, the book contributes to two of the most important current debates about contemporary Russian actions: whether Moscow is acting strategically or opportunistically, and whether this should be understood in regional or global terms. The book goes against the majority opinions on both questions, and introduces contributions in a number of under-researched themes. It argues that Moscow is not acting in a simply ad hoc, reactive way, but in a consistently strategic manner, and that this is best understood not by analysing Russia’s return to specific regions, but in a more holistic way with a global horizon, linking activity across different regions. This means that the Russian challenge is likely to continue rather than fade away.
The book addresses core themes of Russian activity – military, energy, and economic. But it offers an unusual multi-disciplinary analysis to these themes, incorporating both regional and thematic specialist expertise. Underpinned by detailed analyses of the revolution in Russian geospatial capabilities and the establishment of a strategic planning foundation, the book includes chapters on military and maritime strategies, energy security, and economic diversification and influence. This serves to highlight the connections between military and economic interests that shape and drive Russian strategy.
The railway represented one of pivotal technological developments of the nineteenth century. This book reviews the way in which the British army exploited the potential of railways from the 'dawn of the railway age' to the outbreak of the First World War. It explores the use of railways when the army was acting in aid of the civil power, as a factor in the planning for home defence, and as an increasingly efficient means of supporting the army on active service. If the early Victorian army welcomed railways as an ancillary means of responding to domestic emergencies, it encountered similar challenges in fulfilling its role in home defence. Over nearly thirty years from the Crimean War to the intervention in Egypt, the Victorian army both experimented with railways and observed the employment of railways. The Sudan Military Railway was regarded as 'astounding in conception'. The book reveals that the army monitored the use of railways in foreign wars, experimented in the use of railways within rear areas, designed and built railways for strategic defence in India, and later exploited railways to transform the prospects of military success in the Sudan and South Africa. The Victorian army demonstrated a capacity to integrate the railway into its logistic planning, to grasp the imperative of operational management, and to envisage it as a key element in mobilisation and strategic planning.
). Since conflict can overwhelm state capacity for even basic service provision, planned incorporation of mental health into national and community level emergency preparedness, response and recovery systems is vital. Notably, DfID emphasises the need for strategic plans and programmes to promote the well-being of humanitarian staff – both local and international – often at high risk of suffering first-hand and/or secondary trauma. This requirement was conspicuously absent
, it was clear that the concept of resilience that was behind most of the recovery programming was constructed through humanitarian organisations and foreign experts. For example, the national framework of the government’s strategic plan for post-Haiyan recovery and reconstruction adapts the foreign concept of ‘Build Back Better’, which refers to restoring the economic and social conditions of affected areas at the very least to their pre-typhoon levels and to a higher level of resilience ( RAY, 2013 ). Yet, how can higher levels of resilience be achieved when the
) ( USAID, 2012b ), supporting civil society ( USAID, 2016 ), and engaging in more community-based participatory approaches ( Save the Children, 2011 ; UNDP, 2012 ). The donor community has not developed an ‘overall strategic plan for recovery and development for itself or in collaboration with the government’, raising serious questions about the sustainability of action to-date ( Norad, 2016 : 3, also UNICEF, 2015 ). Conclusion The emergence of new initiatives to collect and share evaluation reports are encouraging. Donors are making their reports easier to
Subsequently, the Russian leadership has often reiterated this commitment in a series of major planning documents, supplemented by articles by senior figures, and prominent speeches such as the president’s annual speech to the Federal Assembly. This strategic planning process is multifaceted and more complex than allowed for in most discussions of Russian strategy. It opens up three sets of questions that are central to our understanding of the ‘formulation’ aspects of Russian grand strategy. These are, first, the strategy planning process and the legislative and policy
focus on developing a statewide strategic plan. These plans set performance targets in a wide range of policy areas. Second, there was a focus on consultation and bringing a citizen voice to the new policy initiatives. Third, there was a focus on whole-of-government responses to a range of policy issues. Finally, there was a commitment to fostering a political vision which moves beyond purely economic goals to include social and environmental targets. In a range of states and territories we can see evidence of this agenda. This chapter focuses on two cases of
So where does this leave us regarding our opening questions about Russian grand strategy? Four points stand out. First, the Russian leadership has a strategic agenda. A structured process, with the Security Council at its heart, has taken shape from the mid-2000s, albeit slowly and with difficulty, resulting in the overhaul of Moscow’s strategic planning. A cascade of documents and initiatives indicating Moscow’s intentions across a great range of subjects has resulted. There are still gaps, shortfalls and delays, and they are often overtaken by events
5 Jobs to people: livability, governance, and strategic planning Policies and markets People to jobs? Or jobs to people? Changing the sequence is not just a word game because the implications for policy at every level are significant. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, urban economies attracted people to jobs when surplus labor shifted from agriculture to manufacturing, and when firms or sectors in decline in one region – mining, textiles – were succeeded by firms or sectors in expansion elsewhere – oil production, aviation. This is still going on, but