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6 Party system change since 1970 The structure of party competition can persist even when the protagonists involved in its promotion change out of all recognition. (Mair 1997) When playing the role of advocatus diaboli, it could be argued that the notion of ‘party system change’ is not only grammatically ponderous but also conceptually imprecise, operationally problematical and, ultimately, of limited utility in understanding the nature of policy-making in pluralist polities. If this seems harsh, it is none the less the case that, despite the extensive
6 Institutional imperatives of system change The evolving European security architecture Introduction The European landscape is changing rapidly, not least owing to a series of decisions taken in the second half of the 1990s. In June 1996, NATO’s foreign ministers decided to adopt ESDI ‘within the Alliance’ and to develop the CJTF concept. In May 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a Joint Permanent Council. In June 1997, EU leaders reached agreement on the AMT. In July 1997 in Madrid, NATO agreed on the admission of three new members (Poland, Hungary and
3 PS intra-party politics and party system change Ben Clift The left PS intra-party politics and party system change Introduction Approaches to the study of party system change tend to emphasise, on the one hand, broad electoral trends, such as disaffection with ‘governmental’ political parties, or increasing electoral volatility and, on the other, institutional developments, such as changes to voting systems. Such ‘macro’-level analysis can at times treat parties as unitary actors, possessed of one ‘response’ to their changing environment, an approach which
5 Geopolitical imperatives of system change Order and security in post-Cold War Europe Introduction This chapter addresses the question of how change at the international system level has produced those political outcomes related to European security and defence design post-Cold War. It is both a description and an evaluation of the way in which Europe’s security arena has changed, as well as an attempt to come to terms with the process that led to the ‘internalisation’ of system change. By ‘internalisation’ we mean the process – or better, the causal
A new concept, White Mindfulness, encapsulates the convergence of multiple social forces that shape ‘secular’ mindfulness in the West. Informed by whiteness, neoliberalism, postracialism, and a drive for meaning, the Mindfulness Industry is exploding through social media, apps, digital and print materials, as well as research and the psy-disciplines. White Mindfulness spans numerous institutions and sectors in service of reducing stress and improving wellness. Its presence is amplified by pedagogies that train educators in its image. Yet the pillars of White Mindfulness reveal institutions and pedagogies troubled by race and cultures that emphasise hyper-individualism, consumerism, and self-regulation in contrast to community, cooperatives, and co-regulation. The industry sits shoulder to shoulder with tenets of late capitalism steeped in growing inequities and deep social chasms. Originally envisioned as a public health service, engulfed by the invisibilisation of whiteness, its present composition is elitist, commodified, White, and middle and upper class. Unveiling the roots of the dominant narratives and social norms that infuse White Mindfulness and shape its social trajectory, this book reveals how it comes to reflect the power structures of the societies in which it takes root in the West. Examination of mindfulness institutions shows a predominantly elite White male leadership. But the race-gender dynamic is not confined to structures and leadership. It ripples through US-Eurocentric approaches to ownership, conceptualisation, pedagogy, and community engagement. Using concepts like People of the Global Majority and embodied justice to decentre whiteness, this book explores the decolonisation of White Mindfulness through a growing movement that stands outside its remit.
Today, in many countries what is viewed as ‘credible’ economic knowledge stems from academic economics. The discipline of academic economics is based in universities across the world that employ economists who produce research that is published in academic journals and educate students who then go into government, businesses, and think tanks. Through the book’s authors’ and contributors’ experiences of economics education, and as part of the international student movement Rethinking Economics, it argues that academic economics in its current state does not provide people with the knowledge that we need to build thriving economies that allows everyone to flourish wherever they are from in the world, and whatever their racialised identity, gender or socioeconomic background. The consequences of this inadequate education links to modern economies being a root cause of systemic racism and sexism, socioeconomic inequality, and the ecological crisis. When economies are rooted in a set of principles that values whiteness, maleness and wealth, we should not be surprised by the inequalities that show up. Structural inequalities need systemic change, change that infiltrates through every level of the system, otherwise we risk reproducing and deepening them. This book makes the case that in order to reclaim economics it is necessary to diversify, decolonise and democratise how economics is taught and practised, and by whom. It calls on everyone to do what we can to reclaim economics for racial justice, gender equality and future generations.
-system or protest elements, other anti- or indeed pro-European stances are based precisely upon the same elements which form the foundation for domestic ideology and thus as of themselves form no basis for a shift in party system format (Evans, 2000b). A potential source of party system change, however, derives from intra-party disagreements over Europe (Mair, 2000: 36). Parties which by necessity are often broad churches aggregating different ideological streams have been split over the European question both in terms of working within it and reaction to it. Some parties
system. It is clear we need both system change, such as in the distribution of economic resources and power, as well as individual change, such as eating less meat, gender equality and anti-racism training. Another way to think about this is as needing both top-down change, through collective decision-making which changes how governments
of politics, party system change, populism and generational effects. Structuring the analysis along these lines facilitates both a deep analysis of the 2016 election and the location of the Irish experience in a cross-national perspective. Changing partisan identities: Partisanship has long been low in Ireland by international standards, yet elections have tended to produce relatively stable outcomes over many decades. The year 2016 was an especially volatile election and the final result raises interesting questions about party attachment. As we have noted
Conclusion On 22 January 1980, in what the Irish Times called the ‘biggest demonstration of organised labour in the history of the state’, an estimated 700,000 people participated in trade union marches across the Republic. They were demanding reform of the state’s tax regime.1 Later that year, Tim Pat Coogan lamented that ‘more people marched to get the PAYE system changed in a few days than the North brought onto the streets in ten years’.2 Indeed, the previous year 150,000 people in Dublin had taken part in one of the first tax marches. Then ‘Homer’ in the