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Superpower rivalry
Author: Joseph Heller

Four questions stand before the historian of the cold war and the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1) Did Israel and the US have a 'special relationship'? 2) Were Soviet-Israeli relations destined for failure from 1948? 3) Was the Arab-Israeli conflict insoluble because of the cold war or in spite of it? 4)Was detente between the superpowers the key to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Israel failed to get a security guarantee from the US because if it were granted ally status the Arab states would turn to the Soviets. Instead of a security guarantee Kennedy used the nebulous term 'special relationship', which did not bind America politically or militarily. Relations with the USSR looked promising at first, but the Zionist ideology of the Jewish state made it inevitable that relations with would worsen , since the Kremlin rejected the notion that Soviet Jews were by definition part of the Jewish nation, and therefore candidates for emigration to Israel. As for the Arabs, they were adamant that the Palestinian refugees return en mass, which meant the destruction of of Israel. No compromise suggested by the US was acceptable to to the Arabs , who were always supported by the USSR.The Soviets demanded detente cover not only the Arab states and Israel, but Turkey and Iran as well. Consequently the Middle East remained a no-man's-land between the superpowers' spheres of influence, inexorably paving the way for the wars in 1956 and 1967.

Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, Lasse Heerten, Arua Oko Omaka, Kevin O'Sullivan, and Bertrand Taithe

attacks on civilian targets and their suffering. For example, it was usually appealing for Biafrans to hear that they were fighting with Britain and not Nigeria. They saw the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, as the real enemy of Biafrans while General Gowon [military head of the Nigerian state] was portrayed as his deputy. The USSR also gave open support to the Nigerian government. What helped Biafra so much was the kind of propaganda machine it was able to set up. The

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
John Lough

wide areas of Russian life is testimony to an astonishing achievement of soft power not diminished by Hitler’s invasion of the USSR. Erich Maria Remarque’s novel Drei Kameraden ( Three Comrades ) first published in 1936 was very widely read in the USSR in translation in the late 1950s. At the same time, West German writers such as Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass and Siegfried Lenz also became widely available in translation. The Soviet authorities looked favourably on them because they criticised social conditions in West Germany. Böll’s novella Das Brot der frühen

in Germany’s Russia problem
John Lough

. This in turn encouraged a sense of deep gratitude to Moscow for making such an unexpected outcome possible. Yet the neat conclusion of the Cold War with its quixotic vision of an all-European cooperative security framework stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok was only a flicker before the sobering realities of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the disintegration of the USSR intruded. Three decades later, there is still nostalgia in Germany for this seductive moment when it finally seemed possible to square the circle and for the country to be fully reconciled with both

in Germany’s Russia problem
African student elites in the USSR, 1955–64
Harold D. Weaver

, economic and cultural strangleholds. Importantly, as the period that represented a shift from dependence to self-determination, it was crucial for Africans to develop requisite expertise and skills to play new and expedient roles. The USSR, as leader of the socialist power bloc, represented an alternative model to Western ideas and practices on racial advancement, especially in the field of education. The radical political and economic ideas and the disparate educational models they presented to African scholars and leaders

in The Red and the Black
Mary Buckley

different times, Gorbachev was facilitator, trigger, approver, persuader and loser, throughout tugged in various directions by different political actors and pressures at home, in East Central Europe and internationally. My aims here are: first, to provide an overview of key political signals and messages, both explicit and implicit, that Gorbachev, other leaders and social movements in the USSR gave to East European elites and peoples from 1985 onwards; second, to indicate how Gorbachev interpreted some of the responses and why he had to adopt similar and different

in The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe
Tracy B. Strong

Harriman as Ambassador to the USSR to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, 6 April 1946) The story I want to tell covers more ground than I can possibly deal with in the space allotted –​or indeed in something less than a book. Nonetheless, as I want to argue that a myriad of different types of factors came together, to some degree by accident, to result in the Cold War, I need to at least sketch out the factors that are essential to the understanding of what results as the Cold War. The matter is much more complex than the simple United States/​ USSR opposition (which

in American foreign policy
Cameron Ross

regions. But if we adopt the definition of a federation given by Watts in chapter 1, then clearly the USSR was not an authentic federation. For whilst the Constitution proclaimed the republics’ rights of sovereignty (article 76), and secession (article 72), the right to enter into treaties with foreign powers (article 80), and local control over economic developments (article 77), such rights were heavily qualified in practice, by the provisions of other articles, which made a mockery of the republic’s sovereign powers.1 And, in any case, whilst the state was supposedly

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Torbjørn L. Knutsen

Dean Acheson entitled his memoirs Present at the Creation. Acheson argued that a new world order was created during the few, eventful years when he was US Secretary of State, between 1949 and 1953. His memoirs describe the consolidation of the bipolar, Cold War world – the world which is also presented in this chapter. The chapter aims to show how the Western Bloc, presided over by the USA, became pitted against the Eastern Bloc, dominated by the USSR. It records the formation and consolidation of the bipolar rivalry that dominated world affairs for

in A history of International Relations theory (third edition)
Abstract only
Rustam Alexander

. 1 In fact, there was a lot of talk about sex during this time and this book breaks through the seeming silence to uncover what was being said. It examines a range of previously unexplored sources that demonstrate that there were remarkable discussions on the issue among Soviet experts – doctors, jurists and educators – and police from 1956 until the collapse of the USSR. In their discussions, both experts and police defined homosexuality and elaborated on ways of dealing with it in the Soviet context. The examination of these extraordinary and previously

in Regulating homosexuality in Soviet Russia, 1956–91