So how should Conservatives talk? What is the mood they should be seeking to promote? Authority should be the by-word, not freedom.
Peregrine Worsthorne, 19782
What the Conservative Party, then, should concern itself with … is the strength of
T. E. Utley, 19783
he purpose of this chapter is to outline the political thought of the traditionalists associated with the Conservative Party. The core ideas of the
traditionalists can be summarised as a strong sense of patriotism, defence of the
established social order and respect
This book is an analysis of the political thought of the Conservative Party. Academic discussions of the Conservative Party have tended to neglect ideology, focusing instead on the 'pragmatic' nature of the Party and its electoral and governmental record. The book traces the ideology of the Conservative Party through its most prominent thinkers. These are Harold Macmillan; R. A. Butler; Quintin Hogg (Lord Hailsham); Enoch Powell; Angus Maude; Keith Joseph; the traditionalists; the 'wets' (most notably Ian Gilmour); John Redwood; and David Willetts. These are the individuals considered by the authors to have made the most important contributions to the political thought of the Conservative Party. Some of them did so through the publication of a major book or even in some cases a series of books. The book provokes two theoretical issues and it is the purpose of the introduction to deal with these head-on. The first relates to the nature of the Conservative Party, which many commentators argue is not an ideological entity. The most widely cited academic perspective of this sort is the 'statecraft' thesis first outlined by James Bulpitt, who argued that the Conservative Party is in fact a pragmatic movement committed above all to winning elections and maintaining power. The second issue raised here is that of why and how the authors have selected the individual thinkers and overlooked others with plausible claims to influence.
Explanations of working-class politics in Australia and Britain have traditionally been heavily rooted in domestic 'bread and butter', socio-economic factors, including the much-debated issue of social class. 'Traditional' and 'revisionist' accounts have greatly advanced our knowledge and understanding of labour movements in general and labour politics in particular. This book offers a pathbreaking comparative and trans-national study of the neglected influences of nation, empire and race. The study is about the development and electoral fortunes of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the British Labour Party (BLP) from their formative years of the 1900s to the elections of 2010. Based upon extensive primary and secondary source-based research in Britain and Australia over several years, the book makes a new and original contribution to the fields of labour, imperial and 'British world' history. It offers the challenging conclusion that the forces of nation, empire and race exerted much greater influence upon Labour politics in both countries than suggested by 'traditionalists' and 'revisionists' alike. Labour sought a more democratic, open and just society, but, unlike the ALP, it was not a serious contender for political and social power. In both countries, the importance attached to the politics of loyalism is partly related to questions of place and space. In both Australia and Britain the essential strength of the emergent Labour parties was rooted in the trade unions. The book also presents three core arguments concerning the influences of nation, empire, race and class upon Labour's electoral performance.
Abstentionism and the growth
of internal divisions
For traditionalist republicans, the refusal to recognise the parliaments in
Leinster House and Stormont symbolised their allegiance to the de jure
Republic which they claimed had been illegally overthrown in 1922. For them
it still had legitimacy with legal authority having been passed to the IRA Army
Council in 1938 by the surviving anti-Treaty Sinn Féin members of the Dáil
elected in 1923. Traditionalists, as represented today by Republican Sinn Féin
and the Continuity IRA, still adhere to that belief.
the Conservative Party in the period of study was no longer
between Eurosceptics and Europhiles, but between social liberals and traditionalists.
How this division informed the strategies of Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard
and the debate over modernisation is explored. The chapter ends with an assessment
of Cameron’s claim that under his leadership the Conservatives came to terms with
this dilemma, and evaluates whether his efforts to appear socially liberal whilst also
emphasising the centrality of family policy constituted a distinctively Conservative
answer to it
, which placed him ﬁrmly in
the traditional wing of the acknowledgement school.16 Rabbinic literature was a different matter, and Frankel dedicated himself to the critical study of the Talmud, particularly the Mishnah, which he analysed in
his Darkhe hamishnah (‘Paths of the Mishnah’, 1859). In that work, and
elsewhere, he argued that some of the commandments described by
the Talmud as halakhah leMoshe miSinai (‘given to Moses on Sinai’)
were in fact created later by the rabbis and the Talmud’s term merely
implied great antiquity.17 Contemporary traditionalist critics
and becoming a ‘campaigning paper’ on social issues.4 The paper’s editor Tony
Meade was in favour of disbanding Sinn Féin and turning the IRA into a new
party. He resigned in August 1967 to be replaced by Seamus Ó Tuathail. Those
opposed to the new direction had no difficulty in identifying the reasons for
the malaise, and traditionalists were resigning in large numbers or being
forced out. Goulding, meanwhile, was publicly referring to the IRA’s ‘new
tactics’ based on an alliance with the labour movement and campaigning for
civil rights and democracy in Northern
contribute to its well-being. It fell to Adler as a leader of Anglo-Jewry to
show that they were.
When we examine Adler’s policies in the context of those of other
religious leaders, they again demonstrate that Adler is correctly sited in
the traditionalist camp within the acknowledgement school. In his policies Adler had much in common with other members of that group, such
as Hildesheimer and Hirsch, while he differed from the antipathy and
adaptation schools, and crucially, with those in the non-traditionalist
group within the acknowledgement school
more signiﬁcantly because Hertz’s religious policies were very important in shaping Anglo-Jewish religious history, and, as we shall see,
Hertz’s religious thought was the greatest factor in determining the way
in which he led his community.
I argue that, like Adler before him, Hertz was a member of the group
of traditionalists who wished to acknowledge what they considered to
be the valuable aspects of modernity. Although Hertz was part of the
scientiﬁc branch, he was also inﬂuenced by Hirsch – a position which
Meirovich regards as impossible, but as others
the early years, 1997–2000, when the government’s confidence in its ability as an agent to shape a modern British foreign policy was at its zenith. Even then, however, Blair and Brown were of the mind that history needed to be valued for what it was and what it taught us, so the second section of the chapter will study the government’s traditionalist approach to the ‘lessons of history’ and what the leaders had learnt about Britain and Europe from their study of the past. Blair and Brown’s confidence in the ability of the past to offer up lessons was severely shaken