French subsidies played a central role in European politics from Charles VIII’s
invasion of Italy in 1494 until the French Revolution. French kings attempted to
frustrate what they viewed as a Habsburg bid to pursue universal monarchy.
During the seventeenth century, the French monarchy would embrace the payment of
subsidies on a different scale than previously, using alliances in which
subsidies played a prominent role to pursue crucial aspects of royal policy.
Louis XIII made alliances promising subsidies to support the United Provinces’
resumed war against the king of Spain, and for the Danish, Swedish, and various
German princes to fight against the Holy Roman Emperor. Louis XIV continued some
of these subsidies and used subsidies as a tool in order to implement his own
politics. When Louis XIV appeared to Dutch and some English statesmen as
aspiring to Universal monarchy, the Dutch and particularly the English used the
tool of subsidies to frustrate the French monarch. During the eighteenth
century, principally the French and the British, but also the Austrians, used
subsidies to procure allies and attempt to maintain the balance of power. The
subsidy system prompted significant debates about the legal, political, and
moral implications, and was sometimes a source of political conflict between
competing power groupings within states. The book argues that participation in
the French system of subsidies neither necessarily accelerated nor necessarily
retarded state development; but such participation could undoubtedly change
political dynamics, the creation of institutions, and the form of states that
lords Ordainer went one step further in 1311 by seeking to deny altogether the king’s ability to make war or to leave the country without the consent of the baronage in Parliament. Equally, the king’s acknowledged right to purvey goods for the sustenance of his household was extended, under the pressure of warfinancing, into a quasi-national levy for victualling the royal armies. As a consequence, purveyance became another familiar target for the king’s opponents. The Petition of the Barons complained that purveyors were taking two or three times as much as the needs
of representative institution
to mediate their demands for taxes, human resources, and materials.
These forms of extraction can be labelled ‘fiscal’ and encompassed
a wide variety of direct and indirect taxes paid in cash and kind,
as well as forms of compulsory service extending from varieties of
feudal levy through types of militia to different forms of conscription.
Debt and forced loans were additional forms and played a substantial
part in all warfinance. These aspects have been widely studied as
a dimension of the emergence of sovereign states, but this
Intermediating the French subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years’
in the Netherlands 1570–1680 (London and New York: Routledge, 2014),
30 Peter Wilson, ‘WarFinance, Policy and Strategy in the Thirty Years’ War’, in
Dynamik durch Gewalt? Der Dreißigjährige Krieg (1618–1648) als Faktor
der Wandlungsprozesse des 17. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider
and Anuschka Tischer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), pp. 229–250; Peter
W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw: Een studie over het ondernemerschap
op de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen: Van Gorchum, 1965), pp. 205–208;
’t Hart, The Dutch Wars of Independence, p. 184.
Geographical networks of auxiliary medical care in the First World War
War Record of the St. John Ambulance
Brigade and the British Red Cross Society in Leinster,
Munster and Connaught, 1914–1918 (Dublin, 1919);
Reports by the Joint War Committee and the Joint WarFinance Committee of the British Red Cross Society and the
‘Poor’ Europe’s pathways to empire and globalisation
Esteban, ‘The British Balance of Payments, 1772–1820: India Transfers and WarFinance’, The Economic History Review , 54 (2001) , 60, 66.
17 Devine, Scotland’s Empire , pp. 326–8; Devine, ‘Did Slavery Make Scotia Great?’, pp. 232–4.
18 T. M. Devine, The Transformation of Rural Society: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy, 1660–1815 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994) , pp. 60–5.
19 Draper, ‘Scotland and Colonial Slave Ownership’, pp. 179–82; Devine, ‘Did Slavery Make Scotia Great?’, pp. 229–38.
20 Devine, Scotland’s Empire , pp. 330
Enthoven left no written record of her war work, so one can
only speculate about her duties based on accounts from other Red Cross
workers and from official documents.
In 1921 the government published the 823-page Notes from Reports
by the Joint War Committee and the Joint WarFinance Committee of
the British Red Cross and the Order of St John of Jerusalem in England on
Voluntary Aid rendered to the Sick and Wounded at Home and Abroad
and to British Prisoners of War 1914–19, which set out the development
and eventual standardisation of services provided by the Red Cross
the French for similar exchange transactions represented a profit
for the Hoeuffts and their associates.
Banks and bills of exchange
Historians of banking and finance have called attention to the manner
in which warfinance fostered institutional developments in the first
half of the seventeenth century such as the chartered companies
and exchange banks, for instance the Amsterdam Wisselbank.54
Merchants, including those who partially engaged in warfinance,
combined the use of these innovatory institutions with older forms
of finance, such as the
their own boundaries was often constrained by
the liquidity of the assets they could offer – which often required
significant investments of capital and expertise.
The payment and receipt of subsidies could have consequences
that went far beyond the military and fiscal effects commonly referred
to, affecting public opinion, political and economic relations, and
social mobility.40 Yet in older histories of diplomatic relations or
warfinance, the subsidies’ part in state formation is usually discussed
as a peripheral phenomenon in the context of a wider examination
German reception of French subsidies in the Thirty Years’ War
contributions provided a principal method of warfinancing
in this era, they could be insufficient to allow effective offensive
military action, or could fail entirely through over-extraction or
popular resistance. This was true even for the emperor or imperial
leagues that could pool the resources of multiple territories and
princes – for individual princes the problem was far greater. Those
intent on taking part in the conflict, therefore, were forced to depend
on the financial resources of their officers or to seek external sources
of funding from other European powers