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Ben Cohen and Eve Garrard

over the war in Iraq. I could just about have ‘got inside’ the view – it wasn’t my view – that the war to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime should not be supported. Neither Washington nor Baghdad – maybe. But opposition to the war – the marching, the petition-signing, the oh-so-knowing derision of George Bush and so forth – meant one thing very clearly. Had this campaign succeeded in its goal and actually prevented the war it was opposed to, the life of the Baathist regime would have been prolonged, with all that that entailed: years more (how many years more?) of

in The Norman Geras Reader
John Dumbrell

Ricks, Fiasco , 32. 55 Michael Clarke, “The Diplomacy that led to the War in Iraq,” in Paul Cornish, ed., The conflict in Iraq, 2003 , Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004, 274– 87, 283. 56 Ricks, Fiasco , 36

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Rodney Tiffen

and the Case for War in Iraq, 2002– 2003,” Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol.61, No.1, Feb. 2007, pp. 23–40. 15 Wilkie, Axis of Deceit , p. 128, 16 Howard TV address, March 20, 2003

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Paul R. Pillar

The most serious problem with US intelligence is that its relationship with the policymaking process is broken and badly needs repair. Public discussion of prewar intelligence on Iraq has focused on the errors made in assessing Saddam Hussein's unconventional weapons programs. The intelligence community limits its judgments to what is happening or what might happen overseas, avoiding policy judgments about what the United States should do in response. The George H. W. Bush administration deviated from the professional standard not only in using policy to drive intelligence, but also in aggressively using intelligence to win public support for its decision to go to war. In its report on prewar intelligence concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said it found no evidence that analysts had altered or shaped their judgments in response to political pressure.

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Wider Europe, weaker Europe?

The first European Union's (EU) enlargement of the twenty-first century coincides with a period of international tension and transition. Tensions have been apparent over: the war in Iraq, the 'War on Terror', immigration, organised crime, ethnic confrontation, human rights, energy resources and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The EU has made genuine progress in developing its security policies since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). This book examines the impact that enlargement will have on leadership within the EU, a pre-requisite for policy coherence. It focuses on what has been Europe's most significant region in terms of security challenges and international responses since the end of the Cold War: the Balkan. The book provides an overview of the foreign policy priorities and interests of the new member states (NMS), highlighting areas of match and mismatch with those of the EU fifteen. Counter-terrorism has emerged from the shadows of the EU's Third Pillar, and has been propelled to the forefront of the EU's internal agenda, driven by the demands of the 'War on Terror'. The book discusses the core elements of the EU's emerging common external border management, with a focus on the creation of the EU's new External Borders Agency and the Schengen Borders Code. While the first two are declarative partnership and declarative negativism, the last two reflect the struggle between pragmatism and Soviet-style suspicion of Western bureaucrats.

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Policymaking and intelligence on Iraq
James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian

compared) was to that of the twentieth. 1 Alongside the consequences of the war, the highly controversial decision to go to war in Iraq will be studied and debated well into the future. This book is designed to help frame, facilitate, and inform these debates. The decision to go to war in Iraq offers an excellent case study through which we can analyze the nature of national security decision-making, the foreign policy roles of

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Christopher K. Colley and Sumit Gunguly

office. While domestic factors and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan kept India on the back burner in the first six months of his administration, by the end of 2009, relations with New Delhi were back on track. In terms of diplomacy, it is difficult to compare the Obama era with the previous Bush administration. Obama was constrained by the enormity of the financial crisis as well as the two wars he inherited from Bush. As ties between the two states started to mature, the economic links between the two increased, but not without challenges. Indo-US economic relations

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
James P. Pfiffner

In his decision to go to war in Iraq, President Bush did not follow the same path that he did during his decision to attack the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Immediately after 9/11 he met with his major national security policy team, deliberated with them about what to do, and made clear decisions about how to proceed in Afghanistan. In contrast, the decision to go to war in

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
From Afghanistan to Iraq
Kerry Longhurst

the US, rule on how much longer the weapons’ inspectors should remain in Iraq. Denouncing the US’s ‘military adventurism’, Schröder also maintained that a US-led war in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would detract from the war against terrorism and endanger the West’s relations with the Islamic world. It was in this context that the notion of a Deutsches Weg, ‘a German way’, was articulated by the chancellor in describing a specifically German approach to international affairs, and also to demonstrate to the US that it would be Berlin’s objectives and priorities that

in Germany and the use of force
Charlotte Wagnsson

Dipomaticheskii Vestnik 5 (2003); Ivanov, I., ‘Interview with Kommersant’, 5 March 2003. 57 Schröder, G., ‘Address to the nation on the situation in Iraq’, 18 March 2003, ‘Address on the beginning of the war in Iraq’, 20 March 2003; Fischer, J., ‘Address to the German Bundestag’, 13 February 2003

in Security in a greater Europe