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This book investigates the ways in which the crusades have been observed by historians from the 1090s to the present day. Especial emphasis is placed on the academic after-life of the crusades from the sixteenth to twenty-first centuries. The use of the crusade and its history, by humanists and other contemporary writers, occupied a world of polemic, serving parochial religious, cultural and political functions. Since the Renaissance humanists and Reformation controversialists, one attraction of the crusades had lain in their scope: recruited from all western nations, motivated by apparently transcendent belief systems and fought across three continents. From the perspective of western Europe's engagement with the rest of the globe from the sixteenth century, the crusades provided the only post-classical example to hand of an ideological and military world war. Remarkably, the patterns of analysis of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century have scarcely gone away: empathy; disapproval; relevance; the role of religion; materialist reductionism. Despite the explosion of literary attention, behind the empathetic romanticism of Michaud or the criticism of Mills and Scott, the themes identified by Thomas Fuller, Claude Fleury, David Hume, Edward Gibbon and William Robertson persisted. The idea of the crusades as explicit precursors to modern events, either as features of teleological historical progress or as parallels to modern actions remains potent. The combination of ideology, action, change, European conquest and religious fanaticism acted as a contrast or a comparison with the tone of revolutionary and reactionary politics.
slightly different way from Anna Hartnell’s critique of moral superiority within postcolonial studies (2010: 452). For us, postcolonial innocence involves a disavowal of responsibility for the legacies of colonisation and how these shape global inequalities and present-day global conflicts. The disavowal of this responsibility leads Western nations to perceive their role within global conflicts as essentially benign (for example as global peacekeepers and builders of democracy within civilising missions), without considering their role in creating the conditions which
debauchery, would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The State did not seek, as in the past, to punish what was considered a vice in the eyes of the moral law or a sin in the eyes of the religious law. It refrained from intervening in those spheres unless such acts were considered to harm to social order. This clear separation between criminal law and religion made France at once an example and an exception among Western nations. Thus, in the same period, and for a long time to come, in Germany or England sodomy, bestiality and incest continued to
themselves to the absence of a proletarian numerical majority in each Western nation. This required social democrats to seek multiclass alliances and abandon radical class-based politics. Furthermore, such alliances ruptured the proletariat–party link. Recruiting middle-class allies diluted the class identity of social democracy’s working-class constituency: working-class support was lost and the predisposition to ideological moderation was further reinforced. ITLP_C01.QXD 18/8/03 12 9:54 am Page 12 Labour’s ideological trajectory In the literature specifically
that Westerlund recommended to combat suicides. 58 As Finland was still suffering from such societal problems as famine, it becomes understandable why a Finnish suicide researcher asked for more modernity rather than denouncing modernity and progress as the sources of suicide. The situation was almost an exact opposite of other Western nations, where the faster pace of modernisation and the moral debates surrounding various aspects of modern life had directed the attention of suicide researchers to see modernity as
the privilege of being the first Western nation in the last two decades to have the determination and fortitude to say ‘So Far and No Further.’” 7 With the rest of the world seemingly moving in one direction on racial matters, toward greater civic and political inclusion of non-whites in the West and toward colonial self-determination in the former European empires, southern African politics were moving in the exact opposite direction. Whites in southern Africa were busy consolidating their power and implementing policies explicitly intended to exclude non
look at the evolution of the Ukraine after independence in 1991, but it is also vital to examine the role and power of the Crimean Republic within that nation. Second, it is necessary to elucidate the main features of the double-barreled crisis that afflicted Ukraine throughout 2014. Third, Russia played a central role throughout the crisis, and it is necessary to understand and also to evaluate its policies. The fourth necessity is to outline and assess how the United States and other Western nations reacted to the perceived provocations in the East. While the
overseas aid budgets of major Western nations. Equally important […], a ‘humanitarian vacuum’ is created in complex zones of conflict such as Syria today, where bona fide Islamic charities are almost absent for political reasons and the field is left open for extremist groups to bring succour to victims. The experience of the Swiss project recorded here should help any future
This interlude is based on interviews with migrants in the UK and Italy. We asked them how they felt about the media coverage of the countries they have left, both by international news media and by the local media in their countries. In their responses, participants demonstrate their awareness of the global political economy of media, and how Western media dominance leads to an under/mis-representation of regions outside the West, as well as racialised communities within Western nations.
The conclusion outlines how the medical and social developments driven by the war had important long-term consequences for various segments of German society: orthopaedists, university medical departments, disabled veterans, and disabled soldiers. It demonstrates how the specialization of orthopaedics in Germany differed in important ways from its specialization in other Western nations and points out how and why this was fundamentally tied to their war-time service. The conclusion also examines the consequences of war-time developments in orthopaedics for disabled civilians in Germany after the war. Finally, the conclusion makes broader historiographical points for historians of war and historians of medicine, and demonstrates how important developments in medicine, medical science, and medical technology were for the “management of modern warfare” in the German Empire from 1914 through 1918.