This book explores the transformation of the Japanese state in response to a variety of challenges by focusing on two case studies: Information and Communications Technology (ICT) regulation and anti-monopoly regulation after the 1980s, which experienced a disjuncture and significant transformation during the period, with particularistic approaches embracing competition. The case studies set up the state as the key locus of power, in contrast to pluralist and rational choice schools, which regard the state as insignificant. The analytical framework is drawn from key theories of governance and the state including the concepts of the core executive and the regulatory state. The book explores the extent to which there is asymmetric dominance on the part of Japan’s core executive through an examination of recent developments in the Japanese regulatory tradition since the 1980s. It concludes that the transformation of the Japanese state in the two case studies can be characterised as Japanese regulatory state development, with a view that the state at a macro level is the key locus of power. This book explores the transformation of the state and governance in a Japanese context and presents itself as an example of the new governance school addressing the state, its transformation, and the governance of the political arena in Japanese politics and beyond, setting out a challenge to the established body of pluralist and rational choice literature on Japanese politics.
Transformation and the regulatory state
6 Breaking the egg shell The JFTC’s independence is an unusual feature within Japan’s political tradition. As demonstrated by the 1977 AMA amendment, the commission’s independence emerged as a notable element that characterised policy-making in anti-monopoly regulation (Beeman 2002). Elsewhere, the prioritisation of the sector after the 1990s gradually changed the conditions surrounding and shaping anti-monopoly regulation. This change had the potential to reframe the JFTC and the sector, including the commission’s independence and state capacity within the
5 Piecemeal transformation: anti-monopoly regulation Anti-monopoly regulation, which is sometimes referred to as ‘antitrust’ regulation, initially emerged in the US but grew internationally after 1945. This process provoked a contention between indigenous states’ traditions and the American approach; the spread occurred ‘within a contested cross-cultural public discourse that recognized Americanization as an active element primarily in relation to indigenous factors already constituting capitalist systems’ (Freyer 2006: 1). The development of anti-monopoly
had an asymmetric dominant position in relation to societal actors, drawing on fluid changes of power within the core executive. The evolution of Japan’s regulatory framework in ICT regulation and anti-monopoly regulation exemplifies state transformation dominated by a loose network of the core executive. The next two sections analyse specific examples that demonstrate the dominance of the core executive in the case studies: the 137 138 The nature of Japanese governance sequence of shaping regulators and the capacity of the Japanese regulatory state. While the
The implications of the research
specialising in communications policy, including LDP Yūsei-zoku. The role and power of MIC officials have not been explicitly reported by observers; what appears is their smooth reaction to Abe’s abrupt request and skilful approach to the issue. Turning to anti-monopoly regulation, the Abe administration retained the post of the Cabinet minister responsible for the JFTC created by the DPJ government. The observable impact of this post is not significant and no explicit assignment regarding the JFTC appears on the official government website as of September 2016 (Kantei 2016a
intelligence services. Instead, the UK Department of Health is heavily involved in policy-making together with the Treasury. Elsewhere, Smith’s (1999) definition allows more flexibility to include relevant actors by embracing departments in the core executive. To respond to the case-specific characteristic of the core executive, one must recognise its polymorphous nature. Some important actors in one field (e.g. intelligence services in counter-terrorism) have few roles in other fields (e.g. the NHS, domestic anti-monopoly regulation). An example can be found in Kamikubo
between, say, Coventry and Wimbledon (two other Premiership clubs) is not a close substitute. There are two outlets for this market for watching Manchester United – either attending the ground or else watching games live on television. The sales via these two outlets are organised and priced by separate companies, namely Manchester United and BSkyB respectively. Had the attempted acquisition been successful it would have created a monopoly provider for the two outlets. This would have resulted in at least two anti-competitive threats. Firstly, the monopoly provider
Constructing imperial identity through Liverpool petition struggles
merchants who jealously guarded their exclusive monopoly over trade with India and China. Each time the Company’s charter was up for renewal (1793, 1813, 1833), Liverpool’s 191 JOSHUA CIVIN anti-monopoly committee became the central co-ordinating body for a provincial assault on the metropolis.16 Despite Liverpool’s leadership of provincial anti-monopoly campaigns, enthusiasm for the cause within the town was hindered by rivalries that heated up after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. Various commercial interests struggled to persuade fellow citizens that their
The Co-op, the Labour Party and Resale Price Maintenance, 1918–1964
the consumer interest as it encouraged monopoly and enabled private profiteering. It was conveniently concluded that it ‘would look ludicrous’ to alter RPM policy two months after the JPC’s submission of evidence. This internal debate revealed divergent interpretations of the Co-op’s anti-monopoly strategy. In effect, many local retail societies now perceived unregulated price competition rather than individual RPM as the principal monopolist threat. Their support for the fixing of prices through a combination of RPM and state regulation should, therefore, be
Irish republican media activism since the Good Friday Agreement
Newspapers, magazines and pamphlets have always been central, almost sacred, forms of communication within Irish republican political culture. While social media is becoming the primary ideological battleground in many democracies, Irish republicanism steadfastly expresses itself in the traditional forms of activist journalism.
Shinners, Dissos and Dissenters is a long-term analysis of the development of Irish republican activist media since 1998 and the tumultuous years following the end of the Troubles. It is the first in-depth analysis of the newspapers, magazines and online spaces in which the differing strands of Irish republicanism developed and were articulated during a period where schism and dissent defined a return to violence.
Based on an analysis of Irish republican media outlets as well as interviews with the key activists that produced them, this book provides a compelling long-term snapshot of a political ideology in transition. It reveals how Irish Republicanism was moulded by the twin forces of the Northern Ireland Peace Process and the violent internal ideological schism that threatened a return to the ‘bad old days’ of the Troubles.
This book is vital for those studying Irish politics and those interestedin activism as it provides new insights into the role that modern activist media forms have played in the ideological development of a 200-year-old political tradition.