Society’: marketisation is followed by
popular attempts to secure greater social protection ( Polanyi, 1957 ).
Contrary to cosmopolitan hopes and expectations, globalisation itself has wrenched forth the
forces of nationalism.
Anand , S. and
P. ( 2014 ),
‘ The Global Distribution of Income ’, in
A. and Bourguignon ,
F. (eds), Handbook of Income
Distribution , Volume 2A ( Amsterdam :
North-Holland ), pp.
937 – 79
welfare workers (Goffman 1983: 14–15). Today, the issue
still carries great importance; especially when recognising that different
concepts and norms bring different identifications of the individual and the
relationship into play. This chapter consequently focuses on market values
and takes a closer look at how service and other ideals affect the encounter
between citizens and welfare workers.
The chapter begins by introducing the market context and its inherent
principles, followed by a discussion of how the marketisation of public
administration lays the groundwork
is introduced, namely, the
discussions of new professionalism (Duyvendak et al. 2006; Evetts 2011;
Speed and Gabe 2013), re-professionalisation (Duyvendak et al. 2006) and
de-professionalisation and how these characteristics may be regarded as
inextricable consequences of the strong current influence of marketisation and managerialism on welfare work (Rogowski 2010). With particular reference to social work, Rogowski (2010: 111; see also Duyvendak
et al. 2006) argues that the current emphasis on users as experts and user
empowerment can be regarded as an attack on
Consequently, the most notable feature of the Conservatives’ pursuit of public
sector reform from 2010 was the renewed commitment to ‘marketisation’, either in
the guise of further embedding the principles and practices of the private sector into
such services as education and health, or by encouraging and enabling ‘independent’ (invariably private) providers to become directly involved in service provision
and delivery. Initially at least, many senior Liberal Democrats were content to
accede to such reforms, reflecting the strong influence of the
concomitant development of social capital. The empowerment agenda,
Local democracy, civic engagement and community
notwithstanding its limitations and contradictions (see Chapter 3), was
framed in terms that sought to develop such potential. I will now analyse the
extent to which such potential was realised by focusing on three important
policy areas: crime and community safety; privatisation, marketisation and
the choice agenda; and finally the emerging concept of the ‘big society’ and
Crime and community safety
Involvement by local people in
Contestation, care and the ‘temper of the country’
’ responsibilities, for which it is the
‘chosenness’ of a relationship that generates obligations) but more emphatically
still in the rhetoric of marketisation. Here, choice takes on an iconic, a priori
status, and stands for much more than the making of meaningful decisions.
Marquand depicts it as ‘a reified “Choice” with a capital “C”, which has little
to do with the mundane choices of real-world parents, or patients or students’
(Marquand, 2013: 122). It is both an emblem of, and a vehicle for, the extension
of the market society, and fundamental to ‘a public doctrine that
A blessing or a curse for the employment of female university graduates?
Fang Lee Cooke
Union (see Grimshaw and
Rubery, 2015; Rubery, 2013). By contrast, while a significant level of gender
equality in employment in China has been achieved during the state-planned
economy period, measured by the extent of women’s participation in full-time
employment and the relatively small gender pay gap (Gustafsson and Li, 2000;
Nie et al., 2002), gender discrimination has increased substantially as a result of
the deepening marketisation of the economy since the 1980s in China (Cooke,
2012). In particular, labour market discrimination against women of childbearing
The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the book, articulating along the way how a heterotopia of development may be further explored. This includes further discussion of the future impact of the spectacle with reference to the marketisation of development, including how multi-national corporations can generate income from extreme poverty and the role NGOs play in unlocking this market. This leads to a discussion of the spectacle’s relation to current ‘post-truth’ debates in wider society, how it generates spaces of ignorance, and the black-boxing of development work.
Nationalism has reasserted itself today as the political force of our times, remaking European politics wherever one looks. Britain is no exception, and in the midst of Brexit, it has even become a vanguard of nationalism's confident return to the mainstream. Brexit, in the course of generating a historically unique standard of sociopolitical uncertainty and constitutional intrigue, tore apart the two-party compact that had defined the parameters of political contestation for much of twentieth-century Britain. This book offers a wide-ranging picture of the different theoretical accounts relevant to addressing nationalism. It briefly repudiates the increasingly common attempts to read contemporary politics through the lens of populism. The book explores the assertion of 'muscular liberalism' and civic nationalism. It examines more traditional, conservative appeals to racialised notions of blood, territory, purity and tradition as a means of reclaiming the nation. The book also examines how neoliberalism, through its recourse to discourses of meritocracy, entrepreneurial self and individual will, alongside its exaltation of a 'points-system' approach to the ills of immigration, engineers its own unique rendition of the nationalist crisis. There are a number of important themes through which the process of liberal nationalism can be documented - what Arun Kundnani captured, simply and concisely, as the entrenchment of 'values racism'. These include the 'faux-feminist' demonisation of Muslims.
The well-being of Europe’s citizens depends less on individual consumption and more on their social consumption of essential goods and services – from water and retail banking to schools and care homes – in what we call the foundational economy. Individual consumption depends on market income, while foundational consumption depends on social infrastructure and delivery systems of networks and branches, which are neither created nor renewed automatically, even as incomes increase. This historically created foundational economy has been wrecked in the last generation by privatisation, outsourcing, franchising and the widespread penetration of opportunistic and predatory business models. The distinctive, primary role of public policy should therefore be to secure the supply of basic services for all citizens (not a quantum of economic growth and jobs). Reconstructing the foundational has to start with a vision of citizenship that identifies foundational entitlements as the conditions for dignified human development, and likewise has to depend on treating the business enterprises central to the foundational economy as juridical persons with claims to entitlements but also with responsibilities and duties. If the aim is citizen well-being and flourishing for the many not the few, then European politics at regional, national and EU level needs to be refocused on foundational consumption and securing universal minimum access and quality. If/when government is unresponsive, the impetus for change has to come from engaging citizens locally and regionally in actions which break with the top down politics of ‘vote for us and we will do this for you’.